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PART I. THE SETTI?K AND TflE PROBIBSf 
CHAPTER I. 
ITTTRODUCTION* TCWABD A CONCEPT OF GENERAL TCELFAEB 
Gexwral vwlfare is a problem in perspective. XzidiTiduala az3d groups 
see 'tiie whole in terms of their ovm belie;^ and -valuations,^ 
Noidiere is this more clearly evident than in the case of trade. The 
virtue that has always been assigned to the consumption of hons-produced 
goods, in patronising the local store, in safeguarding the home market, 
has long constituted the most important barxler to an understanding of the 
2 
c^ymmios of the eoonooic processes. 
This is a qualify which aip^pears to be rooted in the character of inr> 
telligence itself, in the way men think* Gunnar %rdal, Swedish eoon-
omist and social scientist, has written with discernment regarding men's 
attitudes or opinions (An American Dilemma* Kbw York, Harper. 1944* 
Appendix 1« A Methodological Note on Valuations and Beliefs* p. 1027}• 
"People have ideas about how reali-ty actually is, or was, and 
they have ideas about how it ought to be or ought to have been* 
The former we call *'beliefB'» The latter we call * valuations' * 
A ]^r8on*s beliefs, that is, his knowledge, can be objectively 
judged to be true or false and more or less oon^lete* His val­
uations - that a social situation or relation is, or was, 'just', 
•right*, 'fair', 'desirable', or the Opposite in some degree of 
intensity or other « cannot be judged by such objective standards 
as soienoe provides. In their 'opinions* people express both 
their beliefs and their valuations. UsuaUy people do not dis-
tisguish between idiat they think tiiay know and vdiat they like or 
dislike.** 
Gf. Gayer, Arthur D* and Carl T, Schmidt, ftmericati Beonomic Foreign 
Policy* Ifew York, American Coordinating Committee for International 
Study* 1939* 
*'The emoticml basis of the tariff has been that attitude which makes 
it a duty to support your neighborhood store; to shop in your own 
townx to ship through your oma state portj and to help coerce by 
law, the traitors who are not bound by any sense of such moral 
obligation." p* 6* 
3. 
PUndamontftlly, this is the basis of the conflict between economics 
and politics •which oonstitutes the central problem of world peace and 
security#^ The deairo to control, each his own securl-ty, and to unite 
with others to that end, is the barrier rAiidti separates modern man from 
attaining a degree of prosperity and economic well-being such as the 
ancients never dreamed could exist. It is the basis of conflicting nation­
al interests at the world level. It is the source of conflict between 
economic and political pressure groups at the national level* 
The political problem is primarily one of organization, the channeling 
of forces -ttirough a system of rules and procedures for the peaceful settle­
ment of conflicts in such a way that men can agree to lire together with a 
''reasonable amount of happiness". The piroblem of economies is one of secur­
ing the release from the constraints vdiich men impose upon the "propensity 
to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another," as seen by AHam Smith, 
and "the instinct of worlananship" which Thorstein Veblen talked about* 
The periods of greatest advance in general economic welfare, have been 
those in which the miniimaa effort has been given over to a struggle for 
power* Mienewr Idiat issue has been settled, by compromise or the defeat 
of one or another of contending forces, men have gone back to the business 
of making a living, to the mutual advantage of all* 
It is characteristic of the power stiniggle -aiat its final resolution 
has only been possible at a higher and higher level* The political phil-
^Condliffe, J*B* The Heconstructlon of World Trade* New York, Norton* 
1940* "There is a fundamental conflict in the modem world between 
political and economic forces or principles*" p* 15* 
osophy of Plato and Aristotle^ their systems of juetioe and etbioa* oon^ 
tained the requisites of problem solving for the oity state* but their 
influenoe on the tiiought of suooeeding genexi^tions vas smll, beoause the 
sun of the oity state ^ s already setting*^ The de-wlopment of solenoe 
and technology has brought the peoples of the vorld trrsr closer together 
until the need of organisation at the present tim transcends ths bounds 
of even the greatest super-power* On the iMorking out of this problem of 
oirganisation, the future of eoonomio progress depends. 
laterdependenoe of Sconomios and PoUtlos 
Boonomios and politics osn be separate only in the mixMis of the 
analyst* Ua^iavelli* lAvo admitted lack of talexit in reasoning about 
"the art of silk or about the art of wool, either about profits or about 
losses,** eleoted to reason about the state - the distilled essence of 
O 
power* In the unique conditions of the nineteenth centuiy, fdien for a 
time "economics escaped tiie bonds of the old "State Hcuseloeeping" (idiidh 
is the meaning of political eoononyy in the strict aiid v^nsologlcal sense 
of the term) and became the indiTidualist housekeeping of laisses falre***' 
the separate study of man "in the cverydi^ business of making a living**, 
enjoyed a oalibate existence under that rather minjmal goverzoMSt idiich 
^sbine, George A History of Political Theory« Tlsw York, Henry Holt* 
1957* pp. 12S-6* 
^Cf* Hirsohman, A*0*, National Power and the Structuare of Foreign Trade* 
Berkeley, Unl-wrsii^ of California Press. 1945* p* ZK* 
barker, Ernest, Reflections on Goyemment. Oxford Unlversi'ty Press* 
1942. p. 139. 
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hmd beoome posaible. 
Probl«at of polioy, whan th« •l«n«ntt tun pur», are more easily 
mtolved* For MaohiaTelli** "Prinoe"* a deoision on how much trade or 
how mooh agrioulture to haT» niaa a tiaqpl* question of how best to eahanoe 
"tiie pomr of his state and l^ersby reduce the poirer of his adwrsariss* 
In a world of mutually sustaining and niatually restraining atom beings# 
"lightning oalculators" all of plsasures and pain* eaoh oould deoide his 
om best interest# and the integral or sum of all such decisions would 
equal the maximuB total benefit, while that super "oop" the state walked 
its beat in the quiet market place* iiaohiavelli lived in a period of 
great political instability and uncertainlyi it is understandable that 
the problems uppermost in men*s minds should have been pure power* J<dm 
Stuart Mill li-ved most of his lifts during an era of comparatively stable 
political relations# -wh«n the struggle for power was restrained by & 
judicious use of the balance of power and a Pax Britaimioa based upon the 
British navy* plus the existence of broad opportunities for expansion into 
the sparsely occupied or culturally backward parts of the earth. This 
was an environment in which a relatively free market oould allocate re­
sources# register the votes of consumers, and reward resource owners with 
a minlwaa interference by the state* 
But that minimal state# evwa during the latter part of ilill's life# 
was already giving way to intervention# not so much the exercise of pure# 
unrestrained power as the Injection of the power and authority of the state 
itfiere a suffioient show of political strength in the electorate could 
s* 
oomsand i't* '£he '^subjects" thezoselvBS bad gaiaed in education and dem» 
ooratio experience; they had become a bit more "sovereign" in 
Mftohiavelli*s day* 
The comparative stability of the hundred years between the Peaoe of 
Vienna and "Sarajevo", call it "Pax Britannloa" or release from social ten­
sions by eit5)ty frontiers, has beKi shattered, Hope for a return to "normal-
so ervident in policies (or lack of policies) eagerly adopted^ at the 
olose of World War 1, has reoeded into the badcground, and pressure groups 
at -Qie national and international le>rols hare organised to impose their 
ovn particular vievs of "paril^" or normal on the rest of the world or 
sooiety« 
Politically and eoonomioally the world is off balance* The maz^cet, sup­
ported and restrained, has ceased to be regarded as the principal agency for 
resouroe allocation* Trade has booome an inatruiEant of the foreign offioe, 
useful for rewarding friends or punishing enemies* If one looks to histozy 
for precedent, tiie 17th and IStfa oenturies are more likely to be useftil 
than the 19t^* 
Eaoh has his own "devil" theory of history in assigning causes for the 
present inbalanoe and confusion* Goveminent is accused of interfering with 
business, business is accused of dominating government, classes and pressure 
groups oppose obb another the particular penonal devil depends upon the 
warning note s ounded by John Saynard Keynes (The Economic Consequences 
of the Peace* London, MaaBiillan* 1919) following the tx«a:^ of Versailles, 
and idiich mar^ the beginnl^ of some of his later tiiought, was an excep­
tion to the jgeneral climate of opinion* "The pow^r to become habituated 
to his surroundings is a mrksd oharaeteristio of mankind. Very few of 
us realise with cohviotidn, the intensely unusual, unstable, complicated, 
unreliable, temporaxy nature of the economic organisation by which Western 
Europe has lived for tiie last half century." p* 1* 
frame of referenoe and the angle of view. Certainly an impersonal "devil" 
desexnres more notioe than it ordirarily reoeiTee - the semi-exogenous in­
fluence of technology (inan'e control over the physical vrorld) which has 
reduced distances and brought men closer together« redistributed the prin-
oipal centers of wealth and power, and imposed the need for xnavt organizations 
to adjust differences and impose settlements. 
In a period of rapid technologiml change« adjustments have tended to 
folloiff vdth a lag} a consequent oumilation of pressures and resistances 
has. resulted in sudden changes and departures from ndiat had existed before* 
Since it is given to men to see the past imperfectly* the future not at 
all, expectations for the future rest heavily upon the past (or titi&t the 
past is believed to have been) weighted inversely by its remoteness in time, 
A stable pa8t« helps to make for a comparatively stable future* Sudden 
changes* particularly violent ones, produce over-adjustsients and expect* 
at ions of further change. 
Ihe future is presently weighted with change. Individuals, groups, and 
nations see opportunities for improving upon the past. Other individuals, 
groups and nations see the present in terms of their more favorable circum-> 
stances of other days, and hope for a return to previous arrangements.^ This 
^Some have esq^essed i&e whole problem c£ expectations and change with 
greater rigor, but few with greater insight than Carl L. Becker, the 
historian (How New Will ^ e Better World BE? Hew Yoric, l&opf« 1944)• "At 
all times in history of civilization the conditions of life for the major-
ii^ of men have been harsh or unsatisfactory, and at all tines men have 
thenfore found oon^ensation for the immediate present by dreaming of a 
better world than has existed or inay or might exist at scsse other time 
or place « • • in times of zupid social and economic changes -Uxe conflict 
becomes more serious; it becomes a conflict between those iriiose interests 
8. 
is perhaps xuavAxere better illustrated tliau in the oaae of Rngland and 
Russia - 1;he one a great poirer of former years, noir Trerglng on bankruptcy} 
the other* a newocroer to the ranks of first class povrea^ 
Until sons kind of equilibrium of forces can be restored# until some 
stability of expectation can be created, the separate efforts of the om or 
the few lead not to the resolution of conflicts but to their cuonxlation* 
This is how Hobbes saw the problem long ago, during another gz«at period 
of uncertainty, on the threshold of mihat has come to be called the "modem 
era"! 
And be there never so great a multitude} yet if Hieir actions 
be directed to their particular Judgments, and particular 
appetites, they can expect thereby no defense, nor protection, 
neither against a eomnon exisay, nor agaixist the injuries of 
one another. For, being distracted in opinions concerning the 
best use of their strength they do not help but hinder o» 
another • • • but also idiere there is no common enen^ they make 
wtrre upon each other for their particular interest*^ 
His prescription for an absolutist government is scarcely more likely 
to be acceptable to the najoriiy of men today than it naa then* He saw a 
problem that is pex^nnialf the adjustment is continuous. But at times it 
is more difficult than others* 
The primary problem of policy may be vieved therefore, as the restor­
ation of some kind of economic and political equilibrium* In the present 
(Footnote oontinued) 
are or seem to them to be, best served by accepting the new nays* The 
great need of our time, therefore, is to adjust our habits of thought 
and conduct to these rapid changes, so that ire can live in the world as 
it is with the least smount of strain and frustraticm*** pp» 22<»3» 
^HcA)be8, Thonaa, Leviaihatt# Nisw York, Dutbon* Everyman's JSdition* 1937* 
First published 1651* p« 88« 
9. 
Junotttr« of history, polities and eoonoraios have moved closer together.^ 3ix 
the words of Alvin H, Hansen* 
Inopeasiag use of the tera "^Public Policy" indicates a change in 
the role of government in modem economic life« It is* of course, 
nothing new that a govsnunental policy is more axid more ooming to 
the fore. The tradition of laissea fairc <• nsvsr, in fact, fully 
applied -so dominant in the first half of the nineteenth oentuxy 
ittereasingly gave way to an ever expanding measure of govemmeiatal 
control and intervention.^ 
Eoonomics becomes again, as it was in the beginnixigj political econon^* 
The narrow division of labor in social studies which had proceeded so far 
in the years before the depression, oalls for cooperation, at least in the 
field of policy. There is need for seeing the problem whole—not the 
v^ole problem, for that is cAnriously impossible — but with more attention 
to the oonneoting areas between the two» nhioh rigorous scientific research 
must necessarily neglect* 
The political pi^iblem remains , as in the past, that of organisation, 
frcsn the lowest levels to the highest* And "tiie economic problem still is 
concerned with the best use of resources - the allocation of scarce means 
to alternative ends. But it requires that goverzunent be recognized as a 
productive agent with oontributions to make to the econuoiqy, particularly to 
Hm general welfazv* This is msrely cmother way of saying that people now 
do more things oollectively than they used to« 
^Cf* Lasswsll, fiiarold* World Politics Faces toonomioa. New ^ ork, 
2ioGraw-Hill« 1945 ISspeoially pp« 65-75 • 
Hansen, Alvin H,, Flsoal Polioy and Business Cjycles. Hew York, Norton^ 
194X« p« 66«-
10 
Inoroaeing anarensss of ttiis need is the most significant development 
in eoonomios in recent years* J«M» Clark has stated* 
Wi-tiiin little more than fifteen years, this country has witnessed 
two momentous revolutions x one in economic thiiflcine, and the 
other in the eoonomio functions of government • • • 
This revolution in economic -thinking has centered around -iiie ideas of 
John Maynard Keynee but many others have made significant contributions.^ 
Although Mr. KeyruoB* most controversial woric focused on the role of invests 
ment and savings, monetaiy and fiscal policy, the implications of his theory 
have been more far*reaohiag» !I!he importance of the political factor in 
eoonomio life and the whole role of expeotatiozis as an important detexmln^ 
ant in eoonomio fluctuations, had engaged his attention for many years* 
It is the oentrul part of the essential problem. 
Probably one of the most useful contributions to the thiziking in i^is 
field, to date, has been that of A»P» Lemer,v^ose The Economios of Control 
h^s attempted to bridge the gap betneen laisseg faire and con^lete sooial-
isation nhioh has, of course, long been the extreme solution to the jax*s 
that began to appear in the enterprise system during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century* Ur* Lemer,hiaself a onetime socialist, became dis-
illusionsd wil^ the experiments in sooia]lsation and attempted a reoonoil-
iation of oomplete individualism and oon^lete collectivism* His system, in 
^Clark, J*M, "Financing High-Level Employment," Financing American Pros­
perity t A Symposium of ficonomiste* Sew York, Twentieth Century Fvmd* p. ' 
^These are treated below under Beview of the Literature* 
The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money* Hew York, Harcourt 
Brace* 19S6* 
11 
short, tries to set up limits for go-rommeirt participation or interference 
with economic life* and the Rule he sets up as a test* or model* is the 
equilibrium •Hhioh presumably would obtain under atomic competition if individ­
uals behavod as competitors, if knowledge were perfect, and the indiirisibil-
ities of the technological prooesses -mve not factors limiting competition 
or free entry. Under his assumptions the public bodies -would perform 
functions in the economy, including speculation and counter speculation, 
the use of a functional jElnance to encourage production or control inflation* 
Foreign trade would, under fUll emplt^rment, beoone a simple and natural 
process of exporting to cibtain imports • 
At the practical level, the state has, since the "depression of the 
1930*8, been desperately txyizig to learn hoar to turn itself from a restrain-
» 1 ing into an energizing agenqy". 
The central problem of an econotny that has been almost conpletely 
transformed by a tecdmology tdiich has required that men do an increasing 
proportion of their production and oonsun^ion collecti-irely, is the working 
out, largely through trial and error, an equilibrating process to -vdxich the 
organism can adjust and the human mind can accept* With a being that 
carries his past with him into the future, loho organizes to perpetuate 
-wAiat appears to be his avn bes-t inteTOst with others of like interest, the 
process is inTolved and slow working* 
1 
Clark, op* pit*, p* 71* 
O 
"Groups and societies, like individuals, carry their past with "tJiem into 
the future and grow in historical uniqueness,'* Prank H* Knight, "The 
Limitations of Scientific Kethod in Economics," The Ethics of Cotof 
petition* p.132. 
12. 
There are those, of course, iiho lire entirely orltloftl of any attempt 
to vox^c out tdthin the framswoxk of a mixed eoonony -»i6io lllce their eoon* 
omioB pure and gorrernment at a mloiaua. lo those iriio« lite Von Hises, 
see the demise of freedom and demooraoy in that kind of planning, there is 
no oos^romise with lalsses faire« But nan*8 abilily to detenaine ihe kind 
of ivorld he wants to live in is limited Tsy i^t exists and what ean be 
agreed upon* Again* as Carl Beoiksr obserTeSf from his broad background 
in history t 
The pattern of thought and beltfLvlor, of customs and institutlcmi 
tiiat exist at any tine can be changed by men, but not easily or 
all at oncei and the nay in whidi it can be changed^ aod the 
direction 'ti^leh the change must take, are as much detemiaed by 
•Rdiat has occurred and what exists es they are men's will and 
desire* IXxring tiielast century social and political institations« 
and men*8 ways of thinTring about them, have been changing* at 
times pretty rapidlyi but they have been ohangiqg in a certain 
dlrsotion» This direction, lAie historical trend of our time* 
has been steadily away from unrestrained "private economic 
enterprise** and toward governmental regulation of private economic 
enterprise • • • 
The problem of greatest mon»nt at the present tins consists, there­
fore, of a working out within 12ts framewoxic of existing demooratio methods 
and values, that new balance of individtial freedom and collective or govern* 
nent action which will permit the solution of the problem of security, and 
free man's efforts for the attainment of that degree of economic progress 
through -tdiioh alone the spectre of starvation and want, of disease said 
sordid poverty can be relieved* For despite the popular slogems of the 
much VKunted abundance, poverty still remains the most in^ortant problem of 
', • P* 1S6 
18. 
th« world ({Mirtloularly If attention lo not centered on the comparatively 
favored few of a lauoh favored United Statea) and greater production the 
principal solution. In the tMorda of Colin Clark« idto, after a reoenb 
•tedy of inoome figure* for that group of oountriee poaeeasing reasonably 
reliable •tatiatlea* obaez^st 
Offe repeated phrases about poverty In the midst of plenty^ and 
the problems of produotlon having already been solved if only 
we uadvrstood the probleias of distribution* turn out to be tiie 
aost Uu'touthfttl of all modem oliohes* In the U.S.A* the high* 
•at nsal inooms per head of the workdjug population so far 
attained was in 1929, with 1582 I«17, per head on the basis 
of a 48 hour weelc*^ 
For Italy» tiie avenge income In the same units for the perla^ 1925*34« 
was S4S« and -Oiat oouzxtxy was not the lowest for idiich income data are avail­
able* India and Qxina could xiot evwn be coxisidered* for no reliable income 
figures exist. Obviously* theirs would be much lower than the lonest for 
any western countiy# 
Contrast these figures with tiiose presented by Schumpeter, tAio on the 
basis of the gains in "available output" (available for oonstin^ion) over 
the SO-year period from 1870*19S0« estimates idiat might have been possible 
in liie way of oonsuaption if -Qie rate of progress in this oountxy had con> 
tlnuedi 
• • • if from 19S8 on available px'oductlon uzider the oondltloas 
of the oapitalist order continue to develop as it did before • • • 
Clark* Colin* Ihe Conditions of Eooncwiic Progress* Londcm* Maomillan* 
1940* p« S* the unit of maasurement* the Inteznatlonal Unit* is defined 
as the amount of goods and services T^loh could be pnrchased for one 
dollar in the Tr«S*A« over the average of tiie decade 1925«>S4* 
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it would after fifty years, in 1978 reach an amount of roughly 
2*7 (2»6916) tines the 19E8 figure • • • Aireratge incomo per 
head during those fifty years would therefore increase to a 
little more than double its 1928 amount, which was about |650, 
or about §1300 of 1928 purchasing power*^ 
Sohumpeter concludes that, bad this rate of progress continued, it 
would have done away in this oouzxtry with ai^rthing approaching poTei>1^, 
even for the lowest strata, by present standards. 
This could certainly be taken as an argujnent for a return to the kind 
of eeonomic arrangeiBent, of free enterprise or capitalism as he calls It, 
which characterized the earlier period. But he does not regard such a 
return as possible, essentially for the reasons outlined above* The in­
creasing uzswillingness, on the parts of all groups, begizming with the 
protectionists, to accept the workings of a free maz^et, has ii»re and more 
created the attitude of uncertainty end laok of faith, the lack of a 
feeling of security.forthe future, idiich would permit its functioning* 
The Economic Problem 
The economic problem is the same, whether viewed from 'Uie world level, 
the national level or fron the point of view of the individual - the 
allocation of resources which are scarce, relative to wants, to altem^ 
ativB uses* 
Proposals for an economic policy, therefore, proceed on an assumption 
that "behavior is, or ought to be economical* These were essentially the 
^oihiiz^peter, Jose^^ A*, Capitalism*Socialism and Democracy* New York« 
£^per» 1942* p* 65* 
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assumptions regarding the '^economic man" of olassical literature. V?hen 
eixds or wants -were given^ and oould be raioked according to their in^orteoxoej 
then existing means oould be applied and satisfaotion oould proceed as far 
as the resources tgould go* Since effort was required* because of a niggard­
ly na-bare, total satisfaction would be at a JMOcIteiuin where the disutility 
of additioaml (marginal) effort was just offset by the additional (margin­
al) satisfaotion or utility* Ihe ooiqpetltion among men would prevent enay 
one man from gaining control orrer the other, or of the conditions wi-tiiin 
•iidiioh economic activity was carried on. In the words of Walton Ifemilton, 
"As written doirn^ competition is a theory of the conuoon good • • • The 
system of free enterprise was mde to operate in a climate of social 
«1 
morali-ty»" 
The continued success of competition as a regulator of economic actiTity, 
Inquired that it be accepted* that the institutions and habits of men be 
shaped to that end* In the circumstances of ths nineteenth century, it 
appeared for a time that this was being acccmiplished » that through inter-
oational trade and the gradual acceptance of commercial procedure (the code 
of behavior of the Biritish trader) the system was destined to spread to 
the entire globe« 
C<^etition was fitted just as neatly into the legal establish* 
ment • • • Nov master and sex^rant had to oome to terms i their 
agreement was essential to unite property azid labor in a produc­
tive enterprise • • • It was, therefore, no difficult matter to 
eqiaip competition with legal foundations. !Iliey consist of two 
^Btoilton, Walton H,, The Pattern of Competition* H&w Yoric, Columbia 
Universi% Press* 1940* p. 13* 
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pairs of ioBtitutloBB so daflaitoly aatablishad that thay oan 
be taken for granted* Zhey are private property and liberty 
of oontraot» the pursuit of gain and freedom of trade.^ 
In the long run» given a oontinuation of oirounitanoes nhioh vnuld 
have permitted the elimination of the oarryovtr from the pa8t» of the 
remnants of feudalism and speolal privilege^ and had rate of man's oontrol 
over his physloal universe not prooeeded at so Cast a paoe« these might 
have indeed beoGroe the fixed habits and institutioms of the vihole norld* 
Even granting that oompetition iras an idealised^ and not a K«al« picture 
of ooDBieroial practloex it approximated the faots olosely enough that« 
barring n^id ohange. tiiey might have beoooe real* 
Aooording to the assumptions underlying oompetition* world trade would 
have proceeded along -Uiese lixiss* Barring interferenoe governments or 
other groups^ speoialisation and division of labor should have determinsd 
production according to completive advantage and ocoiparative costs, 
eaoh oountiy speoialising in those goods in which its efficiency was great-
est* By exohanging idiat was produced cheaply for what it cmild only produce 
at relatively greater cost« eaeh oountry could, by specialising, attain its 
greatest benefit in terms of goods and services* 
Somewhere along the line, the system broke down, or failed at estab* 
lishment, both at the national and at the international level* As has been 
submitted, a significant part was played ly the growth of te<toology, which 
imposed changes faster than men could adapt themselves to them* In conn 
bining to exploit the advantages iriiich new processes provided in lower costs, 
individuals and groups found the increased power an advantage in exploiting 
^Ibid*, p* 14* 
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the maz^et. Others found advantages in oombining to resist* 
Contract* onoe thou^t of as a voluntary agreement between 
persons wi-th equal bargaining power, is hard to hold to its 
norm. A diotesr between two fanners over a oouple of horses 
has little in ootsmon with the agreenent between a giant 
power company and tiw ultimate oonsumer*^ 
At the international levels too^ the growth of newer nationalisms 
and the rise to power of important new states on the strenigth of the 
levvling influence of tiie new teohnology, led to a challenging of lAt&t 
had become accepted trade practice under British leadership. This is 
Illustrated in particular by GermEuiy and the United States. 
Under the assumptions of classical economics, no long run benefits 
will accrue to the nation which interferes with the flow of the trade. 
There is, howevsr, a particular sat of oircuniBtanoes in which, from a 
national point of view, a country stands to gain. That is the case in 
idiich the eaported conmodily possesses a relatively ixMrlastic demand. 
Under these circuastanoes it is possible to improve the terms of trade, 
provided the demand for "Uie imported goods is not also inelastic. In 
other words, a country can get its imports with a relatively smaller 
numiber of exports, without doing serious damage to the volume of trade. 
Ihis of course assumes that there is no reteuLiation by other countries. 
Ourittg much of the nineteenth century, the United States was an ex<-
porter of agricultural products and im impo^r of manafaotured goods, 
many of them luxuiy items. The dencuid for its exports, by the rapidly 
growing European cities, was relatively inelastic, furthermore, it did 
not ezioounter retaliation, because the leading trading oountzy, ^ land. 
^Ibtd.. p. U. 
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still had a large area in whioh to operate. As Henry Clay has pointed 
out: 
Before 1914« -Uie spread of protection had not checked the 
expansion of British escorts, because there were alnajre 
alternative markets. India iiras kept open by British polit­
ical control •> in the interest of the Indiam oonsumsr at 
least as much as the European and American exporter} China 
by unilaterally imposed conventions. 3!he new countries were 
not yet in a position to meet their om industrial needs. It 
followed that the exclusion of some British e^qports from an 
overseas market would result usually in their diversion (at 
a cost) to some alternative market* TShen Europe had been 
closed to British manufacturers,Araerica was open; when 
.American was closed^ the Dominions and the Bast were open • . . • 
The rising tide of nationalism in eaoh of the undeveloped cointries, 
as it achieved a degree of industrialisation* giving it a basis for 
greater independence, gradually narrowed the area within which free tr^de 
could operate, particularly as the interest groups within those countries 
could demand the intervention of their governments. 
From the cosmopolitan point of view the argument for free trade is 
unassailable* Viewed from the narrow point of view of short run national 
interest, and especially from the -vantage point of powerful political 
groups within a country, protection can roarshall strong support. And, 
M Schattsdhneider concluded, after an exhaustive study of the American 
tauriff act of 1930, • political beha-vior is seen to beer a highly 
variable and Irregular relation to economic interest*'' 
Henry, "Britain's Beellning Role in World Trade" Foreign 
Affairs, Vol* 24* No. 8. April 1946* pp. 416« " -
Schattsdhneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* New York, 
Prentioe«iiall* 1935* p» 285* 
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But as discrimination begot retaliation, and eaoh sought to better 
its own interest by "beggaring its neighbor," the toIuhw of trade sunk 
progreosively loner to oulmimte in the unrestrained nationalism of the 
1990*0, the driTtt for raw material and markets. 
A Conoept of Policy 
It will be useful, at this point, to set up for subsequent discussion 
a definition of policy. 
All policies are essentially experiments in induced behavior, which 
individuals or groups, or nations adopt or have iiaposed upon them for 
purpose« of inoreasing the range of predictable social action. In a 
world where 'Uie ftitare is necessarily uncertain, policies are agreed upon 
or imposed for purpose# of control, for setting limits to variation in 
behavior* If a policy is successful, it makes behavior predictable. 
It is to be recognised, however, t^t few policies are tiiolly the 
result of reflection and matare judgment* They are the results of the 
struggle for poarer, the consequences of necessazy conqpronise, and are 
frequently no more than the results of on the spot decisions, made in 
the fkoe of immediate necessity and in ths light of old valuations which 
are caxried fomard cuid devslop a life of their own. For this reason, 
it is usually more is^ortant to know -vdio shaped ^e policy than vdmt 
1 T» the policy is. For the pover group which determines the policy does 
so on the basis of its o«m valuations* 
%arold D. iasswell defines politics as the study of influence and 
the influential (folitlcs, Who Gets lahat, llihen, Mow* Hew York, 
MoGrawwHill* 1936)' p. 1. 
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Broadly spaaklog, thon. policy stay ba defined a« tdie relationahip 
bataaaa naans and aade* of oontrol applied for tSte attainawnt of a 
speoifio goal or values But it oan be broken down into three essential 
elements (l) Goals or ends, (2) Itteans^ and (s) Constraints or oonditLoas 
iiqposad. (The art of the feasible}. 
Under conditions of perfect oonqpetition the only constraints upon 
an economio polieymald be the qaantity and quality of available 
resourees. Under conditions as they exist* the constraints inposed upon 
any group, or aqy state« in the attainment of its ultiaate goale, are 
detaxnoined by the extent to ahioh that goal osn g«in aooeptanoe or be 
inqpoeed upon other groape or states* 
A completely unified national policy for at^ govemniBnt, particular* 
ly a reasonably dehtooratio one* is obviously itopossible exoept in tine 
of var or great national energency* So long as the -aar oontizwed, a 
national policy could be achieved • a poli<7 idiich touched the lives of 
all and shaped the actioztt of each to the end of victory* There nere 
few eonstraints* The means to victory consisted of the total reaouroes 
of the counbiy • the natural resources, the adult population, and the 
enomous store of 'wealth and knowledge that had bean aocusscilated* In a 
demooraoy a national policy, under the usual peaoetiae conditions, idll 
emerge only as a balance of tiie afyriad separate polioies put forward by 
groups, or the influenbial members of those groups, find a oosnnon level 
of agreement* 
Questions o£ government policy fluctuate betmen idiat ought to be 
and vdiat can be* Only irithin Ota limits of agreement (vdiich is the 
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poli'bieAl problem) oan oholoe be said to operate* Discuseions of 
polioy* particular]^ of economic poli<^, oan best be considered in 
terms of the separate elements of the policy concept itself. 
Ends or values 
Inplioit in all economic discussion is l^e asstimption that behavior 
is or ought to be eoonomlo. This ms essentially the assumption of the 
"economio** man of classical literature, who neither combined with nor 
expressed a preference for or sympathetic interest in other men - a 
being without enemies, or friends, llever seriously intended as a ooxof 
plete picture of reality, this ^ideal type" nevertheless exemplifies an 
important aspect of modem man's behavior? and although the enteirprise 
econonQT as a social organization, Midiose principal -virtue is the fact 
that it has stimulated its members to produoe in quantities never before 
knom* has been subject to no little criticism, its performance in terms 
of inomased longevity, better standards of health and comfort has had 
nuoh in its favor.^ 
In view of the poverty that still exists, to have as an end an 
eoonomio policy of increased natioml inoome would certainly merit a high 
rating on the scale of possible ends. Zhis is what is usually designated 
^''But increased production is important. Of course it isl That plenty 
is good and scarcity evil - it needs no ghost ffom the graves of the 
past five years to tell us that." Tawney, R.H., The Acquisitive 
Society. Sew York, iiaroouz^. Brace. 1920. p« 5. 
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as «oouomio progress. If more equitable distribution is also an ob-
Jeotive, as it has beoooe to an increasing extent, then it may beooms 
necessary to make 8c»ne ooneeasion in else of inoome in order to achieve 
vider distribution* Stability of incon» may also constitute an important 
objective in national eoonomio policy, and may in fact involve action to 
prevent national inoone from expanding as much during a boom« as it 
might* in order to keep it from falling as low during a depression as 
it has had the tendency to do» But the heart of an economic policy will 
cantinae to be greater production of a majority of the items which msGce 
up national income* 
Moans 
The means at i2ie disposal of any country for the production of ineoms 
consist of what it has ixdierited from the pastt the population, its 
struotara axui social oharaoteristics] the natural resources, such as 
t2ie land, the mines, and olimatei the accumulated stocks of materials, 
the state of Hie arts, and the degree of organization * the institutions 
and traditions* With the exception of labor, this is usually designated 
1 
as capital* These are the means ordinarily regarded, as the basic mater-
o 
ials of national income production* But, vdkiiie these are the basic means 
Guiding, Kenneth E,, The Iconomios of Peae<»* New York, Prentiee-Hall, 
1945* p» 5,. Boulding's definition is slightly narrower than that given 
above, a little more material* However, he defines capital as the sum 
total of valuable things which appears to take in about everything* 
2 There is a fundamental difficulty associated with the whole conoept of 
income - that idxioh oomes in. Inoome is essentially subjective* Ibtion-
al Income is usually associated with the volume of goods and services -
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of inoome production these are not the means at the disposal of govern­
ment# Most of these resources are still pritrately owned, except in 
Russia* The enomous volume of present day inoonte is the product of a 
roundabout, cooperative process* Qovenunent exercises its influence on 
the sise of that inoome by using its authori-ty to influence i^e extent 
of that joint effort* by its influence upon confidence and expectations. 
By the use of its power to tax, its monetary and fiscal operation, by 
shifting incomes among the members of the sooie'ty, by protecting properi^ 
rights « these are the means by n^ioh government influences the sise of 
national income* Government, or the state, is not something separate 
1 
and apart* As such, it does not produce inoome. But it can be and is, 
highly productive* Through its policy with regard to trade idth other 
countries, it can add to the national inoome by making it possible for 
goods and sexnrioes to be added to the national income vdiich would not 
(Footnote continued) 
an aggregation of unlike thiz^s - for iRhich economists have long 
attempted to construct a useful measure* But tiie difficulties are 
enomous* M national level of prices can be oonstruoted, through the 
use of index iBimbers* A oorresponding index for physical production, 
or inoome is 8iiiq>ly something it has been necessary to create* Cf« 
S<diumpeter, Joseph, Business Cycles* New York, UcGrawwHill* 1939* 
"However useful for many purposes, total output is a figment which, 
unlike the prioe level, would not as such exist at all, were there 
no statisticians to create it* We seem indeed to. fb^oe a meaningless 
heap.** Vol. II* p* 484* 
^ome resources, of course, are owned government - that is, they 
are owned oolleotive]y« Such things as the Postal Service, the 
national forests, and the properties of lesser governmental units* 
These, of ooune, contribute directly to the sise of national income* 
In this country, they are still relatively unimportant, but they have 
been increasing. A recent tendency in Economics has been to recognize 
tiiese sources of income and to include them in the total* 
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ethemlM !)• aval lable, 
Ih« b««t my for a ^oranuBout to use it« "potters"* has loi^g been a 
subjeot of heated disouesJLon* Adam Smith bellered that its greatest 
oontrlbutloa oould be naide through noderation In the use of the means at 
Its disposal •> that men oooperated and restrained one another if left 
alone* That vas the visw of nineteenth oentury liberalism. The sooial* 
ists, of course« have long advooated abolition of private ownership of 
oapitalf in which ease all available means would be direotly oontrolled 
by The issaes ourrently in dispute revolve around the extent 
to vrhioh tiie aeans to be placed at govemnent disposal should be social^ 
ised or oontrolled in tiie general interest.^ 
Constraints 
The ooxastrainta upon -ttie use of means at the disposal of goveminBnt« 
consist principally of 13is extent to which the policies of separate groupe 
as enacted into legislation or esipressed in taoit resistance, work at 
oroas purposes with the ends of policy as it operates at the national level* 
At the international level, -Uie most io^ortant constraints are the 
extent to idiioh the separate policies of the individual countries conflict 
and cancel each other out* For to the extent -ttiat eacJi attempts to attain 
seouri-ty for itself alone* to extend its area of control^ the security of 
all is rsduoed* 
^Cf* Lemer, A*P« "Ecoumkio Liberalism in -&e Postwar IKorld*** in 
Poatear goonomle Problems edited by Seymour B* Harris, Now York, UoOraw* 
Hill* 1949. pp. 127-139• 
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Requirements of a Planetaiy EcononQr 
A national policy Tiiioh looks to the improvement in the general 
wslfare - of eoonomio w»lfare» speoificsally • is required to face in two 
direotions for the removal of constraints and the reestablishment of an 
•oonomio and political stability within whieh security and economic progress 
ono« more beoomes possible. For a natioaal policy -which looks but one way 
cannot bo enough in a planetary economy^ and a world made small by air 
tnuasportf in a world made insecure by rocket missies and atomic fission* 
It oan be generally agreed that a world dominated two or three 
super powers (probably two end a half) offers no possibilities of combin­
ation for a political equilibrium such as the balance of power provided, 
Without such an equilibrium* the possibilities for economic progress, 
outside the largest units, is impossible. If world trade is to be possible* 
then the world will need to organize for trade* and to surrender to some 
fom of international organisation the powers to regulate the extent to 
which one nation can beggar its neighbors by currency devaluation, foreign 
excduuige regulations* az^itrary quota impositions. Those aro the require-
menta for economic progress* 
In any industrial economy a movement of goods oan be seoi to take 
Cf* Staley* Eugene* World Eoonopgr in Transition* New York* Council tm 
Foreign Relation* 1959* "The tendency of technology, -m have seen* is 
to make it eaoler to move resources and goods from place to place over 
the earth's surface* to increase the economic connections between differ^ 
enct regions* and to create a plaoaetazy eoonony* The tendency of pol­
itics in recent years has been* by and large* to ixvsrease the eoonomio 
significance of political boundaries to confine the movement of resources 
and goods within national or imperial frontiers* and so to oounteract 
the tendency of technology towards world wide integration* p. 59. 
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plaoe in which raw materials and agricultural products move into the in­
dustrial markets from the "hinterlands"# From Von Thunen on, students of 
eoonomios and geography have been aware of this fact. Bulky materials of 
low value move from the periphery inward. The isore valuable items tend 
to be produced near ttie markets. But there has been a long-run tendency, 
also, for the industrial revolution and industrialization to move into 
the agriculturally backward areas. As an area develops its industries, 
incoiQS rises, and the proportion of the population required to be emplpyed 
in agriculture declines. This is due both to the effects of technology 
in improving the efficiency of agriculture, and to the shift in tastes 
of people away from a purely carbohydrate diet of cereals and fats,^ 
Again, if the world eoonoiy be viewed in perspective, the movement of 
foods in the future, given political stabilit;^, is likely to consist of 
a flow of raw materials in the direction of IAlo industrial and the areas 
rich in capital, with a reverse movement of irtanafactured goods, tedi-
nological knowledge and skills, and credits, from the industrial areas 
or regions* In the words of Osoar Lange: 
It is the exchange of industrial equipment for consumers goods, 
agricultural products, raw loaterlals, and handicraft products 
^Cf• Staley, Eugene, World Economic Devalopmentt Effects on Advanced In?-
Jfontreal, International Labor Office* 1944. 
"Increasing effi^en^ in agriculture, which is one of the strategic 
points for attack in the economic development of less developed coun­
tries, anablee a smaller percentage of the occupied population to 
supply more food • • • It is a statistical fact that for evezy great 
region of the earth income levels are higher whore propositloxis of 
the working population engaged in agriculture are lower." p» 25. 
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irfiioh in my opinion provide the solution for the basio 
eoonomie problezos of the world 
History is replete with cases where pressure groups and vested inter­
ests haxre undertaken, through governments, to stem the flow of capital 
•quipment and teohniqaes to other countries on the grounds that the in­
dustrialization of the agricultural area would ultimately destroy the 
basis of their trade. As it has actually turzied out, homever. Idle ex­
change of goods and techniques, of manufactures and 8eiDi<^Daamfaotures 
have provided inorecuted volumes of trade after the basis of l^e original 
exchange of agricultural for manufactared goods has disappeared. As 
Fisher observes: 
"Natural** differences in productive capacil^ are seldom un­
changing differences • » • in the nature of things the nature 
of production can never be fully solved.^ 
Perhaps what should be stated is that the growth of technology is a 
cxxmulative thing viiich cannot bo entirely predicted, conferring advantages 
now to one, again to another. There can be no permanent advantage, except 
that conferred by maintaining enough flexibilii^ to be able to change.^ 
^Lange, Oscar, "Eoonomio Prognss and full Empldyment", The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 246* 
July 1946. p. 93* 
2 Pisher, A.Cr.B,, Economic Progress and Social Security* l>«»idon, Mac-
millan. 1945. p* 224. 
Cf. Staley, op. oit»« "The key to the problem of avoiding adverse 
effects from the new oon^tition of newly developing countries is to 
be found in a policy of promoting adaptation - that is, encouraging 
the transfer of capital and labor into the lines v^ere opportuiiities 
are expanding and out of those lines vdiere other countries are becom­
ing able to produce at lower cost. The competition of *law wage labor* 
in the newly developing countries will not injure labor if the advanced 
88* 
But thl« reqiilrea politioal atabillty as well as economie flexibility. 
Ite two ftre inter»«oting» and nay be nutually sustaining or may be off­
setting* During the nineteenth oestary» a vmry flexible eoonomio ait-
uation tended to break doen politioal rigiditiea. The beginning of 
eoottonie rigiditiea tended to break doim exiating politioal arrangementa 
onoe Bwre and reintroduoe an inereaaing degree of gowmment intenrention, 
and a euaulation of poser atrugglea* 
Signifioant ia the flaot "ttiat the a ingle moat important etent of the 
nineteenth eentury thleh led to free trade expanaion for a brief period 
«aa an arbitrary aot by a aeni-diotatorial govemnent* Free tradera 
haTS loxig uaed the oooneroial ti«aty betweea England and Franoe of Jan-
uaxy 1860a oomnonJy knom aa the Cobden Treaty« aa almoat the aole est-
pirieal baaia for the aalutary effeota of their thesia* had gone 
to free trade beoauae ahe had an advantage In trade. France* on the other 
handy bad no au<^ advantage* Ber industries were not advaneed, but were 
politioal]^ atrong* The parliasMnt and the country aa a idiole, favored 
proteetion* But in 1852, Louie Hapoleon had aunounoed the creation of 
the second entire* with hiaself aa Emperor %poleon III, Although Hapoleon 
III was a in faot« a free trader by conviction« his principal reaaon for 
deairiag trade expanaion waa politioal - to allay the fears of -Uie rest 
of Europe that he entertained the inqperial anibitions of the Napoletmie 
countries maintain flexib;l!..lty« keep in the fo<*efr nt of technical 
progress and aim at expandlag produotion in pramising iaaastriea rather 
than defending to the bitter end those industries for lixe outlook 
is tmprooising • • • Govenunent* business aid labor in the advanced 
eoantries ndll be wise to reject proposals for defending Tested inter­
ests against the need for change and to adapt instead a policy of faoil-
itating and encouraging adjustment*" p* 28* 
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tradition* To improve his position abroad would msan strengthening his 
hand at home. It was out of this situation that the Cobden trea-ty emerged. 
A brief eummary from Haight will malce olear how the use of a rigid and 
arbitrary political power, actually promoted trade expansion and political 
stability. 
Chevalier (of Napoleon's Council of State) was convinced that 
the only way to secure a revision of commeroial policy was to 
present parliament with a fait aocompli. In 1859^ on his own 
initiative, he discussed the prospects with Cobden and Bright 
• . • with the approval of Gladstone they prepared a plan for 
presentation to Napoleon. Though well aware of the hostility 
of parlieument and the public • . • the treaty was signed , , , 
This "most conspicuous single event in the commercial history 
of the nineteenth century" was brought about largely by the 
peculiar political circunstanoes of the time •> it promoted but 
was not the result of intematiooal friendship. Another point 
of great significance was the fact that this liberal reform was 
introduced by a ruler, holding special power, in opposition to 
the will of the people • • • Drastic customs reform, like the 
introduction of the metric syste-n, calendar refom, or a bein on 
lipstick, usually requires the firm hand of a dictator.^ 
The firm hand of the dictator is not so much required as the exist­
ence of a higher level of authority or power which may be essential to 
perform the experiment in induced behavior, to reduce the constraints of 
lesser competing policies. 
Probleim of domestic policy, when the issue of political and econom­
ic equilibrium are considered, reflect identical issues, but at a different 
level. The separate policies of pressure groups reflect the extent to 
whidi a use of that group's power can be effective. At the domestic level, 
as well as the international level, the circumstances of the nineteenth 
^iiaig}it, Fraxik A. A flistoi^ of French Commeroial Policies. New York, 
Sbcmillan. 1941. pp* 30^2. 
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oentury were unique, Bi© existence of an undeveloped frontier, a 
reservoir of virgin resouroes* afforded an opportunity for a continuous 
release from an effective control by any single, powerful group^ and 
provided a .political eznriroainent favorable to economic expansion. As 
the country filled up and poner was more and more concentrated, both 
economic and political, that environment disappeared. Competing povrer 
groups, more and more limited the economio horison* Attention was con­
centrated on the use of political power to restrain and redistribute 
rather than to expand. .Agriculture was -Qie last of tiie great economio 
areas to enter the struggle as an effective economic pressure group, 
How the government has been called upon to exercise its influence 
OS an energising rather than a restraining agency. 3^e task is difficult 
and complex. Zo quote« again from Eansent 
In place of our 19th oentury weetem frontier we can, if we 
look for it, find and develop a groat new frontier in our 
own ''back yaird". We can. have an expanding and ^^ynamic eoontnQr. 
But it will not come automatically. It is not easy to conquer 
mass imemploynient. Our forefathers could exploit virgin resources • 
Our task is more difficult. We need to develop and improve our 
resources. This requires ingenuiiy and planning. Ife need to 
discover and develop areas for public investment which can open 
up private investment of^rtunities, increase our productivii^ 
and add to Idie nation* s purchasing power 
^Riis was essentially the continuing theme of much of tiie work of tiie 
American historian Frederic Jackson Turaer (and his followers) whose 
Frontier in J\iBerioan History (iJew York, Henay Holt. 1920) contains this 
observationt 'Whenever social condition tended to czystallite in the 
East, vdienever capital tended to press upon labor or political restraints 
to impede the freedom of the mass, tiiere was this gate of escape to the 
free conditions of the frontier. Xhese free lands promoted individualism, 
economic equality, freedom to rise, democracy . • . « p. 244, 
Hansen, Alvln H. "Stablli-ty and Rjcpansion'* in Financing American Pros'* 
perily edited by Paul T. Homan and Fritz S&ichlup. I^ew York, The 
Tnentie'tili Century iiUnd, 1945. p. 212. 
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But in a vorld n^ere oombination aizid interference have prooeeded as 
far as 'tiiey have at the present time, the problem cannot be solved by 
merely taking from one group or one state and giving to another* of assist-
one group to use its combined streingth to gain a monopoly for pux^poses of 
raising prices and gaining a larger share of a pie that has ceased to 
grow* Bieh as the United States is» it cannot yet solve the problm in 
that manner* If the lower income groups are to receive larger incomes, 
it still must be done from an expanding pie. 
Welfare eoonomistSy of yHiotsL iuO, figou is perhaps the most distinguished» 
have de^veloped a criterion of economic ^ Ifare* In general* the conclusion 
that has been reached is that total -v»lfare Is Increased iiAien some members 
of the society are made better off, without at the same time making others 
worse off. Ihis, perhaps, opens up the most promising avenue for govern* 
meat action* If a specific program can be demonstrated to expand total 
income, those disadvantaged by the change can, perhaps, be bou^t off* 
In the interests of economic progress, those who stand to lose by change 
may be "bought off", their transfer subsidised* i^ain to quote A*P* 
Leroert 
inother iinportant lesson that will have to be learned by the 
time the war is over is that the most economical way, as well 
as the most jnst way, of overcoming policies that have to be 
unde3*taken in -Ww public inteirest is to provide generou| com­
pensation for all who have to make a special sacrifice. 
^Lemer, Abba P*, "Bcoaomic i4beralism in the Postwar World", op* cit*, 
p. 130* 
It la not auffloiaat a inply to naka aoaa paople riohar than thay 
are now* That way lies a progreaaivaly poorar world for all* Powar 
axaroiaad by one group to better ita ova position relative to o^ra 
raaults not in a working aquilibrlim but a oumlatiTe uia of powar*^ 
Iktoh of the thinking that ia ourraatly being done on thia idiole prob* 
lea of public policy and govammnt aa an energising agent« faaa oonoen-
tratad on oaa or two areas suoh as nonstary and fiseal polioiesa publio 
woxics poliey» foreign inveataent, ete* as proiiding the single most 
iaportant touohstone to suooess* A^litioal flaasibility has not alosys 
been taken into aooount* A host of unsettled issues atill require in* 
veatigatian and thiidciag through. Ihe purpoaa of the study idiieh follows 
is to attempt to think through the prohleaa aasooiated with two iaportant 
araaa of publio polioy* 
\rao<^ Tinar has aade an aoute «lbservation regarding hunan behaidor at 
the intematiMial IstsI ("Peaee as an Beoncnio Problen** in Hew Paatw 
syotivs on Peace edited by George B* Bassar* Qxicago, Universily 
of Ghioago Press r'lQil* p« 104) idii^ oan also be extended to ooner 
"ttie beha'vior of groups within a oouatiy*" • • • I believe that 
oountries bear resentment on eeononie grounds against other oountries 
not beoause they fesl poor* but beoause idietber they are rloh or poor 
they do not feel as rloh as -Utey deserra to be«" 
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chapter ii. 
comict betweeh aoeicultcjral awd foreign tradb policies 
In the preoediag ohaptar an attompt was made to set forth soioe of 
the oonditlons of xxrberaotion between politloal and eoonomio forces, and 
to define in broad terms» certain concepts and relationships. This is 
the baokground against vAiioh 'Uie assumptions of the present study must 
be viewed* 
Ihs study began as an examination of certain apparent conflicts 
betmen this countiy's substanti-ve agricultural policy and its stated 
foreign trade policy* Depai^bnent of State has announced in favor of 
eicpanded and presumably freer world trade. Congress has made important 
ooDmi-bnents to that end* Existing agricultural pollq;r« lohich since 1935 
has centered on raising and maintaining farm prices, requires for its 
suceess a protected home market* 
On the surface, tiierefore, an old controversy long regarded as 
settled • appears to have been reopened, but vrith the adversaries chang­
ing sides* During the greater part of Hhs nineteenth century and the 
first tno decades of the present one, the policy of protection follosred 
the United States 'was actively pronoted by the manufacturing and 
industrial groups* Agriculture, on the other hand, vras more frequently 
to be found on the side of freer tcade* 
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Today» many Amsrioan industries, -whoBS early growth was fostered in 
a proteoted domestic market, are seeking xmt trade opportunities abroad* 
and are prepared to enter the world market on a oomparatitrely free trade 
1 basis* By vay of contrast, during a period of a little less than a 
generation, tfaere has beoa a significant shift in the attitude and inter* 
est of agriculture -with respect to foreign trade* Parmez>8 no looger have 
a primary interest in foreign outlets, partly because they regard those 
maiicetB as lost, or no longer important, Imt largely because l^eir most 
important markets have mo-ved in on them, under the same national roof, 
and they would lite to keep them for themselves. From an industry produc­
ing largely for export, agriculture has to an ever«lnereasing extent 
2 ' 
shaped its production to the demand of the domestic martret* The farmer 
has, in short, arrived at that "best of all possible worlds" pictured for 
him by the proteotianisto during -ttie nineteenth centuzy to lure him away 
^Cf« Foi^ne, Vol* 32, Ifo* S» November- 1945* This entiire issue is devoted, 
to foreign trade opportunities for American producers and the plana of 
important sectors of industry for expanding exports* 
^Cf• Barger, Harold and Hans iff* Landsherg, American Agriculture, IBOS-
1999* New York, Hational Bureau of Economic fieseardh* 1942. The extent 
to i^ich domestic demand has shaped production is told in the foUowing 
susmairy of changes in the cbaraoter of output since -ttxe turn of the 
oentury* "Citrus fruit increased in output more than ten fold; the 
production of sugar, vegetable oils, milk products and poultry doubled} 
potatoes and tobacco rose a little more tiian 50 per cent* Cotton and 
livestock expanded less than 50 per cents grain production wss about 
the same at t^e end of the period as at the beginning} and tlw net out-
put of hay fell sharply over the four decades , * • • In interpreting 
the "behavior of production data we found that the contraction of exports 
(in absolute tenns and relative to taxm output) has played an espeo-
ially important part in moderating the expansion in the output of the 
gz«ins, of ootton, and of livestock products." p. 291* 
36« 
from, his periodic free trade leaniziLgs«^ 
There is the temptationj therefore* to approach the problem along 
traditional iii»s, to see the oontroversy as one between free trade and 
protection - the special interest of agriculture versus general economic 
welfare* In terns of the real issues, hcwswr* this would mean little 
more than sotting up a straw man and bowling him o-ror with a lozig^mn 
argunwnt proving that it would be to the interest of the fanner to support 
free trade* 
A second glance at the proposed trade policy is xiot required to 
dnaonstrate that free trade* in Hie orthodox sense* is not contemplated 
Z 
and is not involved. Trade policy has bocenne an inatrument of the 
foreign office or the state department. 
More is at issue than a conflict between the general economic welfare 
and the special interest of agriculture* The i^ole question of how this 
counfczy can use the full weight of its vezy great vealth and power in the 
interest of world political stability is in question* As Ellis has saidr 
^ere* in the words of Horace Greeley (Political Ecangmy* Boston* Fields-
Osgood* 1870) is hos the protectionist envisiowd it* 'It seems to me 
self "-evident tluit protection tends to shorten the distance between tiie 
farmer and the artisan or manufacturer* hence to diminish the cost of 
eacchanging their respective products* and thus to secure to the famer 
not only sursr and steadier markets for his produce but an ampler 
recompense for his labor*** p* 71* 
^Cf« Ellis* Honard S** "Removal of Restrictions on Trade and Capital"* 
in Posttwir Economic Problems edited by Harris, op* cit* "International 
trade and finance after the war* it is sometimes thought* either will 
go the way of the thirties, naxiced by rigid national interference of 
an autarchic nature* or will return to the relatively unregulated ohar« 
acter of trade in. IdM prosperous twenties* Ihese extremes « intensive 
national regulation versus 'free' intaxmtional trade > may appear to 
be the natural alternatives |in fftet* however* they are not the 
• • • protaoti-ve tarlffi in the United States, particularly on 
oertain agrioultuml raw Materials promise to be tho one most 
foraldable obstaole to postwar international reoonstruotion*^ 
A rsthiaking of many aspeots of xiational policy is ourrently re<juired. 
Not only the eoonomioally desirable, but the politioally feasible need to 
be taken into aooount* For althoa^ tiie role of government has expanded, 
polioy is not somsthinE independent of the power groups within the ooan» 
try* nor of the power struggles between ziations. 
Agrioulture is but one of a nunber of sepamte pressure groupe #iioh 
has perfected the teehnique of iapoeing its oan polioy upon the eoonooy* 
It has eiaerged as a politioally unified industiy, capable of a signifioant 
show of strength on natters vhioh invol-ve, or appear to itiTolve, the 
interest of faraers* 
for aaxgr years the fkmaers of this oousbxy felt that they were at a 
disadvantage, politioally, beeause -Uiey were widely eoattered over a 
large area* Svetional differences, the laolc of eommunication and rapid 
transportation# were long an almost insurmountable barrier to the meeting 
and joining together in their oooaoa interest, of those engaged in primary 
production. Ihe automobile, the aeroplaxke, the radio « rapid transport 
and coaBBinieatlon •> have systaaatically reduced -those barriers* In 
addition the institutional rigidities imposed by an inflexible area 
alternatives in prospeert* Ibe international moveraenb of oommoditiee 
and funds will be regulatsd in all events, and the only issue is, 
will the regulacion be natioial or Internationa? For now, more 
generally than before govemmsnts have definitely aocepted wslfare 
economics ae a basic policy*'* p* 345* 
^Ibld», p* S5S* (Italics mine) 
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representation in the national oongress have pire'vonted the political 
strongth of farmers from declining, relatively^ as faat as their propox^ 
tional numbers in the total population* ^ rural people havo shifted 
to the oities« i^ich tend to be conoentrated in a rather small nuidber of 
states« they have left their political representation behind them, 
particularly those in the Senate* Thus, the political influence of 
agriculture has increased because of the lag in the representative char«> 
aotar of political institutions. However* the faraers* influence is also 
an expression of the strategio oontrol over basic raw materials. Although 
agriculture has declined in relative impojrtanoe in the whole econotgy* the 
fact that it does exercise oontrol over basic raw materials is itself an 
important source of ponrer* once farmers have been vrelded into a unified 
group vhioh behaves as such*^ Xhe growth of a separate policy for 
agriculture has played no small part in suc^ unification. ''Paril^" has 
beeome a ponerfbl political symbol to move men to action* 
^e crisis caused by the great depression provided idie environment 
in tiiioh factors favorable to the growth of a separate policy for agricul-
Z ture oould emerge* Through that policy, agriculture was invested with 
^niat this unity was not achieved easily, euvi is of oon^ratively recent 
date is illustrated by this quotation from S*S* inrehmein, careful 
atudent of agricultural problems, who in 1928, even after the rise of 
the Farm Bloc, was doubtful i^at the farmers could ever hope to achieve 
much through legislative aoti<m in controlling their industry C^fhat 
Does ^riculture Need - Readjustment or Legislation?" Journal of Farm 
Eoonomlos* 7ol* 10* 1928)* "The industrial groups are now nunwrically 
Bteoogeir"tiian the agrioulturali-vond can outvote the fanner* It is 
within their pover to decide how moh agriculture we shall have and 
lAat kind, insofar as legislaticai can decide this* Left to their own 
izrterests they will tend to select the kind and the amount that will 
give them fbod and raw materials at the lowest possible prices." p. 16* 
®Cf* ikinsod. Merle and Lincoln (Gordon, Government and the American Boon-
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the public interest, and machinery set up for the purpose of raising and 
stabilising farm prices* Almost the last important stronghold of private 
competitive industiy had thereby disappeared*^ 
In one sense a vast carteliaation of agriculture had been achieved 
by the important farm groups operating through government, based upon the 
eiqploitation of the domestic maz^t* In tiiis politieation of agriculture 
can be seen an in^ortant shift in ponar distribution viiich the cumulative 
growth of technology has brought about, requiring some Wfttier fundamental 
readjustments to achieve a re-vr political equilibrium within ufaich economic 
progress can again become possible* For that control has not resulted 
in stabilisation but has required progressive extensiozu %ien prices rose 
during the -war, the "parity" goal -wftB achieved, but iiSiat had appeared 
during -ttie depression to be a far-off "Eldorado" -was clearly seen to be 
inadequate* Zhe paril^ foraula was extended to include a long list of 
oomnodities not formerly recognized as "basic"* In addition, legislation 
was passed vdiich -ims intended to safeguard agriculture mil into the 
period of transition to a peacetime econony* Still, the farmers of Idiis 
ony* New York, ITorton. 1941* "Behind -tiie evolution of these expand-
izig oontrols is a long stozy of agitation and organisation on idle part 
of fam groups operatixig tiirou^ both political parties, of a gradtial 
turn toward collective acticm. under the pressure of economic maladjust­
ments and the slow acceptance of the major responsibilities which 
government has come to exercise in this area*" p. 110* 
1 0f* Sehults, T*W* Redirecting Farm Policy* TSew Yoiflc, IHiaemillan* 194S* 
"Agzloilture tias bnce -Uie classic exan^le of free enterprise, privately 
and competitively managed* It is now subject to maiy t^es of govern­
mental contool*" p« 1» 
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oountzy face the future "with groat misgiving. If need be» they will 
undoubtediy bo prepared to extend controls much further. Cuinulative 
eoonomic maladjustmentj the growth of unmanageable surpluses, are likely 
to call for a cumulative application of control* 
It will be useful, therefoare, to consider existing agricultural pol­
icy as an expression of the shift in power relationships that has ocourred 
at the domestic level. 
Ihe United States has never, in fkot, had a national politer for 
agriculture, in the sense that France or Switzerland have a policy •• 
tiiat of consciously zoaintaining a peasant population on the for 
specific socicd and political reasons. There* the policy is a product of 
a social ]^iloso]|^ -ohich places a premium upon agrioilture as a stabilis* 
ing force in HM oatlonal political life of the country, precisely because 
the peasantxy has continued to resist the changes 't^ich have aecon^anied 
the industrial revolution in other western countries. The degree 
of self sufficient^, the slow acceptance of newer methods has been, in a 
sense, the denial of economic progress m^ioh has been given high premiim 
in -Uie enterprise econcny. For those countries such a policy has meant 
the preservation of something of a constant political factor in the 
shifting power relationships that have followed in the wake of tech* 
nologioal development* 
In this country, agricultural policy is the valuation of a farm pop-
ulation that has itself become highly ccsmnercialized, l^at has accepted 
the tenets of economic progress* Although certain elements of agricul­
tural fundamentalism do play a part in the thizdEing of seme farm groups. 
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•ad olalM for spvoial trMtnont haw aomitims b««& ad-vanoad oa thoaa 
groimda, thia haa l)Mn for ths noat part a ratiooalization of other, 
nor* peouniary motitva*^ In da(v»lopixig their axperinent In induoed 
b*haTior» faraars hava •nibodlod in it an •ndorawoaaat of aoonomio prograaa 
and hava at the aaiM tiaa plaoad the oonatraint of their oma polltioal 
poM«r in the «ay of proKreaa. It la at ono* a T^id for hl^er inooma 
and a stipulation of oonditiona under whioh that inoone shall be earned* 
IQien th* aaparat* polioy for agriculture ia aat off againat the polioiea 
of other eoononio group* * oadh aaekiiig ita oan adnmtage, the implication 
for aoonomio prograaa beoonaa olear* 
!Ih* Bole of Trade Poliey 
Foreign trade polioy operate* at a higher level* While it pur^ 
portedly «nbodiea vbat ia aooepted aa tfa* national intoreat^ it haa ooma 
to reflaot the dhang*d statu* of iiiia oountry wil^ respect to the reat 
of 'ttw world* The United States he* emerged aa the greatest industrial 
nation. In tema of the world eoonooy ita relative Industrial ia^ortanoe 
ia roiighly 46 per oent of the total*^ Ita ia^rtanoe in vorld trade, 
^Ihera has alvaya been, and ia, a atrain of thou^t In Amerioan life 
«hioh plaoea a hi^ prenivtm on fanning aa a nay of lifls. It -naa aluaya 
an inflnenoe in the -aritinga of Thorstein Vehlen. It is sonBthlng of a 
religious oonviotion vith men like 0«E, BaJcer of Idie tT«s* Department of 
Agriculture and i«lph Borsodi* Cf» Balcer, 0*E*, JBalph Borsodi, and 
U*L. Ililson, 4griculture in Modern Life* Hew York, Barper. 19S9, See 
alao» a review of thia bode* by Alvin £* Coona, Joutnal of Political 
SooattOBar* Vol* XCTIII* Vo* 4* Auguat 1940* pp* 606-8* 
^«S* DepartBent of Conmeroe, Hal B* Laxy and Aasooiatea, Ihe United 
Statea in the World Boonqaay* Eoononie Seriea Ho* 25* l^shington, 
Dnited Statea Printing Office, 194S* p* 29* 
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end in world eoonomio development has become so great* that its impact 
on the rentainder of the world* the trading world at least, can no longer 
be ignored* Foreign trade* idiich oooupies a relatively minor plaoe in 
total United States trade* bulks large ia world totals* 
The dominant role of the United States in the world eoonony 
is stiggested ths fact that it ranlced as the premier ex­
porting nation during the interwar period* aooounting for 
15*6 per oent of the world total in 1929« In the same year* 
its share of total imports was 12.2 per oent* being exceeded 
only by that of the United Kingdom*^ 
Sinee 1923 tiie tmde policy of this country has increasingly been 
modified to take into account the fact of its dominant position in world 
eooQomio and political affairs* and sinoe 1934 has been consciously 
shaped to influence both world political and eoonomio development* The 
attempts to expand trade and alleviate world depression during the 1930*8* 
was in part a move to use ths weight of the United States to stabilize 
deteriorating political relations and stop the drift toward war. 
Once war began* trade policy was dirsoted solely to the defeat of the 
axis eointries. How it has become an instrument of reconstruction and 
stabilisation. In eaoh ease the end has been largely political. Unless* 
or until political equilibrium can be affeoted* consideratioiut of econom-
io progress will be of secondary consideration. 
Not without significance is the fact that tha United States is almost 
^Ibid.f p. 27. 
42 
ftlouo in its desire to return to freer trade, England, viiiere the theoiy 
and practice of unrestricted ocmnaerce had its birth, hae shown consider­
able reluctance to abandon its oomparatiirely recent experiments with the 
tariff and its systeta of empire preference. Kie Latin Anerioan nations 
at th9 Chapultapeo Cont^ronoe showed a singular lack of enthusiasm for 
the trade proposals advanced by tiiis countxy's delegates*^ Soviet fiussia 
and its sphere of influence vill in all likelihood oontime to operate 
uirier a system of state monopoly of foreign exchange. 
The United States has eioerged frcaa World Vfar II not only as a cred­
itor nation, but as the greatest single creditor nation and the most ist-
portant source for future loans and capital equipsient. The devastated 
areas and baokward agricultural ooontries have need for and desperately 
desire the durable oonsmpfcion goods and the ii^ustrial *'knon^hov" of 
%erioa« Certainly^ the lot of the Chinese, the Indian, tl» South Amer^ 
ioan gauoho« and the Bastem European peasant could be elevated in a 
matter of years, -with sufficient left over to pay the returns cai borrowed 
capital, rather than in a mtter of decades (or never) if their ooun* 
tries sire foroed to aocumulate capital from present income. The expert 
ience of Bussia has demonstrated that oapited aecumulation is possible 
in a baoknard peasant country, given vast natiural resources and author­
itarian govBmaent, but even -tiien tbe cost in human sacrifice is great* 
The marginal productivity of capital invested in -tiiese areas is 
"hihittaker, "Latin -daerioa and Postvnr Organisation", Annals of 
the American Aoadeny, 7ol« 240, July, 1945. p. H3» ————. 
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likely to be oonsiderabJy higher than if invefited at home, vdiere, ia a 
mature industrial country with large capital aooumulation ai3d a high 
rate of oavings, the r«tum on new investments in the volume required 
to maintain fall ewployinent is not sufficient inducement for that in­
vestment to take plaoei where only increasing publio investment appears 
likely to perform the task* Ihe retuzn in human satisfaction* as well 
as efficiency, i/^ould certainly be higher if en^loyed in underdeveloped 
areas thtm if used to an evezwincreasing extent in vast public works 
projects which no one partioularly Yfants except to provide jobs.^ 
fhere is no question of 'Qxe abilily of the United States to find 
markets abroad for its production of greatest efficiency - capital equip-
ment, nachinexy* mass-produced consumption goods such as automobiles, 
refrigerators, -typewriters, etc. - either if it is willing to accept 
payment in handicraft, raw materials and agricultural products, or if 
it is willing to lend abroad indefinitely* ^ring the 1920* s tiiis 
countzy financed its large volume of exports to a considerable extent 
by lendii^; during the 1930's it did the some thing by buying hi^ 
priced gold* Keither proved to be a sound basis for stable trade rela­
tions, for when defaulted loans caused a drying up of credit sources« 
trade declined sharply forcing radical adjustments, and a eumulative 
1 
Ribllc worts programs, of course, are not the only method of redis­
tributing income and increasing consronption* Cf, Boulding, op* cit* 
p* 189* "Kaced with bursting storerooms and stockpiles, an entirely 
self-contained econtmQr can do one of two things t increase oonsus^ion 
either by war or 1:^ subsi^, or diminish produotion* For emy section 
of the world eoonoiBy* however, there is another avenue of escape -
the e:qport of capital, or foreign investment.'' 
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Srowth of national oontrol«» 
If the «xporl«noe of the 1990*s is not to be repeated^ if trade 
is to flovr in the regalar ohannels dictated by eoonomio progrees 
rising inooiRe« then there will need to be a system of political stability 
isposed through orgsnisation at the international le^l. This tho U«S, 
State Department has* in faot« proposed* 
Itot the lesst of the diffioulties faoed by that progrsm In 
aooeptsnoe among other nations sre Oim doubts regarding its sineerity* 
The ooontries most in need of the oredits and the industrial equipment^ 
fkoe ^  realities of high agrioultaral tariffs and« doobtisg the ability 
or villiagness of ite United States to abide by a program vhich requires 
liiat it be id.lling to aeoept an inoreasing Tolnme of Sa^rts, seek to 
retain tiie national oontrol whiob appears to provide seoarily, 
Sttbstanti've agrioultural policy oan be said» therefore, to conflict 
vitfa the proposed trade policy in tvo respects t (l) By insisting on 
the maintenance of high tariff rates on agricultural products to safe* 
guard tto doaestic price policy^ and (2) by rejecting in spirit the 
propoeals currently being made by ths State Department to implement this 
cousfery's efforts to secure the kind of international organisation vhidh 
alcme will make trade possible in an orderly sense*^ 
^Cf» Thiited States Department of CoBBwrce^ op» oit» 
The effect of a bifurcation of national policy is -wbII stated by Lary 
and associates t "The record of ttie thirties demonstrated i3ba.t foreign 
countries» save for those narrowly dependant on the American market« 
could adapt themselves, after initial distusTbanoes, to a relatively 
low level cf exchange with the United States and yet attain a sub* 
stantial internal prosperity and promote their trade with each other* 
ind» in time* this oountiy could also make the necessary adjustment 
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Creation of a political e<juilibritmi at the separate national and 
international levels consists of two interdependent problems« and success 
in either area could reinforce and sustain the other* An expanded world 
trade which promoted full employment and rising standards of living would 
mk» easier the appsaseinent of contending political forces at the oatioiw 
al level* An adjustment at the national leval, particularly in the 
United States, T^iich resulted in a high level of employment, might like­
wise be a sigiaificant contribution to world stability and international 
peace* 
The latter, in fact, is the talking point of the important group of 
econoittists liio propose that government attack directly the problem of 
full emplc^ent and rising national income as the most useful contribution 
that can be made to the world political problem. World trader they feel, 
is secondary, and will follow as a matter of course if each country is 
able to achieve a high level of political and economic stability at heme. 
In the words of Hansen, leading Aoerican exponent of this views 
Wil^ respect to tiie tlhited States, it may be asserted witb a 
good deal of confidence that this country could mke no greater 
contribution toward the solution of the international political 
as well as the economic problems than that of achieving a high 
degree of internal economic stability at a level of fairly 
full eiaployxaexxb of labor and other resources « • « * If we can 
achieve tinrough a conqpensatory aisd developmental fiscal program 
in its export trade and domestic eoonoragr, although with difficultiea 
exemplified by the agricultural policies of recent pre-war years* A 
world economy organized on i^is basis would unquestionably be less 
progressive and more subject to c<HiBoercial restoictions and disoriat-
inatlDM,' but it is an altogether possible one. Ilhat is ei^hatically 
not possible is to have it both ways-x-a large volume of dollar receipts 
against a small volume of dollar pe^ptents* Tet United States foreign 
eoonondo policy in -ttie paist has been largely predicated upon this 
manifest Impossibili-iT-, most notably «^en the tariff on imports was 
sharply increased on two occasions in the flKce of continued efforts 
to collect war debts and promote exports, p. 24* 
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adequate markets for all vte are able to produce« then we 
need no longer have any fear of impoz^s* 
%anaea, Alvin, Amerlea'e Role in the "World Eoonomv* New 'Xoric, Kortwi. 
1945« pp« 23 and 16S« SomeiAiat In contradiotion of Ilansen, Professor 
Jaeol) Viner holds that this proposition Is by no means self evident, and 
Buffioient knowledge is not at hand to substantiate it. The volume of 
imports will depend, he oontends, upon the mrginal propensity to import 
and the income elasticii^ of demand for imports* He estimates an income 
elastioii:^ of appr(xcimate3y uni-i^« (Notes propensitgr to import is an 
extension of the Keynsian terminology and refers to the taste or desires 
of the individual! a person of foreign birth, with a taste for the 
produotB of his native eountyy, would be likely to have a srelatively 
high propensity to importj income elastioity of demand for impoi^s 
ean be defined roughly as the percentage increase in imports which 
viould result frm a one per cent increase in national income)* B-ven an 
elasticity of demand of vinii^, however, could lead to a substantial level 
of impoirbs* In 1939 with a national inooms of approximately 90 Billion 
dollars, this oountzy*s is^orts totaled roughly 4*4 billion, the largest 
in its histoxy* With an income of» say, 150 billion, and assuming an 
inocme elastioii^ of unity total isqports vould be somevdiere in the 
neighborhood of 7*3 billion* However, Professor Viner's contenticm that 
a high level of national income does not necessarily in^ly an automatic 
inbrsMe in in^orts is supported by indexes of income recovery, con'-
trastitd with the reoovexy in imports during the 1930^ s* 
Industrial Production in Certain Countries (1929 « 100) 
1932 1936 1937 
u*s* 58 94 103 
U*K* 97 129 138 
Canada 58 90 100 
Japan 98 150 169 
Sweden 89 135 151 
Souroet U»K», Foreign Commerce Yearbook* Other Statistical 
Teai^ook* League of iiations. 
Qiiaatum of World Irade (1.929 et 100) 
1932 1936 1937 
Foodstuff^ 88 93 
Ifeiterials, raw or 
part manufactured 81.5 95*5 111*5 
JAsnufaoiared 59 75 86 
Total 74.5 8& 97 
Source t World. £oonomio Survey* Changes in quantum of world 
trade represents ohangea in total value of trade after 
elimination of price variation* 
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Underlying much of the roaaoning of this group, hovne-ver, is tbe 
assumption that a degree of political uni-tyhas already been achieved in a 
s«Di*autoaoinou8 policyparticularly in the field of monetary and fiscal 
control* But goverrmient still inuat operate in the face of constraints im­
posed "by the separate policies of pressure groups and interests. Education 
of the eleotorate, the thinking through of policy objectives, the integral 
tion of separate policies so that they do not cancel each other out in 
muaulatl-ve political struggles still has to be aooomplished. This requires 
effort in many areas. It is the purpose of the remainder of this study to 
show the forces that have shaped the separate areas of agricultural 
foreign trade policy, tiie ''beliefs" and "valuationswhich today have result­
ed in the emerging confliot betneen t^e two poli(^ areas, and to attempt a 
losasure of the problem of integration. 
Scope of Study 
In Chapter III a review of the literature and a note on methodology 
will conclude I of the Studty, 
Birt III will be a presentation of the changing role of agriculture 
as a factor in foreign trade policy. The emergence of a separate agricul­
tural policy will be considered in greater detail. Finally, in a case 
study of the attitudes of leading farm organizations on the specific issues 
of the renewal of the Beoipi*ocal Trade agreements, and of the votes of 
members of Congress as a measure of agriculture's opposition to freer 
trade relations will be presented. 
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Part XV will ooxisLst of an Aoalysis of the Common SooominatorB of 
poll(^ anA oarfcaln fkotora ndiioh nay redaoe Ihe oonfliot* 
finally a suBnary tvlll b« offered. 
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CHAPTEE III. 
EB7IEW OF LITEEATUHB AND A NOIE ON HETHODOLOGY 
A revlm of the literature which treats the essential problems em­
braced by this study is faced vith the difficult decision of choice* 
International trade theory as a separate and highly specialised branch 
of economics has an extensi-re literature of its own. Agricultural policy 
and the role of the primary industries in a ttwdem industrial society has 
likevdse been the subject of extended discussion and controversy. In 
addition^ the vhols question of the interaction between politics axid 
economics has been subjected to a voluminous treatment and poses a vide 
diversity of vmsettled issues. The role of the social sciences as such, 
as a contributing factor to insight and action is involved. Technology's 
impact on society and social institutions^ as an important force in its 
own right deserves,; and has received, vide attention. All that can be 
attempted, therefore, in tiie nay of a review of literatuz-e is a controlled 
sampliiag for the purpose at hand. 
Foreign Trade 
Universal free trade, from Adam Smith onward, has been both a con­
viction, based upon logical demonstration, and an article of faith, tdth 
eoonomists of the classical and neo classical school of economics* An 
integral part of the laisses faire tz^dition, it has received the most 
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oomplete treatment at the hands of Rioardo , Mill , Edgaviorth , Marshall « 
5 6 
Taussig , and Viner • In his systematic and thojrough sujrroy of the field, 
Viner has drawn npon more than 579 -works of known authorship, and for 
earlier treatments of the subject upon soaroe tracts of unknown origin. 
In tills country Taussig has probably been i^e most distinguished and 
productive thinker in the area of internatioxial economics, of the classical 
free trade tradition. 
In most of these works, the law of comparative advantage provides the 
principal point of departure for the separate treatment of inteznatlonal 
7 8 trade. Two fairly recent works by Ohlin and Van Haberler , have under­
taken to integrate the theory with the more general prioe-cost doctrine 
of economics. 
The decline of the theory and practice of laissez faire has brought 
in ita wake a rebirth of the Mercantilist doctrine which Adam Smith, with 
his free trade thesis, had attacked at length. As John Maynard Keynes, 
^Idoardo, David. The Principlea of folitioal Economy and Ta»ition» 
New York, Datton. 1926* 
2 liQ.11, John Stuart. Principles of Political Eoonowcr* TIew Yoik, 
Appleton. 1898» Laughlin edition. 
®Edgeworfch, F»Y, Papers Relating to Politioal Econonor. London, Royal 
Eoonomio Society* 1925. 
^Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics. London, Macmlllan. 1920. 
Eigihth edition. 
r 
Taussig, F.W., InteiTiational Trade. New York, Maemillan, 1927. 
®Viner, Jacob. Studies in the Theory of International Trade. New 
York, Barper. 1937. 
7 Caxlin, Bertll. Interregional and Inbemational Trade. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press. 1935. 
q 
aiberler, Gottfried Von. The Theory of International Trade. New York, 
MsLCmillan. 1956 • 
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leading exponent of the new "nationalist" eoonomio frames it* "It should 
he understood that the advantages claimed are a'vovedly national advantages 
and are unlikely to benefit the vrorld as a Thole. 
Ihe rise of i\iblio Policy, -which must of necessity he a function of 
, -&e natioxtal state» has meant the decline along witii much of laleseg-
ftiire doctzlne of the traditional approach to international trade. 
Econozaio analysis and the economic problem* however, are independent 
of poli(^« This point has received increasing attention in the economic 
2 literature during recent years* Dr* Fred U* Taylor, in his presidential 
address delivered at the fori^^first annual meeting of the American Kconon-
ic Association in 1928, set forth tlae principles to be followed by a social­
ist stats in tiie economic use of resources* Building upon the principles 
laid donn by te^lor, Oskar Lange further elaborated on the practical as-
pecbs of resource allocation as it would flaoe the collectiyist state, 
Fiually, 5.n tiie integration of nolleotivist and laisses-faire economies, 
A«P» L»ro0r has set up a Idieoretical franwwork for an economics of control, 
^Eiaynas, J*M,, The General Iheory of Bnployment, op» eit» p« 335* 
2 fis^lor, Fred "The Guidance of Production in a Socialist State", 
jtogrican Economic Review, Vol* 19, No* 1* March 1929* 
3 lange, Oslcar* "On The Economic Theozy of Socialism"* Review of 
Economio Studies* Vol* IV* Kos* 1 and 2* October 1936 and February 1937* 
^Lsmer, A*P* The Bcoiwmics of Control* Ksw York, liacmillan* 1944* 
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«h*r»ln th* prinolplss for aotting up a Bul« (presumRbly the rule of law 
imtiier than tho rule of men) within irtiloh rational economio behavior might 
b« attained Irreepeotive of a glorifioation of laleaeg faire or of the 
•tata» Both pri'vate enterprise and govemaent oould be made to funotion 
in the interest of the general mlftire* Lemer frames the problem of 
trad« as fOllovst "in a oolleotiTist eoonany the same Kule oan be applied 
to foraiga as to domestio trade. If all oountries • « • follow the same 
proeadora* «• tiill get the optimum utilisation of resources o-ver all the 
oountries tideen together."^ 
An important shift in the fnuas of reference for eoonomio literature 
has witnessed the re-emergenoe of the maoro^oonomic view of sooiel^- as 
eostrastad with th« mioro-eoonomio 'vieiw idiioh oonoentzatea largely upon 
ih9 problems of the household end the firm, of partial equilibrium. The 
newer point of view is ooncexiied to a nuoh greater degree with the probleaa 
of national inoome* total ei^ltqrment* popttlation« national fisoal and 
monetary poliiqr* income distribution, capital formatian« savings axid in­
vestment# and* of coarse* the iriiole role of the general climate of opinion 
or expeetations. 
The break with the past, however* is not as sharp as it has sometitnes 
been piotursd* Eoonomios too oarries its past with it* Welfare eoonomios* 
2 d#iveloped and ad'vanoed hy Plgoa toA others has bem the atartizag for nuoh 
^id** p* 847 and 848. 
2 Figou* A«C«* The Economies of Tfelfisre* London* Macmillan. 1932* 
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of the later work} in the whole field of monetaiy and fiscal probleas, an 
1 2 
undisputed province of the state. Fisher and Wicksell did important spade 
woiki Claiflc, throiigh his studies in the social control of business 
has assisted in- the linking if mioro and maoro eoonoinios. The institutional 
eooxioioists, never quite respectable in aoademic eoonomio circles • Thorstein 
Veblen^, Weley C« Uitohell^, USalton Hamilton^ and many others, with their 
interes-t in empirical research, have likewise broadened the base of eoonomi-
ice and related it more closely "bo the other fields of social study* 
Division of opixiion ainong economists occurs, just as among other people, 
with sometimss violent disputes between those too content with the old and 
those too enamored, of the new * an aspect of ^ valuation" at a higher in> 
telleotaal level. But Edwin Cajinan, a third of a centaiy ago, frwned the 
problem of increasing organisajjion and collectivism and the attitude of 
the economist toward it as follows< 
^FLsher^ lining* The Hatare of Capital and Incoae» Nsw Tozk, libosillan. 
1919. 
Wicksell, Enat»- Interest and Prices* London, Macmillan, 1936 c 
*^eblen, Ihorstein. Ihe Theory of Business Enterprise^ Hew York, Scrib-
ners* 1932« 
Mitchell, Wesley C« Business Cycles, liiew York, National Bureau of 
Economic Ees^roh* 1927« 
^jHamilton, '^te.lton and Others. Price and Price Policies. Hew York, MoGraw» 
Hill. 19S8. This is only one of a series of studies which Ibmilton has 
directed and which are the basis for his inferential The Bsbttem of Com-
laetition. Hew Yoxk, Columbia Universii^ Press. 1940. which is referred 
to a zumber of times in the present study. 
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If a2]Qroiu asks ma if 1 am a sooiali8t« and demands an anavrar* 
yes or no, in the rude -way ill-informed people have, I say no. 
But if atyone asks me if I am anti-sooialist or an individualist, 
I say no with equal readiness. I am not an anti-sooialist, be-
oause I think progress invol-ves a great extension of oonsoioue 
organization, and I do not olDject to that extension and tiy to 
hinder it as much as possible • • « I am not prepared to take 
the line of advocating or opposing things singly on the ground 
Hbskt th^ seem to be in aocordanoe ^nith a general prinoiple«^ 
The "natiooal" approach to economic problems has relegated internation­
al trade to a place of lesser prominence, as another aspect of trade in 
general. These words from Viner, a student of Taussig's, and an authority 
in the field are perhaps significants 
Bconomista are still fairly veil agreed that world-wide free 
trade would contribute greatly to world prosperiiy, and a 
majority of American economists, I l&ink, would still support 
with some degree of confidence the proposition that, in the 
long lun, and taking only considerations of American economic 
interest into account, the United States would benefit from a 
complete remicnral of its tariff* But the economists have never 
been able to convert the^&merican public to their views and,in 
recent years, have shown maxked signs of having been converted 
to the short-run and nationalistic views of the public* If the 
United States should move in the direction of substantially 
freer trade there ie now little prospect that the eotmomio 
profession would provide united leadership. JPerhaps this would 
not be a serious loss for the free trade cause, whi<^ is by no 
means merely a question of technical economic analysis cr even 
of material prosperil^. Security and power considerations have 
always be«i an inqportant factor appearing to justify and even to 
require trade barriers.2 
^Cannan, Sdwiiu The Kconomio Outlook. London, Unwin. 1912. p. 281-2. 
2 Viner, Jacob. "Peace as an Economic Problem"» op.cit., p« 103-4. 
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Polltloftl Equilibrium 
The problem of politioal equilibrium* or security* has b«ea tbe eon-
oern ohiefly of the politioal soientists, although eortalnly the soeiol* 
ogiats and the anthropologists through their studies of integration haTS 
also contributed muoh. With laanjr* the ptlnoipel reliance has been in the 
lav and organisation* with the bureaucracy as the nearest approach to a 
representati-vQ of the general interest that can be attained* Oaus^ has 
asserted* for instance* that "Under modsm conditions of ocnplex sooial 
organisation the civil servanb is the nearest to an agent of the vhole 
public in his ultimte function of looking out for the publio interest not 
only in the administration of existing law but also in observing social 
change." Others place greater eiephasis on the sheer **tnoral and physical" 
authority of goveraroent* to use a phrase from Hans J. Morgeuxthau^ eacponent 
2 
of the balance of poner thesis. Even Kmest Barker* liio has the highest 
faith in deaiooraey as a process* in his Reflections on Grovemaent* states 
that "The strengthening of executlTe govemroent* and an adequate prorislon 
of leadership* is thus a work of justification nAiioh dentooraoy has to 
g 
aohie-re." Pendleton Herring has offered one of the better works on Pub-
4 15-0 Administration in the Publio Interest* 
^SaTUS* John M. and Leon 0. Woloott* Rib lie Administration and the United 
States Departeent of Agrioulture^ Chicago* Public Administmtion ^ enrice* 
1940. p. 
Mtorganthau* Hans J. "Bie MsLohiaTellian Utopia", Ethics. January* 1945. 
^Barker* op. cit>* p. 415» 
%erring* S. Pendleton* Publio Administration and the Public Interest. 
Hew York* McSraw^Hill* 1956* 
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Certain studsnta of the problAzn of political eguilibriun soe its 
attaixsnent through tho medium of the '^xniddle olatses", as in the case of 
A*N« Boloonbe^- a thesis at least as old as Aristotle. 
Not to be ignored, of course, are the important wories of two Austrian 
eoonomists who maintain that no basis for equilibrating political forces 
exists •» that the growth of gownuoBnt interference with freedcm in 
eoonomio life is inevitably a etuulative prooess mhich must lead to a 
totalitarian, autooratio state, nriedridi A. Hayek and Ladwig von Uises 
hsTV reiterated this theme in many books and artioles, of lAxioh The Road 
3 S 
to Serfdom , by the former, and Bureanoga<ar by the latter, oan perhaps 
serve as representatiye. Against vdiioh should perhaps be posed Berman A. 
Flner*s^ reply to Bayek, bad tempered though it is, as well as his more 
prs0oatio study of a balancing of social, eoonomio, and political forces 
in -aw T.V.A.® 
^Bolooofbe, A.H. 3he Middle Classas in American Politics. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press* 1940. 
^Eay^, >riedrioh A* The Road to Serfdom. Chicago, Univeirsiiy of 
Chicago Press. 1944» 
% 
IGLses, liudwig von, Bureauoraoy. Ifoir Haven, Yale University Press. 1944. 
^Finer, Berman A. Road to fleaotion. Boston, Little, Brown* 1945. 
^nLUsr, Herman. !Pie T.Y.A»t Lessons for International Application. 
Uoatreal, Intematicnal Lsbor Qffioe. 
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Agriculture and Agricultural Policy 
A separate treatment of the place of agiriculture and of agiricultural 
policy is very old# Biis is perhaps because of the interest society has 
al'mys had in its source of food. Agricultural fundenentalism has had its 
champions in ersry ago. The Fhjrsioorats in France accorded agriculture 
special treatment, as the only true source of wealth. It was evident among 
the founders of this countxy^ espeoialJiy so in the writings and thia philos-
of^ of Jeffd»on» But when the world is viewed as a whole, the outstand­
ing faot of economic progress is the relative decline of the farnter as a 
producer of income, in the modem sense. This point is stressed by Colin 
1 2 Clai*: in his Important study* In its report on Postwar Agricultural Policy 
the committee of the Association of Land Grant Colleges azid Universities 
sets forth as one of the basic econonio considerations the fact that "in a 
progressive eooncaqr the needed foods and fibezrs can be produced by a 
decreasing proportion of tJje total population (production?)*" 
33ie record of American agriculture's continuing efforts to shape the 
conditions under which its production is carried on« are contained in two 
3 4 books, one J<flm 0* Black , and one by E.R.A* Seligman • A world approach 
^Clark, The Conditions of Ecoaomlc Ft-ogress, op, cit» 
2 Association of Land Grant Collsgea and Universities« JKeport of the Com­
mittee on Poetmr Agricultural Polioy, October 1944, p« 5. 
%laok, D,, ARrimtltural Refoim in the United States, New York* 
McGraw-Hill, 1929, 
Seligman, E,R,A, The Economics of Farm Relief, New Yoric, Coltunbia 
Haiversiiy Press, 1929, 
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1 to problems of agricultural policy has been attempted by Karl Brandt, as 
a basis for eoonomic presoription, assuming the political problem is capable 
of settlement* 
Gritioisms of existing agricultural polity are oontained in two con-
2 paratively reoent books 'ty agrioultural economists - T#W, Schults , and 
.. S 
John D* Black • A descripti-ve and analytical treatment of the workings of 
4 
agricultural price polioy« is oontained in a study by G*S, Shepherd. 
Ihe Sole of Tei^mology 
Perhaps tJie most important work on technology as the nntiYating force 
in economic progress* is o<utained in two wozks "by Josej^ A* Se^uropeter* 
Brandt, Karl» The Reoonatruotion of World Agriculture* Sew York, 
Norton.. 19^, 
2 Schults* T*?* Agriculture in an Unstable Boononnr. New York» UoGraw* 
Hill. 1945. 
®Blaok, John D» Parityj Parity, Parity. Cambridgei The Harvard Com­
mittee on Kesearoh in Social Sciences. 1942. 
4 Shepherd, GeoffS. Agrioultural Price Control. Ames, lowsi State 
College Press* 1945* 
5 Sdiuinpeter, Joseph A. The Theory of Economic PeTOlopmsnt. Cambridge, 
Harvard nnivwrsi-ty Press, also, by the sams author. Capitalism, Sooial'-
iam and Dsmoeraoy* Sew York, Iferper* 1942. 
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A vast amount of vrork in the Importanb field of the ivpMt of teoh­
nology upon institutions and organisation has been done by the Sooiologists, 
1 
W.F» Ogbuzn'' being one of the nx>re widely known in the field, Zhe in­
stitutional economists have always devoted oonsiderable attention to this 
important aspect of the adj^wtmenfc problem, and it is reflected in waoh 
of their work* 
Mention should pertvaps be aade of the wox^ of Lewis ttuaford^ whose 
2 leohnios and Civiligation uses teohnology as his point of departure. 
fhis brief sttmmary makes no elaim to completeness, and has been used 
only to indio&te' the areas from which, ideas and interprbtations have been 
borrowed in the process of thinking about the problem at hand* 
A Note on tiethodology 
The objective of science is prediction and, indirectly* control* 
5ho purpose of policy is control for purposes of prediction. Knowledge 
and actiohf in social affairs« is an interdependent process, each setting 
limits to the other* This is the eternal paradox, which the social 
scientist fi&oee, in his desire to know, to understand, and esqplain. To 
^idiat extent is he rationalising lAtat exists, or i^t should exist * his own 
^Ogburb, A«F« Sooial Change* Hew Yoxic, B*W* Oiebsch* 1934* This was 
among the earlier worka of this authors teohnology is considered as one 
of the ii^ortant forces of sooial ohangs* A later paaphlet. You and 
Machine* Bashington aatlonal Capital Press, 1934, contains a popular 
formulation of his -tresis. 
O 
lianford, Levis. TechnlcB and Civiligation. TTew York, larooux^ Brace* 
1934. 
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partloular tet of "beliefs" and "TRluations"?^ 
Ifaere is no neat solution to this parados* There is no "objeotive** 
nethod idiioh oan guarantee that results are soientifio beyond the "desire** 
to be obJeotlTv* 
Suoh Is the nature of social data tiiat tiioy can never be refined and 
purified in the laboratoxy* to be reoonibined in proper proportioxis so as 
to provide defiziitive ansivsrs on problems of preoise interaetion and Tar* 
iation* For iiiat reason the limitations imposed uptm the social sciences 
are truly great* The neat expedient of intellectual experiment (controlled 
by rigid aaBuiqytion and capable of considerable refinement) most useful 
as a teadhing device in the classroom# opens itself to the character* 
isation of "oulti'vaited nonsense" unless used wiiii the utmost care in the 
field of praotioal policy* 
Even -ttie iwdding of the sooinl eelenoes with statistics and matii* 
ematics, that handnaiden of all the sclenees« must accept its own limita­
tions as a device for discovering new truths about institutions that are 
ooQstantly changing^ at times fairly rapidly* and sust derive its principal 
usefulness frcis being able to tell "iriiat isn*t eo"» 
It is not possible in problem solving or prediction in the social 
soienoes to keep the distance betoeen puspose and method, which is is^osed 
12ie na1»rs of the subject matter on other soienoes. For man is both 
^Cf* Knight* op» pit* "The Limitations of Scientific IHisthod in Economics"* 
pp. 104-47. 
2 The phrase is Professor 7in8r*s* 
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the aubjeot and object of study, Even the astronomer, who now stands off 
from his subject (and therefore maintains proper perspective and objective 
given the power to participate in the affairs of the universe, would 
probably begin by altering a few orbits « the better to suit his taste or 
his preeonceptions on design * and end with a headache of collison courses 
^ich would greatly contplioate his science* 
In human affaiani, where '^valuations*', however anrived at, are social 
data, and thinking nay make it so if it results in action, where nothing 
succeeds so well as success, or fail so completely as a venture launched 
in the faee of doubt, laws can be no more l^n tendencies, oertainiy only 
a probabili^ wiidi not always clearly defined limits. "It is never givsn 
to man to know i&e whole truth, least of all about himself, lest he go 
blind or mad* He possesses only the power to detect untru^ in the mouths 
of -Uiose tAio claim a monopoly of truth*"^ 
Severthelesa, there can be no substitute for the spirit and method 
of science, for those who would see tiie direction mn is going, even though 
the purpose and and are unknown, ^ o seek in the formation of policies a 
common denominator for separate activities that will ssake possible at least 
a "reasoni&le" amount of stability in human relations. As %rdal has pointed 
out, one part at least of people^s opinions, the "beliefb" ae contrasted 
with "valuations" are subject to the ordinary methods of science* 
^Sehuman, Frederick L», Soviet Polities, Sfew York, Knopf. 1946* p.50« 
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The histozy of sooial esqperinsn'b is replete with oases vihere B'ven a 
rudimentary understanding of tendencies, and oven facts, that are fairly 
conuaon knowledge in the social seienoes (even -tiiough it be knowledge of 
vbat isn't so) eould have indicated in advance a probability of failure 
high enough to dictate their rejection in favor of an alternative. 
Vihile valuations are not of such nature that they can be made the 
subject of joeasurement by ordinary soientifio methods, they are neverthe­
less^ facts of the real world which have important bearings upon future 
events and Mre to be reckoned with in policy decisions, Ihey do have a 
connection vxiii the broad basic changes tixioh have occurred over time, 
particularly as i^ey affect expectations. 
It is an assumption underlying this study that these valuations are 
an expression of the changing power relationships -Oiat have taken place 
in consequence of the of technological progress and of shifts in 
the centers of resource control* 
The cumulative power struggle is such that efforts to gain further con-
tarol have inoreeisingly reduced the prospects for further economic progress 
and the processes of adjustment that is a prerequisite of that progress* 
It is further submitted that oo]^ through the integration of povrer 
conflicts and the regularization of their solution at progressively higher 
levels of organization can the conditions required for further eoonomio 
progress be reestablished. In short, policy making consists of the im-
positicm of certain political rigidities for "Qie pirpose of economic flex­
ibility. 
The point of departure for this study is the growth of a separate 
agricultural pressure group, with its own separate policy. This policy is 
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a -mluation.» vriiioh is the expression o£ agrioulture*s ooUeotivs power* 
and its interpretation of the past* 
At the same tine, the change in ^ ,3, foreign trade polloy* ejtpresses 
a shift in power relationships at a higher level. 
Both refleot the present reqairenients for institutiozial ohange whioh 
alone oan insure peaoe aod economic development* 
Although ito debate over free trade versus proteotiooEi nas long the 
issue at aoademio levels, that was never the probleavhidh the praetioal 
nan i^oed* The question -was 'vdiether tariffs ^ ould be higher or lover. 
The political success of protection oan be trapad in terms of the ocn> 
cessions the proteotiooists vers forced to make in order to gain the 
required political streng'tii for their ends* 
An attempt is made in the following pages to traoe the changes in the 
attitude of agrioultare mrith respect to foreign trade as a parallel to 
the development of the industrial eoonony* 
Agriculture was, in many respeots, the last of the eoonomio categories 
to respond to -what Barlcer has called the ^eruption of the group** • Like the 
others, it has progressively built up in its own mind, the value judgment 
that its own best interest is the interest of sociel^* That oonviotion is 
buttressed by the power iiiat acooiqpanies it* 
!Ihis study makes no pretensions to the discovery of new truth* its 
objective is otherwise* It is rather an attempt at synttiesis, a bringing 
together of material from diverse sources, as they bear, or appear to bear, 
upon the problems of two public poli^ areas* The method is explanatory 
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and tentatlTa* 
Thla ia dlotatad by tha Ikot that publlo policy haa mora and more 
baan aoknowlodgad aa oceupying a plaoa midway batman tha raaanrationa 
atakad out by the separate dlaoipllnes of polltloal solanoa and eoonomloa. 
Aa attempt haa been made to tra.oe bade an important area of natioral 
polioy, -with ita Attendant aaaun^tlona and valuationa* The funotion of 
asrioultura ia viewed aa more than the previa ion of food and fibres» but 
as part of tha larger aooial prooess liiioh has gradually freed men from 
a narrow dependenoe upon the soil. If it be taken, thus* there ia 
juatifiofttion for the reocawideration of the whole background of that 
l]q>ortant induatry in Anarioan life« and a reaaon to raise the question 
of what its future is to be. 
To oonsider eoonooios and polioiea aa part of an interdependent 
process is of course nothing new. liarx was among t^e first of the social 
aoientists to attenqpt it on a grand aoale. He thought he had fouod the 
key to histoxy. He founded a iriiole aohool of thought* and a political 
aotion« based upon the aasumption that oxily Idie viotoiy of oxw of the 
oontending classes in the social conflict can work for the unfolding 
hiatozy. It was his belief that eoonomics was the cause« politics the 
effect. Ihe view here expzvssed stands Uurx on his head (aa he olaimed 
to haws done to Hegel), For it appears tiiiat only in periods of political 
rtabfiliiy Sias ooonomiB progreos nade substantial headaay*. 
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If justifioation be zxeeded for an attempt to straddle two areas 
of the sooial dlseiplines, perhaps these vords of Bopke's will be as 
good as ax^s 
As ths present hlstoricsal crisis finds its first, its most 
painful and its most oonspiouous manifestation in the 
eoonomio sphere, and sinoe the nineteenth oentury has 
aooustomed us to treat the eoonomio problems as the main. 
ones, it is easy to understand yixy the crisis is conceived 
primarily as an eoonomio one and indiy, therefore, the tradition^ 
al approaches of economics ha-ve been relied upon thus far 
•• men and means haire been mobiliaed during the last ten 
years, on an unprecedented scale. Pacts have been piled up 
sky the real cause of deficiency in the sooial eoiences 
seems to lie just in the narronnsss of our economic conception • 
There is, in fact, iaoreasing evidence that tiie real epicentre 
of the eai>thquake does not lie by any means in the striotly 
eoonomic sphere, but raider that the economic disturbances 
are only the external manifestation..^ 
^Bopke, Wilhelm* Intematiooftl Econoroic Disintegration. London, 
William Hodge# 1942« pp* 1-2. 
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PAJil II. 
THE cmmim ROIiE op AGRICrJLTtJl® AS A FACTOR IN U.S, TRADE POUCT 
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CHAPTER IV, 
THE PAIiMER*S ROLE IH INDUSTRIAL TRAiSSPORMATIOH 
It ia possible to present a oase for the l^othesis «iat the faraer 
beaeme a protsotionist through conversion* and to eonolvda vith one 
eoonomio historian -&at ^'During muoh of the period from 1860 to 1900 the 
fanner was quite cloubtftil of the effect of the tariff on his narkets and 
prosperity . , , yet viien tariffs on all -ttiey (the farmers) bought kept 
rising, -tiiey fell an easy dupe to protectionist argvu&ents*"^ For» iriiat 
agriculture now seeks in the articulation of its om polioy^ industry 
sought and obtained for itself earlier. 
Wore is involTed, hovever, than a process of oonrorslon. The tradition 
of "the Amertcan •way" has uisdoubtedly had an independent influence of its 
am, supported by certain empirical e^denoe of benefits derived by speeif* 
io individuals and groups, but lixe basis for this meeting of minds in the 
growth of aotive protectionism among the fanners is to be fooM not in the 
idea but in the common den<»iinator of opportunity, in ths creation of a 
vested interest and the growth of political power* 
Agriculture had to wait, perforce, for the woxking of time and tech­
nology to o-vero^Ros the earlier barriers of sheer spaoe to communication 
^hazmon, Fred A« !flie Farmer's last Frontier« New Toric, Farrar and 
Eineharfc# 1945* pp« 196«5» 
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and organisation befora it oould attain the basis of a unity #iich ino 
dustzy hadf almost from the begixming* Until almost the beginning of 
the twentieth eentury, the great bulk of American farmers, widely 
soatfcered aoross a sweep of continent 'Uxree thousand by sixteen hundred 
miles, had in coomon little more than a sutaal hunger for free land. 
Under oiroumstanoes iriiere the marginal produotivi-fy of displacing Indians 
appeared so high, at least in terms of expectations for future increments 
in land Talues, problems of foreign trade policy could be lefb to 
those with an interest in that sort of thing. Only if it offered the 
prospect of new lands, as it did in 1812 and 1860, oould the faxmer's 
interest be aroused. 
The farmer performed his function as an alienator and exploiter of 
virgin resources to makB his contribution to the growth of the republlo, 
but a foro* that was transforming England and the rest of Europe, the 
dyaamioa of the industrial rerolution, was to change his republio in a 
manner no one oould have foreseen* It was to transform the fazmer as 
well, bring him closer to his neighbors, shift him in great numbers to 
oities and towns, end alter his own way of life and doing business* In 
the words of Walton Hamilton, "Zhe farmer, bulwaric of the old system, 
was dragged into the new, forced to beoome somethixg of an industrialist, 
and in time to speak the language of business with a slightly alien accent*" 
on, Tblton* The ftittem of Cwipetitiop, op cit* p, 21* 
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Early Trade Policy 
The United States began its national life as a predominantly agricul­
tural country. Aside from the local products of handicraft trades» 
usually closely linked with agricultura itself* the nation was depend-
exit (gu9 the colonies had been) on isqpoits to supply the goods of more 
complex jnamfacture. Agricultural exports« the surpluses cbtained from 
cultivation, the furs and hides collected by the hunters and trappers, 
the m-val stozvs from abundant natural groerth, irere the resources converted 
by trade into items of consumpbion which could be had in no other my.^ 
Jefferson, the auldior of the Declaraction of Independence, ivas above 
all both in practice end in outlooTc, an agrarianj a majority of the 
members of the Constitutional Convention came frtaa the land - the landed 
gentry to be sure, but their outlook emd interest were tied closely to the 
soil and the primary industries of agriculture and forestry,^ The makeup 
of the first Congress did not depart from this earlier pattern. 
It would be easy to conclude, therefore, that vihon the first tariff 
act of 1789, which has been characterized as "protective in Intention and 
„S 
spirit" was passed, it was -Qie farmers of the courctry who initiated an 
embryonic "American system" of protection — allowances being made, of 
^Tiaussig* PVW* The Tariff Hiatory of the United States. New York, 
G«P« Putneon's Sons. 8th Edition* 1930. p« 8* 
^Bodell, Fred* Fifty-five men* New Yoric, Dial Press* 1934« 
^Xaussig, op* oit»a p* 16« 
oourse* for the faot of limited manhood suffrage and certain oonsnon inter-r 
ests of the landlords and eniall manufacturers and traders in the struggle 
for powers On tiie o-Uier hand> it has frequently been taken for granted 
that the inspintion for proteoti<»i was provided in Alexander Hamilton's 
famed Report on Manufaotuirers of 1792^ But there is evidenoe to support 
the thesis that neitiier a desire on the part of ^ e farmez>s to create a 
home xnanufacturing industzy* nor their oonversioa by Hamilton^ played a 
signifioant part in the deoision to embark on a policy of proteotiozu 
Taussig points out that Hamilton's recommendations had very little 
effecrt on legislation.^ The provisions of the act of 1789 were decidedly 
on the moderate side, and, apart from a few speoifio duties (on certain 
selected items of tmde such as hemp, cordage, nails, iron and glass) 
to stimalata prodaotion, -were general and intended to raise revenue only* 
For the next 20 years the country followed, to all intents and purw 
poses, a free trade course, and the gross volums of trade, both in imports 
euad exports, rose steadily* Yankee traders became familiar figures in the 
ports of the vorlda Many Hew England fortunes had their foundation in the 
foreign trade which plied a two and three-vay exchange^ returning to home 
ports wil^ cargoes which ranged from molasses, oriental silks and spices 
to Africsn slaves and immigrants in seardi of freedom an3 land* 
^Ibid«, p» 10* 
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liable 1. Srovbh of CJ*S* foreign trade, 179L-1814 
t Gross t t Exports of t Price of 
Year t imports t Gross 1 foreign 1 flour 
t (000) « exports 1 produce t per bbl* 
1791 29,200 19,000 500 
1792 31,500 20,700 1,750 5.07 
1793 31,100 26,100 2,100 6.21 
1794 34,600 33,000 6,500 7.22 
1795 69,700 48,000 8,500 12.05 
1796 81,400 67,000 26,500 12.45 
1797 75,400 56,800 27,000 9.00 
1798 68,500 61,500 53,000 8»78 
1799 79,000 78,600 45,500 9.62 
1800 91,200 71,000 39,100 9.85 
1801 111,300 94,000 46,600 10.45 
1802 76,300 72,000 55,700 6.78 
1805 64,700 55,800 15,600 6.75 
1804 85,000 77,700 36,200 8.22 
1805 120,600 95,500 53*200 10.28 
1806 129,400 101,500 60«500 7.30 
1807 188^500 108,300 59,600 7.00 
1808 57,000 22,400 15,000 5.60 
1809 59^400 52,200 20;800 6.90 
1810 85,400 66,700 24,400 9.66 
1811 53,400 61,300 16,000 10.00 
1812 77,000 38,500 8,500 8.75 
1813 22«000 27,900 2,600 8.50 
18U 1S«000 6,900 ISO 7.70 
Sourcet Ssussig, F*tr«, Ihe Tariff History of the United States* 
Bat the course of trade, as mil as 'ttw direction of Azserioan deT»l-> 
opment* was interrupted and given nev directions "by war. And by the War 
of 1812 * especially by -titie Embargo and Hon-^teroourse Acts Khich 
preceded it - there tias created first of the vested interest in a 
protected mrket. Thoy iwre provided an entering iredge by the fftraers 
azd a president n^o had glorified agrieultun and iihose basic philosophy 
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"MM grouadtfd in a distrust of manufaotures* 
Th« l^argo of 1807« and the Non^Tntercourse Aot of 1809^ and finally 
the «ar with Oreat Britain^ whioh was deolared in 1812a were motivated by 
ittterflsrenoa vith this oovuatxy's foreign oonmeroe* Jefferaon« fearing war 
ojod desiring peaee, had first ordered Amerioan ships from the seas and then 
attenqtted to disoourage their entry into Buropean ports to avert the pos* 
sibilily of eonfliet with eitiier England or Ifapoleon* It was the over-
balanoing majority of the agrioaltural interests that made the deoision 
on idiioh aetion was eventually taken • and this deoision was made against 
the opposition of -ttie ocomeroial interests^ as the fieards have pointed out> 
If in form vrar on England was deolared for oonoeroial 
notlves, it vras in reali-fy oonoeived primarily in the 
interests of agriealtura • • • Agriculture just as shipping 
suffered firom British depredations« for American exports were« 
in the main, xiot manofaotures but the produce of farms ani 
plantations* She laea who voted in 1812 for the deolaration 
of war on represonted the agrarian oonstituenoies of 
the interior • • 
Moire than the question of American rights on the seas was involved* 
The then is^rialistioally inclined farmers* pushing out fVom the frontiers, 
and resentAil of British aid and encouragement to the hostile Indians« saw 
an opportunity to annex Canada and ronove the influence of England from 
the oontinent* 
Quite aside from intentions* however* the ot^erall effeot of the war 
was to prcnKJte the growth of domestic industry* Restrictive legislation 
from 1808 to 1815 amounted to an equivalent of extreme protection and 
under the mantle of the Bobargo and !Ion->Interoourse Aots* as well as the 
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TOT Mstrietions, a substantial body of manufaeturera gr«w up* After 
1816« their success depended heavily on continued protectioai consequent­
ly they "foimed "tiie basis of a strong movement for more decided limitation 
of foreign competition."^ 
Although it had for a tinw been assumed that world trade relations 
•would return to what they had been prior to I8O&0 the pressure for ia-
creased protection continued to mount, and the still comparatively moder­
ate tairiff of 1816 passed through successive upnard revisions until it 
reached an ell-time high in the Hariff of 1828 - the "tariff of abom­
inations'** 
It can be stated, therefore, that at the inception of the American 
policy of proteotion. the role of agriculture -was one of unwitting oollab-
oration. The farmers' stand in the dispute with England had been a ma;)or 
cause of mur betneen the tvo countriM - r. war Aihloh oraated the ciroum-
stances out of which grew a veeted interest in protection in the home 
matrket* The mushrom industries cone to look upon the domestic eonsunsr 
as their oon, ^  ri^t, and proceeded to oonaolldate a close-knit position, 
over tiie years, in defense of that right* 
Betneen 1816 and 1820 the proteotioniets were able to muster consider­
able support among the farmers, largely because of the effects of an agri­
cultural depression which helped oreate willing listeners* The grain trade, 
which had been unusually profitable during the Kapoleooio wars and insasd-
^Tbussig, op* oit», p* 17* 
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lately after, due to droath and short orops in Europe, collapsed shortly 
thereafter vith the ia^joaition of the British Com Laws of 1816 and the 
good harvest abroad in 1818, Land prices, vfeioh had risen sharply during 
the boom, collapsed, and the farmers, particularly of the middle states,^ 
follcwed the lead of the manufaoturers in their demand for the oreati(m 
2 
of a home market by means of protective legislation* Moreover, they 
asked for protection of their own. products of wool, hemp, flax, and even 
for com and -v^eat* 
Although a temporary phenomenon, attributable to the depression 
psydiology and slated to cool perceptibly as foreign markets began to im­
prove with the increasing eoonomio aotivil^ in Europe, this brief fam 
support from the middle states aided the profcectionists over the roughest 
part of the conflict with the oommereial interest of How England, and the 
unregexierate opposition of the southern agrarians. 
During the years frcm 1820 to 1860, the most important single factor 
in the economic development of the ccuntzT^ was the effect of industrial 
specialisation in Ikirope, which led in turn to the tremendous expansi<m 
in agricultural specialization in America* The factories and mills of 
England depended on tbe foods and fibres of the New World to a flar greater 
extent Idian ever before* A balanced trade bel^en the fields of the 
^Kbw Toilc, Hew Jersey, FSnosylvania, (Mo, and Eentuoliy* 
2 This included, in addition to tariffs, a bill for shortening credits 
on duties, and a tax on sales by auction of imported goods. Taussig, 
op. Pit*, p* 70* 
75. 
United States and the shops^ of the Old World ran parallel vith expansion 
and population grogrbh in both hemispheres, with ootton» tobaooo* oereals, 
and meat, beiag used to purcheuse tools, textiles, metals, glassvaro, 
earthenware, azid other items of oon'venienoe and luxury* Four-fifths of 
all U*S, exports during the period were farm products*^ But the imports 
began to inolude more and more the means of industrial production - capital 
goods for railroad building, machinery, and techniques* Indeed, the nhole 
industrial revolution mui imported, and soon American inventors were mak­
ing Qontributions of t^eir own to the advanoement of the aieoondaxy in-> 
dustries* 
Foireign trade policy fluctuated widely, as reflected in "ttie success* 
i-ve tariff acts, scmetimes registering trivai{die for the proteotionistB, 
SQinetistes granting ooaoesaiozis to the South. In the Tariff Act of 1828, 
l^e strategy of the southeiu representatives, of voting ridioulously high 
rates to all oomers in an attempt to defeat the upnard revision as a -nhole, 
baokfired, and the **tariff of abomiimtions" became law* But the Ordnance 
^It is to be noted that the South had supported the oon^aratively mild 
tariff increases in the Act of 1816* fiut by 1820 they were again in 
violent opposition* A slave econon^y was not adapted to factories* 
Ifeumfac^red goods would have to be iiqiorted from the outside, in any 
event* They could be had n»re cheaply froia Etiglazul than from a pro* 
ted^d dotnestic industry* And there was always ths fear that Britain 
mi^t retaliate with a tariff on cotton* 
Departanent of Agriculture, tamers in a Changing World* 
Hashingtcm, D*C» 1940 Yearbook* p* 571« 
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of Nullifioatlon, which passed the South Carolina legislature in the 
autusm of 1882* and other threat* to the Union, brought some modification 
in the Iwriff Aot of 1832« vilix the consent of the proteotlojoista* Al­
though in 1852 Henry Clay* ardent protectionist» had vranted to retain the 
rates of 1828 izifcaot« he rose to ih» occasion in 18SS with his fsinious 
compromise n^ich appeared to satisiy both sides - the South with proposals 
for reductions« the protectionists with the assurance that the reduotioos 
would be spread over 10 years 
Although the whole struggle of this era was heavily charged with 
many purely personal issues * such as Jackson's hatred for Calhoun •» it 
was evident that "Uie protectionists wore being forced to give grouxid in 
the flaoe of an aroused publio opinion* Ibussigf for exan^le, observes 
that "In the farming states* tiie enthusiasm for the home maricet had cooled 
peroeptiblyi and in nanafaoturing states the agitation came rather from 
2 the froduoers directly interested than from the publio at large." 
The CoiBpra&ise Aot of 1833 continued in effect until 1842, with 
reduptioos proceeding gradually as scheduled; then in 1942 tariff rates 
were ijuite low for a period* but were increased substantially in -Uiat 
year* to remain so until 1846, In 1846 they wejpe again lowered and a pe3^. 
iod of very moderate protection continued until 1857* -adien rates were 
still furtiier moderated. 
^eard* op, eit»* Vol, I* p, 559, 
2 Xaussig* op, pit,, p, lis. 
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But "bha debaties in Congrosa had begun to mirror* with ever«>inoreasing 
bitterness» the approach of -Htie "irrepreesible oonfliot". The issue of 
slavery ms injeoted into the picture by th> northern abolitionists, while 
the southern representatives charged that this issue -was "mere subterfuge 
to cover other purposes"• All other issues tended to be subordinated to 
the stKiggle for power - power to determine« in the final analysis, the 
shape and direotion of national policy* Beuben Davis, of Mississippi, 
however, declared in 1860, almost on the eve of the Civil War: 
ilhere is not a pursuit in whioh man is engaged (agriculture 
excepted) which is not demandii^g aid to enable it to enlarge 
its profits and all at the expense of the primary pursuit of 
man « agriculture • • » Kow this combined host of interests 
stand arrayed against the agricultural states; and this is 
•the reason of the conf Hot which llffe an earthquake is shaking 
our political fabric to its foundation.^ 
For those liio incline toward a Hheory of history**, it is easy to 
detect in the events of the period the inevitable wox^cing out of a 
process« -^le predestined emergence of triumphant "capita lism". An approach 
which weights more heavily idie in^ot of random variables and the role 
of oonsoiais human decisions can trace -tite threads of an unfolding strat­
egy, the in^ositlon of an induced behavior, lAiioh gave powerful direotion 
to future events. rigid standards of econonie interest, the tariff-
consoious industxdallsts should have found the agrarian interests of the 
Forth and West arrayed against them wi-t^ tiie agricultural South} true, 
the slave-holding planter had little in ccnmnon wi-Ui the crude frontier 
^Q^oted in Beard, op» oit«. Vol* 1I« p« 4* 
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farmers, but the gap was ao greater than it -was with the small farmers 
and free holders of the South -vdio fought beside their aristocratic 
neighbors in the "vrar bo-fcween the states'*. But the compact industrial 
gjroups of the East and North possessed a cohesion and uni-by of purpose 
which the seotioml, highly individualistic farmers lacked. 
That stra-tegy has been aptly characterised in a report -which was 
presented to -the Twelfth In-bemational Studies Conference at Bergen, 
Norway, in 1939: 
The main agricultural industries were export industries; 
co-bton and -wheat had -their -world price fixed at Ld.'verpool, 
and it -was not easy to see why -bhey should permit -bhe 
artificial raising of -the price level of manufactures -vAien 
it was impossible to pretend, with ax^ real plausibilil^, 
-that protection oould do any^ing for the farmers. Until the 
Civil lt!br, this obs-tacle was too great even for so adroit a 
poli-tician as Henry Clay, but -the Republican Party -was able to 
combine an appeal to moral emotion, -to economic interest,and 
to patriotism that worked the trick.^ 
The economic side of -bhis strategy centered around -bhe public domain, 
and the Viest was enlis-bed on -bhe side of -bhe par-^jr of pro-bection by -the 
prospect hold out to it of free land under a "liberal Homestead Act". * 
The public land question had been interwoven -with the tariff controvewy 
almost from -the beginning, since both offered possibilities to the federal 
2 government for raising its reveme. Accordingly, as part of its -tactics 
to a-btract -the farmers, -the young Sepublican paiiy let it be known that 
a quarter section of lemd carved free from the public holdings would be 
^Gayer and Sdimidt, op. cit», p. 7. 
2 
Beard, op. cit». Vol. I, p« 562. 
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pairb of its program of the land hungry settlers* Support enlisted in 
this manner tended to continue throughout nndi of the seoond half of the 
nineteenth century, even though the land oade available was never "free" 
and the Homestead Aot, as a^nistered, was anything but liberal*^ How-
ev»r« evidenoas of continuing oonsiderationa oan be seen in the i^et 
that the nane of Justin Morrill graces both the Land»Orant College Acts 
and a mmiber of the important Tariff Acts* 
liith the aid of the Vtesty the northern proteotioxxists were destined 
to emerge trivuBphant from their struggle with the southern agrarians, 
with praotioally a oarte blanohe for their system of regulating "oconeroe 
with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian 
tribes,"^ 
Final triuaph of an extreme policy of proteotion, however, oan only 
be viewed in the full light of its historioal badcground if oertain 
details of policies ewlved to nset the exigencies of the war be included* 
Financing of the Civil War, as of all wars, required the development 
of new sources of revenue* A system of excise taxes of extraordinary 
intensity azd inolusivansss were introduced to supplement tiie tariff, 
t^ich, up to that tine, had been pzaotically the sole souaroe of federal 
revenue* The tairiff, too, xmdement an upiiard revision as a means of 
increasing government income. But tariffs, if carried to too great e*» 
^Robbiss, Rcy M* Our Landed Berltage* 
Press* 1942* pp« 296*267* 
^Art* I, Sect* 8, tJ*S* CoiMtitution* 
Frinoeton, Prince ton University 
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trenMSf beocne aelf-ilefeating as produovrs of revenue* More and more 
the burden VM imposed upon domestic Industries and oonsumers* Zn this 
context there was evt>l-ved the practice of extendiiig tariff protection to 
all industries carrying hea^ excise duties as a means of ocmpenaiting them. 
''The high duties vhidi the nar thus caused to be imposed* at first regarded 
as temporary* were retained, increased, and systematized, so developing 
gradually into a system of extreme protection*"^ 
During l^e 26 years that the party of protection iias to remain uni-
challenged in its control of national poliqy, the "war tariff**, irtiich in 
tiie beginning had been regarded as unreasonably high even suoh convinced 
protectionists as iforrill* was rationalised and justified Ijy degrees, 
was allowed to stand and even raised} after ths war taxes vbioh had 
called it forth were abolished. 
Thus, by its support of the pojrty of extrane protection, did part of 
agriculture (Just as it had in 'Uie first decade of the century) contribute 
to t2ie "inerican traditi<»i'' of IT«S» trade policy, largely by indirection. 
lAoldng a policy of their own, other than in a purely immediate sense, 
(incapable, in fact, of achieving such a policy) the famer acted in 
ccmsort with the group which did have a policy* Later on, -«dien they were 
to recant someidiat and lead the fi^t against the creature they had helped 
create <* the trust - the "road bade" was a difficult one« to say the least. 
"Tfeussig, op* Pit., p, 155* 
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Opposition to Protaetion After 1860 
Between the Civil War and the end of the century, the eeonony of 
the United States underwent a complete transformation. From a primarily 
agricultural country, in tshich the small farm -was dominant, there emerged 
one of the vrorld^s largest industrial nations. 
Students of economic histozy differ in their iveighting of the causal 
factors in this process of transformation. To some, the tdse of large 
scale production units, the building of the cities, the spanning of the 
continent-with railroad netwoz^cs, represented the "triuiaph of ljusiness 
entei^rise**.^ lo others, changing technology, the increase of scientific 
and technical knowledge^ provided the impetus for the transformation! and 
the growth of the modem econorsy hecoinsB, by this hypothesis, a fortuitous 
combination of increasing skills with a continent of fabulously ri(^ 
resources* "Things are in ths saddle, and the course of adventitious 
2 
events takes its tunuliuous -nay domi the decades.** Both, it appears, 
mre part and parcel of the same process, wildi technology providing the 
stimulus, the organisational fonts constituting the adaptatiozu 
As the vealth and poirer of 'Uie nation grew, the protectionists of 
the period attempted to claim ths credit for their own* Shey had promised 
the farmer markets in return for protection^ and it behooved -tiiem, in the 
^Beard, op, eit>, Tol, II, p» 166, 
2 Hamilton, op« oit»» p*19» Also see Schumpeter, Josej^i, Capitalism, 
Socialism and Demooracy* Sociologists like W«F« Ogbum have had 
considerable to say in ihis particular field of i^e influences of 
technology. 
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interest of continuance of their policy, to claim credit when credit 
"Was to their advantage. 
There can ho little doubt that the growth of certain industries 
•was stimulated "by protection. That industrialization itself-was promoted 
by the tariff is open to serious question. Taussig, after long and care­
ful study, has shown in the oase of one industry after another that tech­
nological advance f not proteotion, must be given credit for the rise of 
great industrial processes. Cannon is even more specific in his con^ 
elusion: 
Even the loudly debated tariff from 1816 to 1897, did 
little more than favor one business at the expense of 
another} it has not been demonstrated that industrial­
ization as a whole was benefited*^ 
One phase of national ©oonomic development, however, did derive 
great stimulation and support from protection - the rise of industrial 
combination and trusts. That the newer technology would have prcmoted 
this growth in ary event cannot be gainsaid. But that the lure of gi^at 
profit, to be gained by combining to exploit a growing domestic market 
behind protective tariffs, accentuated and extended this tendency in a 
manner to produce serious abuse, political corruption, and exploitation, 
is a fact supported by impressive evidence. Herein is to be found the 
beginnings of the cumulative use of power* 
The technological involution produced its effect on agriculture as 
well as on industry. But as exporters still, of large quantities of their 
produce, and widely scattered over the continent on millions of individual 
^Cannon, op. pit., p* 197* 
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hemestaa<b,th8 famera were ujiable to achieve the degree of oombiaaticm 
"Which ma vflthin eaay reaoh of auoh industries aa sxigar* iron and steel, 
railroads, oil, textiles, and others* Unable to Join effectively witti 
one another in the exploitation of special advantages as producers, the 
farmers joined in the reform movement vhioh ultimately sueoeeded in 
turning out the party of extreme protection in 1884, on a program tdiioh 
included the regulation of trusts and the revision dowonard of the tariff* 
Among the dissident agrarians, it is true, the burning Issue of -Uie day 
was the breaking up or the regulation of tiie monopoliea and the institut­
ing of other domeatio reforms, but in tte great tariff battle nhioh fol* 
loired Cleveland's flamous message of 1867, the lineup of forces in opposition 
to protection found many ftinners on the same side of t^e issue as -titie free 
traders* Cleveland, wilii a display of courage and insight rare in U#S, 
political history, had attacked the protectionist -tttesis on the grounds 
that -Uie tariff, besides being 'Srioious and ineguitable", taxed evezy 
consumer in the Icmd "for the benefit cf the manuflaoturers*'*^ 
Cleveland vnsia defeated for rseleotim in 1888, but triien the Bepub* 
lican party interpreted its victoiy as an endorsement for oontimed protec­
tion, f)urm voters oontributed heavily to that party's overture in the bi* 
electiona of 18S0 and to Clevelazid'a return to office in 1892. 
Even the Bepubliean party -ma to find within its ranks, from the 
* 
Korth and Ifest, representatives of tto agricultural inberests definitely 
^f* llavizis, Allan, Groynr Cleveland« Stow Toric, Dodd, jlead« 19S2* 
Especially pp* 983-40S* 
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on the side of lower duties on foreign goods. The Chicago Tribtme of 
tha'^ day declared emphatically -ttiat "liie nestem farmers paid dearly for 
•Oie tariff". Such Twjpe the convictions of editor Joseph Wedill that he 
vented his editorial spleen in a vein calculated to arouse the inert 
faraers to aotiont 
llhere then is HVB reme^ from the heayy burdens of a fifl^ 
per cent tax on the necessities of life* both iinpox*ted and 
domestic? Ther« is only on® eleioent or class able to remo-ro 
it and that Samson is sleeping in the lap of Delilah and will 
not anaken, of ooiirse, mean the farmers. The plundered, 
unproteoted twenty^five million of gooseolike farmers 
pesDiit themselves to be pluoked of almoct evezy f';iather by a 
hundred thousand 'proteoted' monopolies. So long as this simple-
minded* buoolio class does not kick off the burden laid upon 
Congress will not distuzl} the mir taxes and the nan-
ufaotarers* corresponding bounties. 
Act they did, in a series of movements - the Grangers, •tiie Planners 
Alliance, the Populist Party - and dozens of additional spontaneous 
organisations, with the prime native of stripping political poirer from 
monopolists, tiiie railroads, and Itail Street* They were advised by sudi 
agrarian orators as liuy E. Lease, idio, in Hie course of her 160 speeches 
during the camiMign of 1890, is reputed to have said, '^vniat you farmers 
need to do Is to raise less oom and more Hell." 
Hot all of the farm organisations were In favor of free trade or 
even of protection. Proposals ranged frat a tariff on bananas to in­
crease t^e oonsumption of home-gronn fruit, to the payraent of bounties 
Congressloxml Record. Slst Congress, first Session, p. 4456. 
Quoted by Eepxesentatlve ISalker of iiissourl in an address before 
ilousa. 
^EDLoks, John D«, The Populist Revolt. Mnneapolis, the Unlversity 
of Minnesota Press. 19SI« p. 160. 
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to producers of such home-grown, crops as sugar beets. 
Lacking the unity necessary for concex^d action, possessing in 
coDjmon only the depression-bred misery and resentment with their lot, the 
agrarian revolution was di-verted first to a new party and then to the 
"money issue", meeting final defeat in 1896* Improving economic con­
ditions and the improved expectations for 1±ie future had reduced the mil­
itancy of the farmers. The party of protection, secure once more, -was to 
hold sway for 16 more years, and as if for appeasement, the fanners were 
granted tariffs on several of their own world-traded crops in the Act 
of 1897, 
A review of agriculture's role in the shaping of foreign economic 
policy "would not be cos^lete without further mention of the couixber 
movement within the party of proteotim itself - the so-called "progressive 
movement"* During the early years of the present century, led by a small 
group of dissident senators from the predominantly agricultural Middle 
West, a revolt against the steadily increetsing demands of the protectixxo-
ists and their complete dominance of the Republican party was carried to 
the floor of the Senate diring the debate on ths Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 
1909* This revolt was the forerunner of the third party movement in 1912 
which contributed to Woodrcw Wilson's victory. 
The names most prominently associated with the progressive movemenb 
were those of Senators Beveridge, iaFollette, Dolliver, and Cummixis 
all middle-westerners* In the heat of their battle, senator Beveridge of 
Indiana was quoted as saying, "I want to see an end to the scandal that 
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has aoooiq>anied the framing of ovory tariff "bill. It has corrupted 
itoerican industries and made great enterprises inere adjuncts to political 
„1 
agitation*" Senator Aldrioh, leader of the extreme protectionists, in 
an attempt to read the dissenters out of the party declared, "The Senate 
has been votizig in reference to these matters vith men who belie-ve that 
protective duties are added to the cos-t of all domestic articles* The 
Senator's speech (Beveridge's) would ha-ve been made with great effect by 
2 
any free trade or tariff refomer." 
In the final vote on t)» bill« tan Kspublican senators^ all from the 
middle vestem agricultural states^ opposed the measure« That the 
pirogressives interpreted correctly the attitudes of their conBtituents, 
and of the counfciy generally, was borne out by the voters at the polls in 
1910 and again in 1812* The split between the two wings of the Bepublican 
parl^ contribated to the victory of Woodrow Ifilson and Democratic 
party^s program of tariff reduction, but it is doubtful, in the light of 
lowers, Claude Beveridge and the Progreseive Era> Hew York. 
Literaiy Guild* 1932. p» 342* 
^ibid,, r. 345. 
^On July 10, 1908* the Hew York Uliorld published a political cartoon 
portrsyisg a bronse tablet engraved with the names of ten Bepublican 
8«aiators« bearing the inscription, "In honor of the ten Republican 
senators nho voted for -Uie people againet privilege, plutocracy, and 
the betrayal of party ftiith#** fhe senators listed weret Beveridge, 
Indianat Buricett and Broim, Nebraska} Dolllver and Cunmins, lowaj 
Clapp and Nelson^, Minnesota} Crawford of South Dakota} Briston of 
Kansas; and LaFollette of Msoonsin* 
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the 1910 voting, that even without the split the results Tfould ha ire been 
greatly different. In their platform, the ProgressiTrss favored a proteo« 
tive tariff •whioh would equalise oonditions of oompetition between the 
United States and foreign ooustries, both for the Ikrmers and the man-
ufaotorers, but pledged a downeard revision.^ Their program was not as 
radical as that of the Democrats on "Qie tariff and proved to be vexy 
popular in -t±» farming states» seimral of whieh returned a larger vote 
for the Progressives than for eiiiier of the other parties. 
President Mlson, in his tariff message^ deolaredt 
We oust abolish evexythisg that bears a samblanoe of 
privilege of pay kizid of artificial advantage^ azid put 
oar business men aod producers under the stimulant of a 
constant necessi-^ to be efficient, economical, and enters 
prising masters of competitive supremacy, better woricexw 
and merohants than any in the world,^ 
The Underwood tariff of 1913 was far from a free trade program, but 
it did represent a step in the direction of free trade and was a reflec-
tion of public sentiment and 'tibe sentiment of much of agrioultuxw. "Ihe 
Democrats in the House • • • passad. bills for lowering greatly the duties 
on cottons and woolens; and they passed a 'farmers free list* bill \thioh 
% 
indicated what element in the electorate they were determined to bid for." 
This first significant downmrd revision in the U.8» tariff since 
^P&rter, Kirfc National Party Platforms. Niwr Yox^* liaemillan* 1928* 
2 
Ctongressional Record. 65rd Congress, l«t Session. Part 1. p. 132, 
^ussig, op. Pit., p. 413* The Arae list for farmers included 
machinery, binding taine, fertllizar ingredients, etc. 
before the Civil Titer never became effective, howeverj tiie obtrusion of 
World War I so changed the entire trade picture that neither the catas­
trophe forecast Tiy the protectionists nor the "new freedom" of the 
believers in free trade bore ai^ resemblance to the real events* Changes 
already evident before 1914 -were speeded up and intensified so that the 
whole -world was destined* though a mliant effort ims made, never to 
return to what it had come to regard (perhaps only after it was gone) 
a« normal* 
tinder the stlmilus of war demnd, intensified by England and France 
having been cut off from the Dominions, from South America, and from 
Russia in the east, prices of agricultural commodities rose, and farm 
output in the United i>tates was expanded to a new high. Foreign claims 
against the imerican economy, built up by borrowing from abroad during 
the previous century, were liquidated in great blocks, paid off with 
twenty dollar hogs, two dollar and twenty cent wheat, and eighteen 
dollar beef. The raison d'etre of the export surplus nhich had seemed 
a permanent characteristic of the Americsn economy had disappeared. 
liUhen the land of Burope once again came bade into production and 
the remote and newer agricultural areas were released from the U-boat 
blockade, the foreign outlets of the American farmer shrank to a fraction 
of idiat they had been and U«S« agriculture was forced to adjust 
itself to a greater reliance on the home market than it had ever knovm* 
Now, at last, the argianents for protection to -riiich it had been 
subjected for so many yeai^ were listened to with 
89 
renewed interest* Industry# persisting in old habits« and beating the 
drums for a return to "normalcy", -nas intent on renevrad insurance against 
foreign competition, "Ihe feeling for national self-sufficiency was 
intensified by the war; and iiio representative of agricultural liTest 
1 
supported protection with a vehemence never shown before#" 
She farmers, faced with prices idiioh had been halved - even out to 
one-third <» were demanding assistance. The tariff vtas little help, as 
ftpproteotion to products vhich still spilled owr into the world market. 
And so there "began the drive to make tariffs "effeotivelt for liie farmer. 
Proposals for escport debenture and domestic allotment, put forward as a 
hatt j^s Tor ftxi integrated poli<^ for agriculture, eventuated in the MoIIazy-
Baugen Bill. She west, idiich in the first decade of the century had 
produced the Progressive dissenters against the Payne-Aldrich tariff, now 
contributed its quota of the Farm Bloc - those "sons of wild jaofcasses" -
which was to display its new power in demanding equali-ty for agriculture. 
This new attitude and display of political strength was clearly 
disoerziible in the SDsergency tariff bt 1922 but was finally to n»ke its 
iUll power felt in the drafting of the Smoot^Benrley tariff in 1930. 
Pnsident Hoover had summoned a special session of Congress in the 
summer of 1929 to deal speoifioally with the "fazm problem", with no 
express instruotians other tiian the suggestion that perhaps the tariff on 
agricultural products should be inoreased. As the special session dragged 
^Ibld., p. 449. 
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on into tho following year and msrgod with th« regular ee88ion» boginning 
in Maroh 1930, the tariff issue beoame the oentral theme of Congressional 
attention. E-very special interest in the country availed itself of tho 
opportuniiy to lobby for an increase in its o»n tariffs. The agriculture 
al representatiTos eventually revolted at the prospeot of a session, 
called originally to consider the problems of their eonstituents, beooning 
the medium for voting new and higher tariffs for industry. There ensued a 
spectacle of log-rolling in the national legislative body at its -worst 
which eventuated in the fariff Act of 1930 * a oonglomeration of the 
highest duties on record, with large inoreases for agricultural products. 
It was for agriculture, however, very largely a Phyrrio vietoiyj the 
provision of subsidized dumping abroad had been eliminated and nsany of 
the agricultural tariffs were no more than nooiinal* Kxoeptiom were 
those on sugar, ^dieat, oorn, wool, long-staple ootton, daisy produots, 
and live oattle* 
An appraisal of the agricultural attitude at the time (offered in a 
totally different context but relevant to the topic at hand) is ex^a^essed 
by Charles W» Holmans "in],1929-30, all important national farm organiza­
tions were vinited for adequate protection a^inst the inpouring of farm 
produots frm lands of Reaper costs 
After the onset of the great depression, and particularly wii^ the 
coming of the Hew Peal, American trade policies entered upon a new phase -
^NsLtioml Cooperative Milk Producers* Federation* Bduoation Series Ho* 28 
Beport of Charles Holman, ^eay« 1945 • 
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* phas* ihioh •xtends into HiB pr»t«nt« Agriculture's role in this new 
phase, snd the emergenoe of a separate agricultural policy, *ill be 
ooniiidered in the next chapter* 
Strategic Jfkctors in the Orowth of ^rioultural Protection 
Tfhils industry can be represented, Renorally, as having maintained a 
fairly ooostant attitude and pursued a consistent policy on the question 
of protection througjiout most of the 19th century and until quite recently 
in the present centuxy, no such generalisation can be made for agrioalture. 
As has been shoam, there have been periods vihen famers have favored free 
trade, or at least tariff reduction. There nas rarely a time when they 
were not willing to accept protection on their own produce, particularly 
during depressions and periods of low agricultural prices. 
In examination of the ^ solutions passed by farm organisations, the 
votes of congressmen representing agricultural constituencies, and an 
analysis of testimony presented at congressional hearings by spokesmen 
professing to speak for large bodies of primary producers will show, in 
the main, that vdiere the opportunity has been present, the kind of trade 
policy desired by farmers has not been different from that of industry. 
"'Sockless Jerry* Simpson might be against a tariff, but, if there was 
anything goings he wcmted his share for Jiansas."^ 
At the peak of the agrarian indignation against railroads and the 
trusts» when the fasnners were charging, perhaps justifiably, that they 
were being exploited, tariff reduction was regarded as a way to strip 
them of some of their power* ^en they became sold on the idea that free 
coinage of silver would do the job more effectively, the tariff issue 
^ayer, op. cit», p. 7. 
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Iseoams saoonidary* 
Yet, an overall impression to be gained frcmi such an examination 
of farm opinion from ths Civil War to shortly before the aad of World %r 
I, wouW bo that, lahile there were wide variations in the proportion of 
the ^ ole, large naMci>er« of farmers •were- of the opinion that industrial 
tariffs were against their interests and that protection for their oim 
oommodities iiould do little for them in any event. That opinion is voiced 
again and again by farm groups aad agrioultural leaders, together with a 
professed idllingxiBSs to meet foreign con^tition on its oim ground, if 
large industzy would do the same* Witness, for example, a JAizinesota 
resolution passed in 18911 
W# demand that the nar tariff which has too lojog survived 
the objeot of ita creation shall be radically revised, giving 
vezy mateirial reduction on the necessaries of life and 
plaolng raw materials upon the free list, to the end that we 
vmy con^te with i^e world foriia market*^ 
It la soaroely ooneeivable that a like expmssion oould have come frcm 
any comparable group of mnufaeturers of that day* 
This consistent^, on the one hand", in the policy pursued by industrial 
pressure groups, and the lack cf osnsistency, by and for agriculture, cem 
be traced (l) to certain politioal*institutioml arrangements, and (2) to 
the (tyamics of economio forces operating within that framework* Both, 
of course, acted upon each other, but for purposes of analysis the too can 
be separated! 
^Dick«y, Harris E* The Attitude of Agriculture I'oward the larlff Since 
the Civil Tatar* Unpublished Xhesis* M»S» Ames, lom State College 
Library* 1929* 
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1. Foreign trade policy iwas, from the beginning, a fUnotion of the 
national govemnent • a grant of power under the Constitution to the 
Congress of -ttie United States to regulate trade with foreign nations. An 
account has already been gi-ron of the struggle for control, throu^ 
Congress, of that policy and of the strategy employed by iiie protection­
ists to determine its direction and nature* 
On the other hand^ no basic policy existed for agriculture, long 
regarded as a concern of the local comnunities and the states • A separate 
department of agriculture was not created until 1862, and e^en then was to 
wait for 27 years before being elevated to the status of an executive 
department with, a Secretary in tiae cabinet to head it*^ Brsn the outlook 
of the deparfenent itself was to reflect an attitude essentially xmfriendly 
to anything approaching a national policy until the third decade of the 
2 20th century* Until then, it was to concentrate principally upon the 
adjustments within the izidividual farm long after the farmers themselves 
had inclined toward the advice of l&ry £« Lease* 
Politically» therefore, agriculture was at a disadvantage* After 
the Civil War, liie South was practically without a voice in national 
affairs until the return cf the Democrats to power in 1884; and by that 
^^us and Holcott^ op* cit*, p* 9* 
2 Ibid*^^ p* 9* Oaus and Wolcott cite a lecture by Carle ton R* Ball 
delivered before the graduate school of the Department of Agriculture 
in 1936» in which he classified the personnel outlook of department 
meuibers as follows: 1862-87, individuali 1888*1912, bureauj 
1912»S2« departmental} 1933> , national* 
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time, the industrial interests had perfected techniques for controlling 
party machinery and influencing Congress -tiirough the use of liberal 
campaign contributions, railroad passes, and other less savory methods. 
And, on the tariff question at least, they could gain the support of 
the growing laboring population by linking it withi-tho gradually rising 
standard of living. 1/?hen they felt it was contrary to their interest, 
they could even block the demnds of agricultural representatives for 
tariffs on their own products, or use thom as a leverage for raising 
their own tariff demands still higjier. The case of a, tariff on wool 
can be cited* ^en the agricultural representatives succeeded in passing 
a higher tariff on wool the mamfaoturors then used this tariff as the 
basis for a further increase in duties on imported woolen materials be­
cause of the increase in their costsFailures, such as this, played 
en important part in the repeated attempts by the farmers to found third 
parties which they felt would more nearly represent their interests. 
Later on, when the political scene had changed in their favor, they were 
to follow the older practice of industry - -worVing through their own 
bloc in Congress x*egardless of pari^. 
2« !Qie economic environment, within ladiich these political forces 
operated, was a conditioning factor, if not deteminate. 
In Idia development of a vast continent of uiiknown resources, the 
process of alienation and settlement was carried out by an agriculture 
^Dickey, op» oit«« p, 5» 
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n^ioh ?ra0 essentially exploitive*^ To feed and olothe the teemixig 
peoples of Europef as tirell as the eacpanding domestio population* the 
output of Amerioan Agriculture rose year l>y year. To fenoe and improve 
the land of the advanoing frontier and to make it ready for the plow, 
millions of aores of forest lands nvre denuded in a mmior tihioh later 
generations -were to view as fraught with great waste. Laxids were braught 
under the plow nhioh, in terms of later social oosts« might better have 
remained in grass or trees. 
Hot counting forest products, agricultural exports rose: in value fraa 
about #860.000,000 in 1870 to 18SS ,000,000 in 1900.^ 7ntil the turn of 
"Qie oentuzy, liie ohief item of export was "the breadstuff of the Wast", 
with ootton holding seoond place* FOrest produots exports likewise 
rose steadily in value throughout the period* The growth and general 
oharacter of exports from 188S to 1900 are shown In Table 2, 
Cannon, op» oit*. Especially Ch* II. 
2 
Johnson, Emory R. and Associates. History of Domestic and Foreign 
CoMneroe of the United Statee. ffiRshington, The Carnegie Institution 
of nasbington. 1915. Vol. II. p. 67. 
Table 2t Donwstio Qxporta by sources of produotion« five-year periods^ 
1865»ig00 (000 omitted) 
I Aeri«»lture % Majaafaotares t Minlne t Foregt t Flaheriee iMiseellaneous : *" 
Yeart t Per » Per i } Per t t Per t t Per t t Por s Total 
t Value : pent » Value t oent t Value » oenti Value t cent a Value i oenti Value t eenti toIuo 
1 t t t 1 1 } 
1865t|156,668 60.46t$ 59,037 22.781 110,792 4.17t 114,858 5.73» 14,795 1.851 112,981 5,01*1 259,125 
1870t 361,168 79,3S> 68,280 15.00} 5,026 l.lOi 14,898 3.27} 2,836 •62s 2,981 .66} 455,208 
18751 430,307 76.95: 92,679 16.571 6,469 1.15* 19,166 3.43} 4,875 .87* 5,743 1.03} 599,238 
1880t 685,961 83,25t 102,856 12.48t 5,863 #71» 17,321 2.11t 5,255 •64* 6,689 •81* 823,946 
1885t 530,173 72,96* 147,186 20.25t 15,798 2.18a 22,015 3.03: 5,955 .82} 5,555 ,76* 726,683 
1890t 629,821 74.511451,102 17,87* 22,298 2.641 29,473 3.491 7,458 .88} 5,141 ,6It 845,294 
1895i 535,210 69«73t 183,596 23.141 18,510 2.331 28,576 3.61} 5,329 .67} 4,172 .52} 793,393 
igOOt 835,858 60.98« 433,852 
t • 
31.65} 37.844 2.76i 
1 
52,218 3.81: 
) 
6,437 .46} 
} 
4,665 •34} 1,370,764 
* 
Sourcet U«S« Bureau of Statistios, "Exports of liaxmfaotures from the U«S« and 
their Distribution, 1790*1902, Monthly Sumnaiy of Conmeroe and Finance, 
April, 1903* p« 3249« 
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Foreign countries, the United Kingdom in particular, as part of -ttie 
process of "building up cheap sources of food and raw materials, invested 
heavily in U,S. internal development during the 19tli century, particular­
ly in railroads, ports, and other internal improvements, but also in 
agricultural enterprises as suohi the cattle industry, specifically, 
•was one in which foreign capital was invested. Agriculture, therefore, 
highly exploitive and subject to great imcertainties, became the "hevrer 
of wood and drawer of water" for industrial Europe, aod the underwriter 
for the importation of the industrial revolution into America, The 
service charge on foreign debts rose until interest charges alone 
approached a guazi^r of a billion dollars annually* The neo-mercantilist 
bias became a semiopemauent part of -Qie national outlook, as, year after 
year, visible esqports exceeded visible imports and the way to national 
prosperli^ and development appeared eternally to be singly a matter of 
selling more than was purchased abroad. TOien farm surpluses exceeded 
in quantily the amount which could be sold at what farmers regarded as 
"reasoxiable'* prices, ssglecting entirely the value of non-replaceable 
national resources, -tiiey were assured that once the infant industries, 
which they were helping to support by means of tariffs, lad reached a 
wature and efficient age, the situaticm would be changed. They were 
asstired that the foreigner paid the tariff in any event. To a certain 
extent he did. But only to the extent that restriction did not lead 
directly to retaliation. For England, top, the principal creditor, was 
also enj(^ii3g a position in international economic life that was in one 
sezise unique. 
Because the demand for ibod and fibres was relativsly inelastic] 
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and teoauoe the demand for England's industrial output -was relative!^ 
elastic and capable of diversion elsewhere* -Uib arbitrary action of 
those in control of foreign trade policy did not, for a considerable 
period of time, lead to the retaliation abroad, i«kioh tibie planters of 
the South had feared* 
Time has wrought its changes, however, both in the political effect­
iveness of the farmers and in their role in both donestic and vrorld 
economy* The sectional nature of agricultural Interest groups, great 
though their influence proved to be in the past, has been moderated as 
they have fused into the larger national organizations that have demon-
stxuted an ability to follow the lead of the earlier pressure lobbies 
of industry* %e farmers have their own "bloc" of senators and 
representatives in Congress vhich can be fairly well counted on to vote 
favorably on important legislation, even across part^ linss, -matched 
over and reported on by the "unofficial third house of Congress"* 
The drift of fam population tonard the better economic opportunity 
of the cities has contributed to this political effectiveness of 
agriculture, because of the heavy concentration of the urban population 
in a relia.tively small number of great centers sudi as those of the 
eastern seaboard, Detroit, Chicago, the steel centers of Ohio and Penn­
sylvania and oh the -nest coast* QvwBLteBt agrioul-tural strength can be 
mustered in. the upper bo<fy, utora the predominantly rural s-tates elect 
^JfcCune, Wesley, The Earn Bloc* New Yort:, Doableday Doran* 1943* 
Also Fortune Magasine, "The Farm Bureau", June, 1944* 
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54 of tiie 96 !nembez*8* In the House, rurel districts sloot 225 out of 
435 members. Only in the electoral college with elects the Chief 
fixecutive, does the urban population possess the greater strength*^ 
The followLag table shows how the declining relative xiumerioal 
strength of the rural areas has affooted the representative oharaoter 
of the Senate< 
Table 3* Senate representation azd urbanism 
1900 1930 
Degree of 
urbanism t 
Percentage 
of 
population 
:Peroentage 
» of 
t Senate 
Percentage 
of 
population 
i Percentage 
t of 
t Senate 
States under 
26 per cent 
urban 
32,9 42.2 5,7 10.4 
States 25 to 
SO per cent 
urban 
31.9 37,7 32,8 45,8 
States 50 to 
75 per cent 
urban 
30,9 15.5 43.9 35,4 
States over 
75 per oent 
urban 
4.3 4,4 17,6 8«S 
Soaroei Haynes, The Senate of the Pnlted States. Vol* 2, p, 3011* 
Despite ths increase in the political effectiveness of agriculture, 
homver, the United States could no longer be regarded as an agricultural 
^oloombe, op» ett», p. 102« Cf» also. Key, V,0,, Politics, Parties and 
Pressure Groups, New Yor^c, Crotirell, 1942, Especially Ch, III and XVII, 
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nation, though in terms of production it still rankod as one of the great 
producers of primary commodities of 1316 world. Although its foreign 
trade almost doubled between 1900 and the outbreak of World War I, 
doubled again by 1916^ and in 1929 ivas four and a half tin»s as great 
as at the turn of the oentuzy^ agricultural e:)q>ort8 lost ground steadily 
as a percentage of the total* 
The United States had beoome primarily an industrial country. More 
and more the domestic market was capable of absorbing the agricultural 
output, -while to feed the mills and factories a growing volume of raw 
saterials were needed from the outside. Masy of these raw laaterialSj 
coning flrom the newer countries with a semi-eolonial agriculture, began 
to con^ete with American farm products. Latin American countries, Canada, 
Ooeania^ and Asia were developing as max^ets for U«S« industrial goods 
and were able to pay only in agricultural raw materials. 
The following table will illustrate clearly the change which was 
taking places 
Table !• %port of merchandise by groups 
(Percentage of totals) 
t 
Yearly average s Agricultural t Ifon-agricultural 
t prodacts t produots 
1896-1900 
1911-1915 
1916-1920 
1921-^1925 
1926-19S0 
195X-193& 
1936-1988 
66.2 
49.7 
42.1 
46.2 
36.1 
56.8 
24.4 
63«9 
63.2 
75.6 
53.8 
50.3 
57.9 
53.8 
Sources Gayer, op. cit., p. 25 
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It has already been noted that the Undonsrood Tariff of 1913 
represented ihe first sincere attesnpt at tariff reduction since before 
the Civil TBar and that this rsduoticn was made possible by the progressive 
split in the Republioan party, vrhich gaw a clear majorHgr to the Dem­
ocratic party under -liie leadership of Woodrow Wilson, a convinced and 
courageous advocate of greater competition and loiser duties on all items 
of foreign trade. The fanners, by and large, divided their votes between 
the Progressive party and the Dwaoomts, both, pledged to do«n»ard re­
vision of tariffs. 
However, during the time that the bill was being debated in Congress, 
-there began to appear increasing evidence of useasiness among farm groups 
over vhaX the effect of lower tariffs all round might do to farm prices. 
Farm papers «er» expressing concern over the likely effect on wool and 
sugar producers. The Country Gentleman was forecasting the ruin of the 
Louisiana sugar industxy*^ Ohio newspapen predicted the demise of -tiie 
2 
sheep-raising industiy in that section of IAbs counbry« Wallace's Farmer 
in Iowa, on the other hand defended the bill on -tdie grounds that -tidiile 
the profits on growing wool would be less, olothing costs to the fanner 
would be lessj it also maintained that, on the wliole, the farmer got the 
^This magazine, with its large volume of industrial advertising, and 
a management closely allied with large capitalistic enterprise, has 
nev»r been noted for its objectivity, or even for an tinmixed bias in 
favor of the farmers. 
2 Dickey, op»oit.> p. 48* 
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vrorst of the wool tariff in euiy eveat.^ 
Although farmers generally had agreed that certain tariffs - those 
on industrial products - had been inordinately high and should he reduced 
duties on farm products were not regarded as 'hinreasonable". As a result 
an increasing emphasis was placed on the -virtue of an iiapartial tariff 
comaission, which would determine the "reasonableness" of tariffs 1:^ 8<»ds 
objective foimula based upon cos-fcs of production. Sven among the membors 
of the Detnocratic party, the old free trade loyalties wer» wsakeningj as 
lausaig has stressed, the difference be-tween "the Republican "cost of 
production fomula" and the CemDcratic "coo^etitive -tariff" war© not so 
great as had been assumed. Under the former, cost of produc-tion would 
be used as a **miniBiumi measure for rates, while the Democratic parly 
insisted -t^at it be the maximum". The National Grange, which had been 
sharply critical of -Wbie Tariff Act of 1909, in 1915 passed a resolution 
-that since -tariff legislation had long been unfair to farmers, a non­
partisan tariff conniission should be appointed which would adequately 
represent agriculture.^ 
Vallaees* Farmer. 1912. Vol. 37» p. 1E2. 
^Taussig, op< eit., BspeoiaUy Ch. 13. 
^cha-ttsohneider, op» cit., p. 8. Vthen this writer considers -the same 
eonfliet bet«n»en the parties in -tiie 1930 -tariff deba-te, he observes, 
"If -the platform of the two parties were, in fact, nearly identical, 
•were pro-tectionist organleations, such as the American Tariff 
League, no-rorttieless fiercely Republican. The answer is that -the 
cos-ts fornaila is wotted out so badly in practice that it can be made 
to mean almost anything." 
Sickly, op.oit., p. 49. 
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Although the Underwood Tariff remained "on the books" throughout 
•fche irar, it nas ne-ver, in faetf «ffeotive, Tlhen German subjnarines made 
'the lon^ ahipping lanes fron South Amerioa and the Paoiflo too hazardous. 
Allied deioand nae shifted to the United >>tates because of the shorter 
distanoes of the North Atlantic ?here it vae possible to protest merohant 
TBSsels traTsling in oonrcy# Par^ prices rose to dizity heists and out­
put expanded in responsej now lands were brought into culti-witlon and 
msohanization proceeded apaoe. 
At "the elose of the war* after the initial shortages had disappeared* 
the provisions of the Underwood Aot began to be effeotive. By 1920, when 
farm prices had already begun to deoline, considerable grain ms being 
imported• 
Proponents of a new high tariff arg;aed that rates -vahioh would be 
effeoti've in keeping out these foreign grains would raise the domestio 
price above ths vorld market price the amount of ths tariff*^ And, 
at no time in histoiy, had flsmers appeared so universally in favor of 
shutting off ths imports of agricultural products. 
Tihen protection failed to livs up to the claims made for it, the 
advocates of agrioultural reform turned to other methods of making the 
tariff effective. But the world was little more interested in the 
agrioultuml suipluses of ths United States, even at very low prices, 
than were domestic consuiaersv 
Ipordn^, J*W., The Tariff. Congressional Record, 67th Congress* 
Ist Session. Part 3, 1921, p.3084* 
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Tho production of ne-wer agricultural oountrias was growing apace# 
5etveon 1909»13 ancl 1922-27, the ^eat acreage of Canada increased from 
10 to 22 million acresr that of Australia from 7.5 to 10»4 million. 
In New Zealand, between 1911 aid 1922, dairy herds ivere doubled. 
Following the peace settlement, a new imve of natioisalism swept 
omr many of the countries that had suffered acutely from food shortages 
during the war. France, (rermany, Italy, and tiie newer oountries created 
by the Versailles Treaty embarked upon a deliberate program to increase 
their own agrioulturalproduetion. The emerging agricultural policy of 
this country, which sought a reserved home market, was, accordingly, not 
out of step with Idie times. 
One other influence in the ehanging pattern of agricultuiwl thought 
should be noted in passing, not necessarily as a causal factor but as 
evidence of the adjustments ^ required, and actually taking place, within 
agriculture* It can be designated broadly as 1±ie Conservation movement, 
alidiough that term has become a blanket covering a multitude of things. 
It has nevertheless become a symbol capable of influencing behavior in a 
manner inconceivable to an earlier period. 
Frederic Jackson Turner, in his analysis of the 1890 census» had 
noted the disappearanee of the frontier* By the turn of the centuxy it 
was beooraing increasingly diffioilt to move fron wom-out land to new, 
virgin territory. An important form of agricultural adjustment had been 
removvd. 
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The National Country Life Conference called by President Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1907 viae, an evidence of the change taking place in agricul­
ture and in tho national attitude tcvsai^ the basic resources of liie 
country. The day of a primarily exploitive and exploratory type of 
agriculture vras dramng to a close• It is undoubtedly true that the 
conservationists - the great names associated with the movement, men 
liks Roosevelt, Pinchot, Van Hise and others - have generated an emotional 
reaction ivhich far transcends concrete accomplishiBents, but the movamenb 
has played its part in creating an environment favorable to a national 
policy for agriculture. 
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CHAPTER V. 
DEVELOPMEHT OP A SBPAR&TE ASEICULIOKAL POLICY 
It is nov proposttd to consider in greater detail the emex^enoe of a 
separate agrioultural policy after 1933. 
The policy -which has evolvecl is a reflection of the farmer's priinary 
coneem with a domestic market and of the growring body of experience in 
exercising control through governmental action. In the developioent of a 
program centered on the parity concept^ famers ha-ve been provided vrith an 
effective instirument for raising prices and -with a syiabol aroutd •*^ich to 
eonsolidate a greater political unity amozig themselves*^ 
Ihe primary conoam of fanners -with the domestio market 'oas an adjust* 
menty as has been indicated* imposed from without in the process of world 
economic development* The extent of the adjustment that has been made has 
been shaped by the fanners themselves* Control of -^e domestic market 
has become increasingly complete* 
Ihe indications are that every attempt will be made to keep that 
control* Xha purpose here is to gain some estimate of the strength iiiat 
has been built up to insure that it can be kept* 
In Key, op* cit* "It seems that these policies -vdiich give the farmer a 
tangible stake in national poUoy, have stimulated a strengtheji^ng of 
fajna organisations ani created a higher degree of politioal alertzxess 
among farmers*" p* 62* 
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General Badcground 
The Agrloultural Aidjuelanent Aot of 193S vms a product of the great 
depression, but its roots extended niuoh deeper in time, to long-run devel­
opments (already noted) vrhich had been speeded up and intensified by the 
impact of Viforld l^ar I. Following the coniparatively prosperous years from 
191S-20, agriculture had passed through more than 10 years of unrest and 
generally unsatisfaotoiy economic conditions» an unrest vrhich attained 
crisis proportions in 1930-32« 
By traditional standai^is of economic analysis, the crux of the 
agricultural problem vue to be found in the failure of farmers (or their 
inability) to adjust to the long-run changes isiiioh had occurred in natioii* 
al and world economic relationships.^ 
Domestically, these changes "were associated -with shifts in oonsumsrs* 
wants as the country as a whole became richer - the demand for a greater 
proportion of goods and semrices produced in the secondary and tertiazy 
2 industries. Technological progress within agriculture itself, the shift 
from animal to mechanical power, were resulting in reduced i^guirements 
for orop and feed production. The adjustment called for, niiiich in fact 
was taking place to a considerable extent, was the transfer of labor, of 
^•ligman, op. oit>» p. 46. 
o 
In technical parlance, the income elasticity of demand for farm products 
is relatively low in a wealthy society, particularly Tor staples, while 
it is relati-vely hi^ for the products of secondary and tertiary 
industries. 
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farm people, from farms to the industries and the seinrioes -whioh were 
accounting more and more for the growth in the national inoome and soalea 
of living,^ This transfer could not be achieved rapidly enough to 
acccmplish the downward adjustment in the production of the great staples^ 
due in part to the lack of easy entry into other fields, in part to the 
traditionally slovrer rate of change among fam people, the smaller degree 
of oaatrol over the farm business* Vlhen the depression struck in industzy, 
creating -widespread unemployment among industrial workers, -the movement 
of labor out of agriculture ims actually reversed, with a net migration 
2 biaok to farms* Although this was a temporary phenomenon, it added to 
the crisis in agriculture and helped to create that "conscioasness of 
need" vihich Key posits as a necessary condition for concerted political 
action* 
The changing world relationships which were intensifying -tise agrioul« 
tural adjustment problem werea (l) the ending of a debtor status for the 
United States) or the growth of the industrial and the economic weight of 
this countzy; (2) the growth of production in the newer agricultural areas 
i^ich were rapid^ developing a position in world trade analogous to that 
of the United States a half century earlier] (s) the changing character 
of U.S* exports, particularly as this country expanded its trade with the 
newer countries in Latin itoerica, Oceania^ Canada, and Japan; (4k) the lag 
between 1920 suad 1929, 6,5 million persons, net, left farms for en^ley-
ment else?diere» Cf* TJ,S* Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricul­
tural Economics, Farm Population Sstiroates, 1910<-'1942* Iflashington, 
November 1942. 
2 Sohults, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy, p* 90* 
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in adjustments in institutions and attitudes in this country mihioh alone 
might havo integrated it wi-tii an expanding world eoonony; the United States 
still insisted upon "behavinj* ns p ('ebtor countr^r, e^cporfcing more than it 
1 
was willing to import* 
One other factor adding to the complexi-ty of the agricultural adjust­
ment problem - a factor that has received increasijig attention from the 
proponents of a "mature economy thesis" was the slowing down of the rate 
2 
of growth of total popalation. Changes in the rate of growth of U.S. pop­
ulation are indicated by tlie follovang figures: 
Per cent increase 
Census period during the period 
1890-1899 20.e 
1900-1909 22.6 
1910-1919 15,2 
1920-1929 16.0 
19S0-1940 7.3 
fiegardless of the interpretation placed upon these figures with re­
spect to their full implication for this country's future* there can be 
little doubt that the slower rate of population growth has contributed 
substantially to the magnitude of adjustments in agriculture, particularly 
an agriculture great]^ expaxided by the war demand from 1915-1920* 
^IXiring the movement for a "return to normalcy" which followed on the 
heels of the First World War, H.C* liallaoe. Secretary of Agriculture in 
the Harding Cabinet, fought a losing battle with the Secretary of Commerce, 
Hex^ert Hoover, in an attempt to get a liberalization of tariff policies 
as a measure of relief for agriculture. 
o 
Contributii^ causes to the declining rate of population growth were 
(l) decreased immigration in consequence of rigid restriction after 
"World War I, and (2) a falling birth rate. 
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"Relief for agriculture" 'beoaine a rallying ory for farmors early in 
the 1920*3, -which continued in a mounting crescendo. The political party 
in power •was forced to pay inoreaaing attention to unrest among the 
farmers*^ But assisteinos in the form of govorninent intervention viae con* 
fined largely to measures for easing oredit and assistanoe to oooperati'veB 
and mariceting organieations. In his two veto imssages on the McWary-
Haugen Bill, President Goolidge stressed the necessity for agriculture 
to rely upon its own devices to meet the required adjustments and upon 
the henefioeuoe of the free market to solve the problem in the long run* 
The first concerted aotion Tsy federal government to provide 
machinery TsSiereby the efforts of farmers to better their eooncmic position 
could he implemented^ took the fom of -^rioultural ii^rfceting Aot of 1929 • 
This aot ''aimed to provide agriculture with a mechanism for the orderly 
production and marketing of farm products iliat vould parallel the pro-
dttction and maxfceting ne ohanisms of oi^r industries* The major provisions 
of the aet -nere concerned with maz^eting and the Federal Farm Board under> 
took to encourage oooperatives and stahilization corporations, provided 
the latter were estahlished and omed by cooperatives* To unify the 
process of agricultural marketing with the support of loans, a 500 million 
2 dollar revolving fUnd was put into the hands of the Board," The belief 
joint Commission of Agricaltural Inquiry was created by Ccxagress 
early inl921 to iavestigate the *'oause of the presexxb ooudition of 
agriculture" and report in 90 di^s. The tieoretaxy of Agriculture, by 
direction of the President, called a Hational Agricultural conference 
to meet in Vlfashington, January 27-29* 1922, Another conference, oalled 
by Fresidoit Coolidge, met in Washington in Koveniber, 1924* 
2 II«5, Deparianent of Agriculture, op* cit., p. 312, 
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parsitted in offioial oirolea that the solution to tho farm problem 
lay in the dlrootion of Improved nazizet procedure, although during the 
•uanMr of 19S0« Alexander Legge» Goniremor of the Fkna Boards toured the 
oounbty urging reduction in th» acreage of harvested orops* The onset of 
world-wide depression was destined to underwrite this experiisent with 
failure and to raise the danand for more positive aotion "wnng famers 
and farm groupa, 
"Beliefs" and "Valuations" in the Fonwlative Period 
Inqportant to the understanding of th» substantive polloy of the 
present ia an understanding of the manner in vhioh farmers, and partic* 
ularly farm leaders, interpreted their problem, and the objectives they 
set up as ultimate goals* 
Wort!^ of note, perhaps, is the fact that two names prominently 
associated with discussions of agricultural reform during tiiese years 
were those of Qeorge K* Peek axid Hu^ S« Johnson, vdiose "equality for 
agriculture" was to becone a slogan iriiioh linked together the many co&> 
timing ocnferences and discussions*^ Both of these men had been eon-
necked wi-tii the farm implement industry, and their thinking was undoubtedly 
conditioned 1^ the experloaces of an. industry idiich enjoyed substantial 
protection in American market but which suffered froo^ the depressed 
^Feek and Johnson presented their recormmndations in the form of a brief 
entitled, "Equality for Agriculture", which was submitted to the American 
fkrm Bureau Federation on Deceicber 21, 1921, approximately one mon'Ui 
before the meeting of the Joint CoBBnission of ^ ricultural Inquiry# 
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oondltions among the farmers. When this experience was projected into 
the agricultuaral field« it was to take the form of rnaVing protection, or 
the tairiff, ''effectiTre" by separating -tiie domestic from the foreign 
market#^ 
Zhe oentraX idea of the Pesk-Johnson plan^ with its equalization 
fee rsocomtendations, ms to be raoast in other forma - t]» export debenture 
plan« the domestic allotment plan« creation of an export monopoly under 
either government control or management of the cooperatives, and others. 
But all of -Qiese plazis «»re aimed at the mising of fcuna prices on idie 
honw market and the use of the tariff to Insure against coo^etition from 
abroad* In general, it can be fairly stated i^at these proposals had 
tiieir most favorable reception a:mong the farm organizations, the business 
and ocBsnercial organizations i^ioh maintained oosmiittees on agriculture, 
and political spokesmen in and out of Congress* 
Other names associated with these early attes^ts to deal with the 
problems of a depressed agriculture included: George HVarren, who con*> 
structed the first index of agricultural prices, -v/hich becaae lAe point 
of departure for a measure of tha disparil^ betweon farm and other prices | 
B»C* Taylor, lixo established and became Hie first chief of the Bureau of 
^For industries operating under conditions of monopolistic competition, 
as -&e farm implsment industry was, the practice of price discriiB' 
ination between foreign and domestic mazicets had proven itself an 
effective means to increase profits* 
2 Of* Black» Agricultural Befoxm in the United States, op* cit* 
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Agricultural Economics, and who instituted the annual outlook oonferenoes 
and reports in an attempt to provide farmers with a body of factual data 
upon -which to "base production and maxiceting plans; John D, Black, long­
time advisor to tha Depai^anent of Agriculture, -whose summary of Agrioul-
-fcural Reform in the Unj-faed States brought together much of -the disparate 
-thinking on the subject; M.L. Wilson, one time a di-^ision chief in the 
an agricul-fcural economist and at one time the advocate of large-
scale corporation farming as a means of solving agriculture's impasse; 
and C»C. Da-vis, one time Commissioner of agrioul-fcure in Montana and long­
time student of agricultural problems, More could be tnen-fci-oned - partic­
ularly the leaders of farm organizations who vjere to lead -the struggle, 
year after year, -to make certain -that tha farm problem -nas never far from 
the forefront of the minds of public policymakers, and key figures in 
•the Department of Agrioul-fcure itself.'" 
Many of these leaders -were agricul-fcural economis-fcs, but mostly they 
represented -fche farm management ^ proach to agricul-tural problems, Wi-fch 
-fche leaders of flam organizations they saw -the problem in terms of -the 
adjustments faced by the indi-vldual famer, -rfiich are important, but Tsihich 
are not al-nays adequate for thinking in terms of long-run policy for agri-
cul-ture, as an in-fcegral part of -the larger national and developing -world 
2 
economy* 
^aus and Woloo-tt, op» cit« See especially Chapters III eind IV» pp*30-81, 
Sohultz ("Two Conditions Necessary for Economic Progress in Agri­
culture," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol, 
X» IJo, 3, August 1944) in an attanpt to rethink the problem of Economic 
Progress in Agricul-ture, observes, "In a consideration of -the economic 
problems that confront agriculture there is much wisdom in a return to 
-the olassioal tradition of treating -these problems within -the context of 
-the political econoo^r* In cur division of labor in professional effort 
-na ha-ve departed from this tradition; and our work has been weakened 
aa a consequence*" pp* 298» 
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Agricultural Policy After 1935 
TJhen Henry A« Wallace aasumed the duties of Secretary of Agriculture 
in 1933, the urgent need of the monent -was for action. Farra prices had 
fallen to an all-^ime low^ and fanners throughout the country ^ rere exhib­
iting an angry mood of discontent not equalled since the Populist up­
risings a half century earlier# 
The Farmers* Union, under the leadership of John Simpson, had, by 
1933, marshalled a substantial and extreme]^ vocal body of opinion in 
support of a "cost of production" program idiich sought to have enacted into 
federal law a series of prices based upon cost of production, and to prohib­
it the pur<^8e or sale of farm cosimodities at less than that amount. The 
movemeiab sought, in short, to have the government guarantee the farmer cost 
of production. Among -t^e supporters of the movement was no less a figure 
•tiian Senator George W. Norris of Ifebraska. Proponents of the plan mainf 
tained that the income effects of such a policy wofuld create purchasing 
•goner in the hands of farmers nrhich vrould lead to an imroediate revival 
of business and employment. Cost of prodaction bills failed of passage 
in Congress hy small margins.^ 
It -nas^in part* to head off this eoonomically unworkable cost of 
production program that the "parity" fomula isas originally put forward 
by the Department of Agriculture and '^sold" to the farmers of the oountiy 
^ee note on "cost of prodiotion" at end of -tiiis chapter. 
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a0 a progma of agrioultuml juatloe with a aolld oore of aolentlfio 
Ihe most oomplata statement of "parity" as Mie basis of a program to give 
content to the slogan "equality for agriculture" uns contained in an 
official Department of Agrioulturs pablieation by Esekiel and Bean»^ In 
a tightly reasoned statement of the measure of agricultural disadvantage* 
compared to the base period^ 1909*>14« these writers posed the more modest 
objeotive for a national agricultural policy* Ihe goal* as stated* vas to 
balance eooaony and raise agricultural prices gradually* thereby giving 
the farmer command over other goods and services nAiioh would make him as 
well off as he had been during the base period* 
nhen this publication appeared* the first AAA had almadly been en­
acted into law* but it brought together and susiBarieed the colleotivs 
thinking -(hat had been done by economists* farm leaders* and menhers of the 
Department of Agriculture in shaping the ^rioultural Adjustment Program* 
It constituted a part of the continuizig "education" which was calculated* 
finally* to build unity of support among farmers and farm organizations 
in the aohiwemsnt of the "parity" goal* 
At the time* in contrast wilh tiie "cost of production" agitation 
whioh propoeed the raising of agricultural prices by government ^ at to 
what appeared to be inordinately high levels* the reasoned statement of 
the parity goal secaned to possess the attributes of souncl economic objective 
as well as justice for the farmer* At the level of prices prevailing in 
^Eselclel* Kordecai* and Bean, Louis H* Economio Bases for the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act* Wai^ington* U*S* Department of Agriculture* Goyemment 
Printing Offiee* 1933* 
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1933* the prospect of prices -whioh would jnako the f{inner as mtll off as 
he appeared to have been (viewed from a point in time some 20 years renioved) 
during the base period, seeioed positi-ve« desirable, and right. The declar­
ation of policy contained in the original act -will sialce this clean 
Sect. 2* It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress 
(1) To establish and loaintain such balance between the produc­
tion and consultation of agricultural conanodities, end such 
marketing conditions therefor, will reestablish prices to 
farmers at a level that will give agricultural consDodities a 
purchasing power with respect to articles t^t fanners buy, 
equivalent to t^e purchasing power of agricultural conmodities 
in the base period. The base period in the case of all agri­
cultural commodities except tobacco shall be the pre-war 
period, August 1909<»July 1914* In the case of tobacco, the 
base period shall be the postwar period, August 1919-July 1929. 
(2) To approach such equality of purchasing power tuy gradual 
correction of the present inequalities therein at as rapid a 
rate as is deeaed feasible in view of the current consumptive 
demand in domestic isuad foreign maricets« (3) To protect the 
oonsumers* interest by readjusting fKm. production at suoh 
levels as will not increase the percentage of consumers' retail 
expenditures for agricultural cotnmoditlee, or products derived 
therefrom, which was returned to the farmer in the pre-war 
period, August 1909-July 1914* 
The pxuctical development of agricultural policy, however, is to be 
found, not in the statement of intentions, bxit in the manner in iriii(di it 
was worked out in the "iixterstioes of procedure** over the succeeding five 
years. For pari-ty, as an abstrao-t statement of objeotives^, is quite 
different from the operational concept. 
Since the purpose of this reca^tulation of agricultural policy is 
limited, it is not necessary to consider the minutae of detail which 
attended two major revisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (one 
^Ibid», p. 1, (Italics mine). 
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neoessitated by Court action) or the niunorous separate agencies set up 
% 
to deal with the prohlem of raising prices in the domestic market. The 
object her© is singly to present an over-all view of the extent to which 
•tiie emergence of this separate poli<jjr has, ly a more or loss cumulative 
process, contributed still further to a separation between the domestic 
and foreign market, in ths process of adjustment to certain significant; 
changes, political and economic, in U.S. and world relations* 
In translating the statement of intentions of the AAA into action, 
"tiie Administration, on the basis of pravious experiences of the Federal 
Faro Board, and in the light of existing world conditions, had concluded 
that in order to put agriculture on an initial equal footing for the 
"orderly progress out of the gz^at economic deprassion", drastic reduc­
tion of existing surpluses would be necessary. Accordingly, "millions of 
farmers entered into contracts to reduce acreage in specified surplus 
crops (and hogs) in return for benefit payxnentB", These benefit payi!»nts 
were financed, originally, from processing taxes on the specific commod­
ities , but when this procedure was invalidated by the Supreme Court, they 
wttre tied to the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act and paid 
out of gezieral appropriations* 
Although the production control features of the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Program have been Uta more spectacular, associated as they were wit^ 
the problem of soil erosion and conservation, it is doubtful v^ether the 
aeconplishments have justified -fiiis attention*^ Improving technology and 
^Sohultx* Agri«Mlture in an Unstable £conqny» p* 172* 
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the ooiW&ullding praotioes tiiiioh were tied ia with the program mostly 
offset the acreage reduotions. The significant reductions actually 
achieved can be credited to the two major drouths of the 1930*8. 
The actual aocoinplishinonts in the direction of achieving "pari-ty" 
prices for agriculture were made by the CoDimodi-ty Credit Corporation, oper­
ating through the E-ver-Normal Granary or storage program, the means where** 
by disturbing surpluses were remo-rod from the market. Originally in­
tended as a program for reducing price fluctuations due to variations 
in annual aitput by alternating large and small crops, the T?ver-Kormal 
Granaiy emerged as the most important price-raising agen^ in the adjust­
ment program. Through the non-recourse loans of the Cioomodil^ Credit 
Corportion, the oontixuisg surpluses in tiie basic crops - cotton, vdheat, 
eoira, rice and tobaceo — were partially sterilized in ttveir depressing 
effect on prices. 
In his appraisal of the operations of the Commodity Credit Corpor­
ation, Shejdierd sums up its operations from 1933-41 as follows* 
The CCC loans ware used, thei:*efore, for thr«e purposes i 
(1) to stabilize prices against fluctuations in production, 
(2) to stabilise prices against variations in general demand, 
and (3) to raJ.se prices over a period of years.^ 
He quotes tiie first annual report of the CCC In suppoz^ of the view that 
the l&tter of these three purposes was regarded as the jaost important. 
It beoomes apparent, themfoi^, tiuit while the "pari^-formula", 
based as it is upon a ratio Isetween agricultural and other prices, possesses 
^Shepherd, op. cit.^ pp« 39-40. 
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a OArtaln flexibility (though not very muoh ivhen prices in the rest of the 
eocnoiny are also ooinparatiYely rigid), suoh flexibiliiy becomes less and 
less -when tied to a loan program ooiamitted to the raising of prices over 
a period of years, based upon loan rates at a steadily increasing per-
oantage of parity« 
Her» it may be useful to digress, momentarily, to consider the 
evolution of parity as the increasingly useful tool n^ich it has become 
in the hands of the agricultural pressure groups for extending control 
over 'tiie domestic naz^t* On tbis point, again. Shepherd has summarized 
the course of eventsi 
In the first five years of the CCC, from 1933 to 1938, parity 
«a« only a general and distant goal, and the loan rates mre 
set chiefly at the discretion of the administrators of the 
CCC» The use of the loans to raise the general level, mors 
or less regardless of supply and deioand (or, at most, in 
anticipation of MA reductions in supply), had been kept in 
the background, !Ihe cultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 
howsver, brought this use of the loans into the foreground, 
and erystallised it into law* It olrcunsoribed the CCC's 
powers by specifying the range of 52 to 75 per cent of parity 
iritJiin which the loan rates had to be set for idxeat, cotton, 
and oom.^ 
This oircuTimoribing of the speoialists within CGC was aoecmplished 
veiy largely by the spolassraen of orgemized agricultural groups, working 
tlirough liie representatives of Hm agricultural districts in Congress. 
For, by now, the effective us« of pari^ as an instrument for achieving 
the end of higher prices vas d>vious« The parity symbol had, in fact, 
become an accepted part of the mores of American agriculture t it had 
p. 46. 
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largely superseded any Testiges of the cost of production dogma; prao-
tioally all individuals and groups had cast their thinking in the parity 
moldt the only diasatisfactions evideizt being from the producers of 
oanmodities -nho were at a disadvantage under existing bases. This 
dissatisfaction mostly took the form of demands for revision of the 
fbrmula, not tSie abandoning of the concept. 
By 19S8 it vas already beoooing apparent that the consequences of 
"fyizig agricultural policy to a comparatively inflexible price formula 
were tending to» (l) promote greater rigidities in the use of agricultur­
al resources and to freese certain production patterns to their histor^ 
leal basei (2) widen income disparities within agriculture} and (3} 
still further reduce agricultural expori:s.^ This latter consequence is 
the direct ooncem of -t^s study. 
The proposed new directiozB in agricultural and foreign trade 
policies emerged toge-^ier - the AAA and the. Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Program. It had been assumed by many, in the Departmexxb of Agriculture 
and out (explicitly stated by Secretary Hiiallaoe in nauy of his publio 
statements and writings)« that as the oountcy recovered from l^e effects 
of the depression* provided a balance had been restored between agricul­
ture and industry, that, tdxen the effects of the new trade program had 
begun to assert themselves, the whole econony would move forsrard into a 
period of rising domestic and foreign tirade. 
Admits, Redirecting Farm Policy. Cf. Ch. ITI. pp.6-15. 
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A. imiabor of important agrioultural oommodities wore still dependent 
upon foreign markets for part of their sales, ranging up to 40 per cent 
for cotton, more than 30 per cent for tdieat, and lesser percentages for 
meat, lard, and certain dried and fresh fruits. If the United States were 
to completely insulate its agriculture from foreign markets it would require 
an even greater magnitude of adjustment* This Seoretazy Wallace pointed 
out repeatedly in his speedhes and publications. 
It should, perhaps, be noted liiat the direction taken in 19SS was 
decidedly more liberal with respect to foreign trade than was desired 
by some of the older proponents of agricultural reform. George N. Peek, 
first AAA admizxistrator« idio frankly espoused a xiationalist program for 
agriculture » with a closed domestic market and an oat->and<-out dumping 
plan for disposing of surpluses aliroad - broke with Secretary Wallace over 
viiat he regarded as a oompromiaing of agriculture by iAie "free traders". 
"The administration", he charged, had, . . oootaitted itself, by a 
distorticoi of the Beciprocal Trade Agreements Act, to a low tariff 
policy -riiich has all the worst features of that free trade ^ ich the 
nation haa always turned down at the polls* 
Nevertheless, the overall effect of the AAA programs, as they pro> 
grassed through successive stages of revision end amendment, wcs to widen 
the gap between the American and the world market. When, after 1932, U.S, 
^Psek, Seorge N,, with Sssmiel Ctwirther, 'Bhy Quit Our Own? New Yoric. 
D. TaJi Nostrand. 1936. p»ll. 
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ozporto rose rapidly from their depress itm lo«8« agrioultaral expoi^ 
followed an erratic oourae, hut as a percentage of total exports, declined 
almost steadily (See Figure 1), Ihe decline would undoubtedly ha-ro been 
more pronounced in "tiie ahsenoe of subsidized exports* 
Since this shift in the character of U,S, eaqports is consistent with 
a lozig-run trend* it would of course be a nist^e to infer "^at the 
declining ia^oz'tance of agricultural eonsnodities in foreign trade was 
due solely to domestic policyj howevar^ there can be little doubt that 
in tilxe case of certain products« particularly cotton and tobacco, the 
high American prices provided a stijsalus for produotion escpazision in ot^er 
areas* Gorton acreage in Brasil, for Iniiteixoe, idiich istood at 2,^6,000 
acres duidng the period 193Q>S4» more than doubled by 1936 and rose to 
6«673j000 acres in 19S7j production increased from 481*000 bales in 1932, 
to 2*075«000 bales in 1937« Egyptian ootton produotion for the same period 
increased from 1*028,000 bales to 2,228,000 bales 
The burden of troublesome surpluses continued throughout liie decade 
of tiie 1930*s (reliewd now and then by the fortuitous intervention of 
droutii, insects, and floods) despite the increasing pressure for acreage 
reduction* marketing quotas, emd export subsidies* The carryover 
of ootton* just prior to the outbreak of the war, was in the nei^borhood 
of 10 million bales « nearly equal to a normal year's orop« Large ndxeat 
^g3rptian ootton, eonsisting of long staple varieties, does not compete 
with American cotton* however, to the extent that the Braslllan product 
does* 
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Indicts of the Volae of Oomeitic Agricultural Products and 
OomttDc Nonaqricultural Export* 1914--42 
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stooks had also aoounulated in the bins of the Ever-Tformal Granary and 
on farms. These oarryovers constituted a oontinuing threat to prices 
for current production, despite increasing regulation of the CCC to 
prevent sales at prices loner than the loan rate, and linitatioxis on 
quantities that might be sold in any case during ai^ one month or »yy 
year. 
At prices maintained in the j&mdricaa maz^cet, it became increasingly 
apparent that faraers would prefer to produce more than the market 
could possibly absorb. The politisation of agriculture had failed to 
solve the problem of adjustment and stability. 
Impact of World War n on Agricultural Policy 
Ihe war changed the context within which U.S, agricultural policy 
had been forced to operate, without materially altering its direction* 
By creating scarcities, where surpluses had been the rule, it gave the 
quite natural inclination of famers to produce more, at higher prices, 
the sanction of public approval* By closing off important con^ting 
producers from access to the Allied markets, and stimulating effective 
demand through large government purchases and induced full employment, 
the war greatly facilitated the entire prioe>raising process - the attaii>> 
ment of full pari^ prices for farm products* It did not, however, divert 
the agricultuxa.1 pressure groups fron a conviction that their subsequent 
interest would be tied to i^e domestic maricet* 
By a sequence of legislative acts, from 1941 on, agriculture's 
repzvsenbatives in Congress succeeded in enacting a series of hedges 
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against the tine in ths indeterminate future vhen the end of the -tneir 
would remove from the picture temporary ad-oantages -Uiat had accrued to 
the primary producers, In Ihe act of Ifaiy 26, 1941, mandatory loans at 
90 per cent of parity (95 per cent in the ease of cotton) wore imposed 
by Congress on the CCC «• exoept in the ease of com eind feed -vdieat > and 
provisions inserted for the oontinuanoe of these loans for two years 
after the mr. By the Aot of July 1, 1941 (the so-called Steagall Amend­
ment)» "tJie parity formula was made applicable to an extended list of 
oommodities* Prior to the "war, "parity" prices had been computed only 
for -tdie five "basio" oomnodities - cotton, com, ;^eat, rice, and tobacco. 
The Steagall amendment provided for the setting up of bases, and the 
extension of price supports for such non->ba8io erops ae hogs, eggs, chick­
ens, turkeys, miUc, butterf&t, dry peas, dxy edible beans, soybeans for 
oil, peanuts for oil, American-Egyptian cotton, potatoes, cured sneet 
potatoes, and others« Although the price bases established for these 
newer ocnnmodities were not tied to the same historical period vihich 
diaraeterized the basic commodities, and -were more nearly tied to a 
forward-looking principle calculated to stimulate production on the basis 
of war needs, -Qiey have been added to the range of commodities vdiioh can 
now be expected to look to government intervention for securing price 
supports on ths domestic market* 
Section 21 (c) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (Public law 457, 
78th Congress) prohibited the sale the Commodity Credit Corporation 
of agricultural commodities in surplus in doraestic markets at less l^ian 
126 
domestlo prloe or parity, v^iohever is higher, hut permitted export sales 
at world prices* 
On April 12, 1945, Congress extended tha life of the CCC to June SO, 
1947, increasing its borrofwing authoritjf to $4,750,000,000 to support fara 
commodities thzt>ugh loans and purchase operations; prohibiting sales of 
farm commodities onned CCC at less parity except for i^eat for 
feeding (at not less -Wian the parity price for com) and except sales 
for new or hy-produot uses, exports, seed or feed, or peanuts for oil. 
It was further stipulated in this act (Public Law 30, 79th Congress) 
that these provisions were to continue for two years after the present 
emergency* 
Behind this wartime legislation can be seen the oontinuizig concern 
of the organized agricultural groups -sdth safeguarding against a recurrence 
of the events of the 1920*8* Thinking among farmers and farm leaders 
tends to be in terms of price - of preventing a debacle in farm commodity 
prices, 8U(^ as followed World Wx I* An indication of such an attitude 
is to be seen in the assumptions behind policies of the National Grange, 
that American consumers have never paid enough for food; it is evidenced 
in the credit claimed by the flarm Bureau in securing the passage of the 
bills listed above, and other wartime measures to insure that price coni-
trol should not interfere with ftirmers receiving full parity prices or 
higher during tixe emergency.^ 
^Ihe American fkxm Bureau Federation* The Hation*s Agriculture* 
October, 1945* 
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In effeot* this primary oonoam with a rigid and a high level of 
fUn prices dictates that the foous of attention mast be the domestic 
market* The foreign market has been of declining iaqpoartanoe - the result 
of lOQgoterm shifts in the world eoonoaQr* intensified by the dislocation 
of war and to a lesser degree by the positiTS action of a more polit-* 
ioally conscious agriculture. 
A Kote on Cost of Production 
It would be intereetlnR to speculate on how the cost of production 
approach to agricultural adjustment might have developed as a vehicle for 
the fraaing of a substantive policy vAxich is an e:q[>res8ion of the politi-
sation of agrioultoro. 
Cost of production, as an economio concept* is another term iifaioh 
possesses tiiat specious quality of "misplaced oonoreteness" iriiich gives 
it a certain popularii^ wi-Qi mai^ people as something real, something 
directly applicable to everyday life* It has, for years, been a useful 
fiction employed by the Tairiff ConEuissicm. as a basis for tariff rate 
detamination. Itecommended rates are supposad to reflect 'Uie difference 
in cost of procluetlon betmen producers in ihis country and foreign 
producers^ in order that foreign azid domestic conaaoditiss shall "con^te" 
in the home mazlcet on a basis of equality* f^aotically, its use has been 
as a device for raising tariff rates, and hence for maintaizdi^g high 
prices on the heme max^et* 
John P* Blacic offers a useful breakdovn of cost of production into 
128* 
component parts, and ahowB that it is really an erabodiment of three 
ideas or concepts. These are stnnmarised as follows* 
1* Historioal cost •> the sum of the cost items actually 
spent on some production already completed. In comput­
ing such costs, buildings and machinery are charged on 
the basis of depreciation from their actual^ original 
purdiase price, It will be apparent that cost thtus 
eomputed will commonly bo out of line with prices on -Hie 
high side in a period of improving technology or declin­
ing price level. 
2. A seoozid meaning of cost of production is cost equal to 
what prices 'shcnild be* - for example, equal to prices 
that will support the kind of livixig producers want or 
that somebody thinks they should have » • • HQiat you really 
do is decide v^at income and prices you want for farmers 
and figure back firom there* 
3. The third and most useful meaning of cost of production is 
the amount that will need to be spent now, or in the 
production year whioh is just starting, to get the needed 
amount of it produced* Shis is commonly called the nec­
essary costs ... Necessary cost figured by this method 
i» likely to be ffeirly closely in line with prices over 
a period of several yeara. Any one year, the accidents 
of weather, or wars, or business recessions and the like, 
may make actual prices either higher or lower than nec­
essary costs estimated cuzrently just in advance*^ 
!Qie cost figures used by the Farmers* Union aod other individuals 
and groups in their campaign for federal legislation represented a ooo-
bination, by and large, of Blade's first and second cost categories • 
historical costs plus farm labor payments based upon returns farmers felt 
they should receive for -tiieir labor. 
Ihe most that could have been incorporated into legislation, -tixrough 
political aetion, would undoubtedly have been the setting up of costs of 
^lack. Parity, Parity* Partly, p. 179. 
129 
produotilon as an obijective which oould be approached gradually over a 
period of tints* Cost of production iwoald have become simply a price* 
raising device, ^ ust as "parity price" did, end the limitations or 
constraints encountered would not have been different. Production 
control would more then likely have become a first order of business, 
with about the same likelihood of suooess which attended reduotions under 
the AAA* For again, as Blaok points outs 
A full-fledged program of fixing prices according to unit 
cost of production would always be faced with the danger 
of pyramiding prices asd costs» Qace prices were set 
appreciably above neoessary costs, land rents, farm wages, 
and capital goods, cost rates would rise in response and 
furnish a statistical basis for still higher costs » • • 
output control 'vrould need to become more and more rigorous 
to prevent a breakdcrnn of the whole program.^ 
The consequeiioe to foreign trade and economic progress would, no 
doubt, have been similar, for the same desire to protect whatever gains 
had been made on the domestic market would have produced adverse reactions 
to ai^ in^rts ^ ich might threaten an established imerican producer* 
Slightly less flexibilily muld possibly have existed between agricultural 
prices an3 prices in the rest of the eoonoiqy* However, it is conceivable 
that, in the face of rigidities such as will likely face ^ erican agrioul«> 
tare at the end of tho present exsergezu^, the transition to necessary cost 
of production (tidiat been called fomax^ pricing by Stdiultz and others) 
could perhaps be more easily made from a cost of production formula than 
from an established and slightly ethical "pari-fy''« 
^Ibid,, p* 180. 
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CiiAPTER VI. 
EXISTING FAfiMER ATTITUDES ON FOREIGN TRADE 
The oonooraitant dovolopment of a separate agricsultuml policy and 
the proposed new direction in foreign trade policy posed somethii:® of a 
dilemma for administrators in the two areas after 1933. Although 
Secretary "s^iallaoe had pointed out the consequence, in terms of the 
asagnitudo of adjustment required, of a completely nationalistic solution 
of the farm problem, organized farm groups -were from the beginning openly 
hostile to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program or accorded it a 
support contingent upon an assurance that farm coBmodities would not 
come under its provisions. 
During the war both policies could pursue their separate courses 
without conflict because, under the stimulus of the requirements of total 
•war, they were traveling in the same direction. For more -tiian four years 
production restriotions gave way before the dercands for more and more 
production, while rising prices and expanding output operated together to 
produe« salutary inccsne effects for the farmer. Despite the use by farm 
pressure groups of their full measure of political effectiveness to 
buttress their greatly improved position against possible future reverses, 
they did relax their opposition to the imports of certain agricultural 
oonnnodities. The iitiporfc of feed grains for use in the production of 
animal products, for instance, which in 1939 amounted to some five 
million bushels, increased to 18 million bushels in 1942 , 246 million in 
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1943» and 224 million, buahels dirlng the flrs-fc 10 montiis of 1944. In­
stead of opposiag these iii5>orte, farmers actually urged their increase.^ 
To interpret this behavior farmers as an indication that« given 
l\ill employment and a high IbtbI of natlooal income^ they would offer 
little resistance to a lotrerlng of trade barriers is a seemingly self* 
evident conclusion. Such a conclusion is supported* as «ell« by exper­
iences from the past* As will be reoalled* even during the nineteentii 
centuzy* the periods idien farmers ivere most willing to acquiesce in 
tariff increases were the depressed ones* while during prosperms times 
they were quite cool to the overtures offered them in the form of tariffs 
on agricultural prodvuats in exchange for increased industrial tariffs. 
But 'vfeen it is considered that» in terms of moving forward into the 
immediate reoonstruotion period under "Qie banner of world trade tvvlval, 
timing is of the essenoe* and the attitude of agriculture may vexy well 
be determinate. And the vigor with idiioh the farm organisations pressed 
for measures to safeguard their wartime gains is sosBthlng of an ixidica-
tlon of their lack of confidence in the ability of the economy to main­
tain high levels of eoonomio activity. 
In consequenoe of rising prices and a 30 per cent increase in produc-
tlon« farmers have emei^ed from the war years in a stronger eoonomio 
^hese figures include tide Is^orts of five selected feed grains com­
prising ibeat unfit for human constoption^ barley, oats, xye» and 
unbailed ground oats. Source of this data is an uz^bllshed study 
by Bert P. TSgiselits, J.M, Letlche, end Hieodore W, Schultz^ of the 
University of Chicago, dated May 17, 1945. 
152. 
poaitlon than they have known in more than a generation. Farm incomes 
have inoroaeed more, proportionally, than have inoomea in most other 
aaotora of the eoononyf mortaged indebtedness has deoreased by more 
than a billion dollars sinoe 1940^ while teohnologioal improvements have 
raised the efficiency of i^e farm industxy*^ 
On the surface, at leasts the posto-nar situation -irhioh faces 
agriculture contains maoy more favorable factors than mas the case in 
1920» The mr baa pointed up« perhaps more than ever before, the 
correlation between a hi^ level of industrial employment, the size of 
the national income, and agricultural income. There is evidence which 
indicates that government, more than ever before, will bend its efforts 
to the maintenance of a high level of ei!^loiymE>nt and fall production* 
But* as Calvin Hoover observes^ 
There is considerable reason to suppose that even if wa 
succeed in maintaining tha level of national incon» necessary 
to, and consistent with, reasonably full employment, our 
agricultural exports will continue their declining trend. 
Should we have to import more agricultural products from 
abroad, a new political problem might develop, ireversing 
the past situation* Farmers might become the effective 
proponents of protective tariffs idiile manufacturers might 
become the advocates of lower tariffs*^ 
Some indication of the strengidi of that political situation can be 
gained from an examination of the position taken -with respect to l^e State 
Department's proposed renewal and extension of a more liberalised Becip-
^*S* Depeurtment of Agriculture, B*A*£,, 1946 Mricultuml Outlook Charts 
Ifoshington* December 1945, p» S3* 
%oover, Calvin B,, International Trade and Domestic Emplcyraent* New 
York. McGfraw-Hill, p. 139* 
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rocal Trade Agreerasat act in 1945 • The bill to extend the Reoiprooal 
Trad© Agreement for three more ymrs* from June 26^1945, provided for a 
grant of power for Hie Presidenb to reduo© tariffs by an additional 50 
per cent from ttiexr January 1# 1945« levels and iireis regarded by tha State 
Dapartment as an important part of aiy attempt to liberalize trade 
policy for the postwar period* It had the endorsement of President 
Roosevelt* who in March* 1945« had sent a special message to Congress 
urging tdie passage of the bill. It had the exidorsemsnt of President 
Taruman and was represented by the majority leadera in both houses as 
the first test of Congressioml support for the now administration* In 
the light of the mas^ ciroumstances favorable to international oooper» 
ation* and the strength of the political support for the proposed bill* 
the position of farm leaders and representatives of farm organizations 
in their testimony before the congressional coamittees* together with 
"tiie votes of congressmen from the agricultural districts, should provide 
a useful case study in existing attitudes and an index of prospective 
conflicts between tine two policy areas* 
TScsa published hearings of -&e Senate Finance Conuaittee^ and the House 
2 
and Means Committee* containing 628 and 2935 printed pages, respective­
ly, of testimoi^* supporting documents, lettei>s, and telegrams presented 
to these oommittees to bring to ^ eir attention the stand taken scores 
%.S« CMigjress. Senate* Ccsmnittee on Finance* Seventy-ninlii Congress, 
First Session, Hearings on 5240 (Revised), May 30 to June 5, 1945. 
^•S, Congress. House, Contnittee on Vibys and Means. Seventy-ninth 
Congress* First Session. Hearings on H.R. 3240. Volumes 1 and 2 
(Bsvised)« April 18 to 14* 1945. 
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of groups and prganisatloiu» includes the offerings from 20 organised 
farm groups or agricultural officials. This is exclusive of the 
evidence submitted by the U'.S, Department of Agriculture as such. 
Aa organisations, 14 of the 20 groups represented opposed the bill; 
six favored it* Aa cmalysis of the positions taken can be presented most 
conveniently by means of a classification of the groups repxvsented into 
three broad categories! general farm organizations, agricultural commod­
ity organisations* and special groups* 
General Earm Organizations 
Of the three large general farm organizations, the National Grange, 
the American Ptairm Buraau Federation, and the Farmers* Union* tno trere 
put on record by their representatives in favor of enactment of the bill, 
one as opposed* 
The National Grange 
The attitude of the national Grange, oldest of the gener*! fam 
organizations olaiming a total membership of about 900,000 farmers dis~ 
tributed throughout 37 states, has remained in unqualified opposition to 
the Reciprocal Trade Agz^ements act since its inception* Their position 
remains the same. In the trords of Master Albert S, Goss, nho testified 
before the. Senate Finance Coounitteet 
We believe in -Qie American market for the American farmer • * 
tixe Aiaerican farmer and the American noiking man ought not to 
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haTe to oompete for the domestic market with the lonest 
standards of living on earth*^ 
To attain this end, the Orange favors a tariff based upon the 
differonoe in cost of production. Although it is willing to recognize 
vAiat it calls '^natural advantages" in prcduotion» it maintains that 
ax^ producer who shows a "reasonable** effloienoy- in his msthods is en* 
titled to a price -ndiich will cover his cost of production* This would 
presumably include anyone now engaged in agriculture. On this point, 
Mr, Goss observeds 
there are those vdio say 'let the ^ merioan farmer get into 
some other line but let us have food mdiere we can get it 
tSie cheapest*^ liiis do not concur with this philosophy* That 
nation is strongest and most prosperous nhich is able to 
maintain a well«>balanoed econony, producing, processing, and 
fabricating the lEurgest part of the basic wealth upon which 
the ecoaonQr is built,® 
Two specific features to whidi the Grange cfbjeots in tho Beciprocal 
Trade Agreezaents act are the '*mo8t favored nation clause", and the 
delegation of the tariff and trea-ty-making powers to the Executive, ^ e 
first, it maintains, gives access to the American market to countries 
who have not given anything in return by way of concessions to American 
goods. The second, it maintains, is a violation of the Constitution, 
The Grange is not uziinterested in foreign trade, but it insists 
that it be viewed chief]^ as an outlet for surpluses - which inoidentally 
will not be large if conservation practices are Iblloned » but insists 
Coogrese, Senate, op, oit» p* S84« (Italics mine), 
^Ibid.. p. 586. 
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upon the flannora' right to those outlets,^ 
There is refleoted in the testimoziQr or the Grange representatives 
muoh of the oharaoter of that organization's membership, ndiich is made 
up predoninaiTbJy of farners tiio produce for looal markets - dairymen, 
poultry and egg producers, fruit and -wegetable growers, and a fairly 
sizeable group of wheat farmers in the Northwest. The almost religious 
qualitgr of the agricultural funda]itentEJ.i8iu it^ioh pervades the testimony 
of tbis ox^anization's representatives, as well as most of its public 
statements,is indicative of the extent to which the basic interest of 
membership in the home market has shaped its opinions and its political 
strategy. 
The Amerlctm Flana Bureau Federation 
Since 1934, the official attitude of the farm bureau has undergone 
somevdiat of a change. At each of the hearings on renewal, since -Qie 
Reoiprooal Trade Agreetoents were passed, this national organisation has 
supported, their extension. 
^ile neither Mr. Goss nor Mr, Fred Brenckman, ^ shington represent* 
ative of the S^ational Grange ti^ose testimox^ was presented before the 
House Ways and Means Conmittee, touched specifically upon this point, 
it has been given positive statement in the national platform adopted 
at the 79th annual convention at li^sas Ci-t^ in plank number 6, -HAii<di 
reads; "A. tvro*price system for exports should be adopted, to be 
aeoomplisbed by international oommodi-ty agreements that assure the 
^American farmers a fair share of the world markets at stable prices." 
Cf. The ITatloml Grange Monthly. Vol. XLIII, 17o. 1, January, 1946. 
(italics mine). 
2 K^, op. pit., p. 56. 
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In 1945, Preaidoat Edward 0»Noal appeared before the Senate Finanoe 
Committoo to urge the passage of the bill to extend the aot and enlarge 
the powers of the Exeouti"7B» In his testimony, Mr. O'Keal listed the 
total membership of his wganltation as 830,000 farm families, or three 
and a half million farm people*^ Under oross-examination, Mr« O'Neal 
stated that the iiational Executive Oonxaittee had votad 17 to S in favor 
of supporting the bill - -tiie thiree in opposition being frcm the iwestsm 
states. Ho then cited a resolution passed by the national convention 
to the effoot that "International trade is basic to the well-being of 
this nation and of the world," 
In his testimoiy, however, Mr. 0*Neal was careful to point out that 
the Anerioan Farm Bureau Federation does not favor free trade, but that 
it did oonsider trade agreement program a praotioal approach in 
dealing with an extremely ooiaplioated international situation. Under 
oros8««examination by Senator Taft, the Farm Bureau president indicated 
his organization, held tiie view thatt 
Foreign trade is vitally in^ortant as an outlet for surplus 
agrioultural products. The total volume of agricultural 
production in 1944 was 33 per cent above the prewar average. 
• • • Even though the domestic market is the most important 
outlet for agricultural products, the importance of the 
foreign market m an outlet for farm surpluses cannot be 
overemphasised*^ 
Oa i^e matter of agricultural in^orts, however, it was evident that 
Congress, Senate, op. eit«, p. 448, 
^Ibid,^ p, 456. (Italics mine). 
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the official position of the largest general farm organization •was 
considerably less trade^minded. This -vdll bs apparent from the 
following exchange between Senator Taft and Mr, O'Heal: 
Senator Tafta If you reduce the tariff on Argentine com, 
it is inevitable that you will reduce the price of com in 
the United States, 
Mr. Q^Heal: TWe are not expecting to »duoo the tariff so 
low as to destroy azfy legitimate industry in this countxy, 
0»Neal continueds 
It is true that there have been sotiw reductions made on 
agricultural products, but it is important to note that the 
greatest care has been taken in making sure that such reduo-
tions do not cause a flood of imports that would disrupt 
our agriculture* 
He then went on to outline why his organization was confident that agri-
culture had no reason to fear increasing ioports under Om Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements program, enumerating four safeguards against foreign 
competitioni (l) the '^escape" clause, now to b« inolu-Jed in all treaties, 
v&ioh provides "Uiat at any time, as a result of unforeseen developments, 
the reolprocal trading arrangement leads to an increase in quantities 
which threaten serious Injury to domestic producers, either government 
is free to withdraw conceisioztt in lAiole or in partj (2) the use of 
quotas; (s) tbo provisions of Section 22, Public law 320, 74tth Congress, 
for an investigation by the Tariff Commission azy time imports interfere 
with the price of a "goods which is being curtailed under ^ le Soil Con­
servation and Domestic Allotment plan, and a proclamation by the President 
to reduce imports vdien they are found to interfere with the agricultural 
programs and (4) tlw fbot that Cosigress can, at any time, nullif;y -Uie 
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•ffeot of the trade agreements*^ 
In the light of hie later amplifications« therefore, Mr* O'Neal^s 
testinosy appears decidedly less friendly to foreign trade than his 
opening statement and indicates ths kind of contingent support his 
crganiaation is willing to give. 
Here, again, the character of the organizational menibership -will 
throw considerable light on the reasons behind MT, O'Neal^s stand* 
Mr* O^lfoal is a southern planter and represents the interest of the 
cotton farmer* Control of the Farm Bureau Federation, by viirfcue of 
strength of meoibership, hae resided almost since it was fbunded in 1919 
in an alliance betwsoi the com»hog ASiddle West and the cotton South* 
These are the great surplus crops least liksly to benefit from tariffs* 
However, since the inception of the Agrioultux^il Adjustment Administration 
and the growing dispfurity between the domestic and the world prices, iiie 
spectre of foreign conqpetition beoomss much more a reality* Xhus the 
tendency has been, as in the case of the Srange, to cling to the hope of 
preserving the best of both the world and -Uie damestic market* 
Another factor» however» has led to a tendency for "splintering" 
within the Fans Bureau itself* A loose federatjon of state, county and 
local orgaziizatioQS, the fkrm Bureau has been built arouna tho country 
agent and the Extension Sexnrices of the land-grant colleges* Bspresented, 
^Ibtd*, pp, 460-61* (Italics mine) 
^Key, op* cit*» p* 58* 
Cf« Bak»r, Gladys, Bie County Agent* Chicago, ITniversily of Chicago 
Frees* 19S9* 
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therefore, in the National Executive Cojosiittee, is the diversit^y of 
interests in the wide variety of agriculture in the separate states, 
which, as the organization has grown in strength and membership during 
the years of improved agricultural inooTt®, has multiplied the conflicts. 
This is demonstrated in the fl&ct that three of the State Bureaus filed 
letters and telegrams -with the congressional coranittees, taking a 
stand opposite from that of the Hational i£xeoutive Committee*^ 
It "becomes apparent, therefore, tiiat the kind of support Mr. 0*Keal 
was able to offer for the program had to be the kind of "contingent" sup­
port his organisation would accept, restiz^ upon an assurance that the 
Trade Agreements would not interfere with the domestic market for 
"legitimate" farm products or with "parity". 
Prom the standpoint of the cooperation that mi^t he anticipated 
from the Farm Bureau in the way of support; for a "sound" trade program, 
much would depend upon the interpretation they might place upon the term 
"legitijnate". TSould "legitimate" mean "low cost" or "efficient"? Some­
thing of an indication of iniiat idmt interpretation might be can be had 
from the following exchange between Mr. 0»lfeal and Senator T^ft. 
Senator Tafti Mr. O^Neal, I would litee to ask you a question 
about this western thing* For instance, the tariff on wooli 
apparently if that tariff were cut in half, it would destroy 
the wool industry. They all say so* Hiftiat do you think? 
iHr, Q'Healt I think so* 
^California Earm Bureau Federation, Michigan Farm Bureau Fedaration, 
and the Minnesota Farm Bureau Federation. 
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Sam tor laffci You aro willing to sacrifice that industry 
for the general mlfare of the oountxy? 
Mr« 0*ltealt So* No* That is the z*eason 1 am saying« let us 
have a trade agreement« let us have soma bargaining authority 
and ua© the protective laws that you put on the statute books 
so as not to destroy that industry.^ 
The Natioml Farmers ^ Union 
In their statements before the oontaittees, James &• Patton, pros* 
identf and Russell Smithy legislative secretary# of the National Farmers' 
Union gav® unqualified support to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements act* 
In his e^pearance before the Senate Finanoe Ccnmnittee* Smith prefaoed 
his remarks -vith a quotation froan the resolutions passed by his organ-
ization^ -nhioh claims a national membership of between 145 axid 150 
thousand, families distributed among 32 states, at its preceding national 
convention. This resolution read as follows s 
Trade barriers contributed to World War II and if permitted 
to continue will bring on World War III* IfShen peaoe comes» 
W0 imist freely exchange substantial parts of our farm and 
industrial production with other nations« receiving from 
them products irtiicdi we nsed*^ 
Mr, Smiibh then went on to says 
In the last 25 years, we have changed to the position of the 
largest creditor nation in the world* Ufa don't believs we 
can maintain aa high a standard of living with that oltanged 
position under the same kind of foreign trade policies which 
we had when we had the other position of a debtor nation* 
Congress* 
^Ibid., p*. 599* 
Senate, op* elt, p» 465 
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Under the orossoexajnination of critical members of the cosimitteey partic­
ularly Senator Taft, Mr, Smith continued to reiterate his position that 
the probleiaa of trade oould not he solved by continuing to examins piece­
meal the effects of a particular tariff on a specific oonmodity - that 
the prosperi'ty of all Atrmere depended upon the total prosperity of the 
mtion. He stressed the importance of the "attitude generally of the 
people in the world rather than of specific instances", and insisted 
that "refusal to extend the tmde agreements authority for more than 
one year would seriously weaken the United States * leadership in world 
eofmomic affairs and would cause grave suspicion of our intention to 
participate vigorously in interaational cooperation for a world order 
and abundance**« aiid insisted that "the issue of ovemhelming importance 
Is an issue of attitude* -eAiether we prove our words of cooperation by 
deeds of cooperation." 
In terms of agricultural and economic statesmanship, there «ua be 
little doubt that Smith psresented the most fomard-looklng testimony 
that was offered befoz^ either of the committees by an agricultural 
spokesman* 
In terms of tiw attitudes of farm groups, there remains only a 
question of the extent to which Hr* Smith (and Mir* Iktton) were represent­
ative of the attitude of their members, or the extent to which ttxey can 
continue to lead their organization if the membership feels that it itiay 
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be ruaniag oounter to their narrower interests*^ In partj the organ* 
ization*8 stand oan perhaps be explained by its general background* 
Seat of its great strength is to be found in the Great Plains where 
fanners have beon subjected ta the rigors of a less friendly environ* 
ment 'nhioh has traditiomlly produced a more radical outlook* The area 
has the traditions of idie Greenbackers and the Populists behind it* 
It has less love of the status quo» hence its policy demands are likely 
to Height more heavily the importanoe of change* to look to a future 
that is better than the past* As yrill be shown presently, however, the 
organization* s stand on interoatioml trade has not been registered in 
the re^iiremeuts it exacts from its congresslozial delegation* 
The ecnmodity orsanigations 
In passing frcm 'tiie general farm organizations to the second 
classification based upon specific commodities, it is not necessary to 
consider the individual organizations in 8u<di detail* Suffice it to say 
that -vith tno exceptions, the coinmodi'fy orgaaizations -mre soldily agaixist 
the Reoiprooal Trade Agreestenfes* Those tno exceptions were the Inter»> 
national Apple Association and -Uie Dxled Fruit Association, bol^ represent­
ing small meinberships and both vith vezy hea-vy stokes in the export trade* 
^Cf« Sehattaohneider, op» cit* Bspeoially Bart 17, Chap* 6^ pp* 217-
28S» in «hi<^ the author analyses the uzurepresentatlve character of 
pressure groups and the extent to irhich claims habitually outrun the 
facts* 
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lATgest of the commodity orgetnizations« representing some 350«000 
farm families in 46 states« is the National CoopesratiTo Milk Producers' 
Assooiation* Not only is this organization pxdmarily interested in the 
domestic martcet, but it is also perhaps one of «ie most highly unified 
and organised. It has in the person of its secretary* Charles W, Holmn, 
a most effecti've lobbyist with a competent and vellopaid staff* The 
association has been^ £r<m. the beginni]3g« bitterly opposed to the Becip-
rocal Trade Agreements* 
Wr. Holman appeared before both committees with extensive documentaiy 
evidence to support his position with oarei!lil3y selected statistics. His 
position in brief wass 
(a) An importation of so much as one per cent of the country's total 
daily product consuH^jtion would ruin the domestic market. This is evident 
from the following exchange betneen Mr* Holman and Bepresentative Eber-
faarter from Pennsylvania» 
Representative Eberhartert In other words a very small per­
centage of imports in relation to our domestic production 
could ruin our msirketi is that your oontentioiu 
Mr. Holmant That is correct* 
. Bep* Eberharter? Qae per cent? 
Mr* Holmani Oh« yes,one per cenb would do it* 
(b) Tbs most ftevored nation treatment provided the act reduces 
American bargaining power and prevents the country from having a favorable 
balance of trade* 
(c) The power granted the President to raise or lover tariff rates by 
as much as 50 per cent violates the Constitution and ties trade policy to 
international politics* 
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(d) Except for a few unimportant types of foreign cheeses, the 
United States has "abundant capacity to satisfy every need of the 
American cousutner for all other dair^ r products". All that is needed is 
governmental support for a relatively small proportion of high-cost 
producers.^ 
Ihe position taken by two other impor^nt commodity organizations. 
The National Livestock Association and the ^ Tational Wool Srowers' 
Association, ms practically identical with that of the dairymen, but 
v^ile the latter has its greatest strength in the Northeast and arouixl 
large uzban centers, the other two are most influential in the West. 
The Wool Growers' Association is most active in 12 relatively sparsely 
populated western states, Tirib.ich in turn provide 24 senators for the 
upper house. The Livestock Association claims 17 affiliated state 
associations. 
P.S. Hlollin, executive secretary of the Livestock association, sum­
marized his organization's position as followst 
The land is useful only for grazing purposes and it would be 
just tragic to do at^thing to the livestock industry that 
would Jeopairdize the use of this tremendous land area in the 
production of food • • . 1 would like to say that if the 
information we have is correct, that we are goizig to need the 
American mrket when this war is over more -Uian we ever needed 
it • . .1 think I can say that our western cattlemen, western 
cmd southern cattlemen, are almost one hundred per cent in favor 
of "Wie position I have taken .... T do not recall a resolution 
that has been passed by any of our more than 100 inember organ- „ 
izations tdiioh has been contrary to the position ve have taken. 
^.S. Congress. 
^.S. Congivas. 
House, op. oit», p» 1970*8• 
House, op. cit., pp. 1208-10. 
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Tha position of the National Wool Gromra* Association, as explained 
by J.ia, Jones, president, who claimed to represent an industry of 175«000 
operators wibb an investment of three-quarters of a billion dollars, is 
aptly suBimrized by the following exchange with iiteprecentative Hberharter: 
RepresentatlTO Eberharter: On the basis of olean content^ 
you would advooate theUt at the present time under present 
conditions, a duty of how much'? 
Mr» Jones* Approximately 50 cents (a pound1 would judge 
roughly • • • and if we did not want to place a dul^ of that 
nature* we might have it by an izoport quota • • • then there 
would be two ways of doing it. 
Rep» ^ erharters And that would Tceep the price to the consuiwr 
at a "rory high lewl, would it not? 
Mr» Jones* It would be at a higher level than it is today, 
yes* 
Bep« Eberharter« It would raise the price of clothing to the 
consumers of the United States? 
Mr« Jones a To that amount it would, which of course would not 
be a Tsry great increase on a suit of olothes for exan^le. 
Rep» Sberhartert But you would be taxing, in effect, every 
consumer or every person that wore olothes in the United States 
in order to protect the wool industry. 
Ii^» Jones* Yes, if you want a wool growi^ industry in the 
tt'ni-tod States, that is what is necessary* 
The reminder of the comnodity organlsatioas to present testimoBy 
or to file briefs • the Beet Sugar Association, the Hothouse Vegetable 
^romers, the California Finiit Growers* Exchange, and the <^gon llut 
Growers - took positions practically identical with those of the larger 
and more poverl\il associations. Since their testimozQr was mostly on a 
•S. Congress. House. op» pit., p» 1758 
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lowor plane and leas ably presented, it is unnsoessary to refer to it 
direotly. 
lUsoellaneous 
T*o organisations of public officials -wi-tti agricultural ties in the 
separate states — the Ibtional Association of Commissioners, Secretaries, 
and Directors of Agriculture, and the i^outhem Comnissioners of Agricul­
ture «• itoalS probably be least useflil as an index of farmer opinion* The 
faet 13iat both appeared in opposition to the bill may, however, indicate 
somsthiqg of -Uie schism which exists between the departments of agri-
oultuM at the stete level as contrasted wiiii the natiooal level, and 
provide soosthing of an index of "splintering" of agrieultural poli<qr 
in eonsequenee of the complex state*>federal relationship that prevails 
in -(his counbry* Charges by the Southern Commissioners that U»S« trade 
policy was ignoring the interests of the cotton South may provide some­
thing of an indication of the metamor^osis cf southern tiiinking in 
consequence of the ztational agricultural policy ftollowed since 1934* 
Totes of Agrieultural Bepresenfcatives 
Ihe attitudes of pressure groups become effective ^ poltay by being 
trazislated into politioal aotion and ultimately through beiiig impreaaed 
nature of testimory given, however, indicates t3iat the Southern 
CoBBDissioners, as a subdivision of the national organisation, merely 
presented its oisi case in order to make a more impressive lowing* 
Both appeared to be "stooges'* of local industries rather -tiian repre­
sentatives of agriculture* 
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upon legislation* Tha preceding analysis of testimony presented by 
agricultural representatives at coagressiozial hearings on a bill pur­
ported to seek; a liberalisation of American trade policies has indicated 
a substantial opposition among farmers to ary move in that direction 
vdfiich might force the individual commodities to compete with foreign 
products*. It is now proposed to examine the results of the stands 
taken by oongressmen, in particular those congressmen representing predom­
inantly agricultural areas, in the debates and the voting vidiioh insulted 
in the final passage of the bill* The assumption is made« of course* in 
giving weight to congressional action, that senators and representatives 
do reflect9 generally* the attitudes of their constituents*^ 
Figures 2 and S are a graphic summary of the areal division betneen 
support and opposition to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements in the Senate 
and House of RepresentativBs* It is based* not upon the final vote in the 
two houses* but upon the real test of support or opposition to the bill* 
. In the House* the opposition made its supreoM ez'fort on a motion by 
It is recognised* of course* tiiat this assumption is a fairly sweeping 
one.to make* particularly when applied to a specifio bill* ^e individ­
ual representative is concerned chiefly with maintaining en acceptable 
record and not to please all of his constituents on every bill - an 
is^osisible task* If the general thesis of this study is true* however* 
this bill would likely be one on -idiioh farmers would feel rather 
strongly* Ihe recent renfflBiziatian of Senator Butler of Nebraska 
against the opposition of Harold Stassen* potential Bepublican pres­
idential candidate with internationalist leanings* provides some 
indication of the extent to -ciiich this may be true* Butler was 
one of the most vigorous opponents of the Beciprocal Trade Jlgreements* 
His renonination by a predominantly agricultural state my be indic­
ative of present faxm opinion* 
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Bepresant&tive Kuutson of Minnesota to reoosnnit the hill to oosEnittee* 
This motion failed to pass by a vote of 181 to 212. TfiJhen the bill finally 
passed the House 239 to 155, the favorable votes included something over 
25 that had actually been recorded in liie opposition earlier* 
Bepresentatives Emtson and Judd of Minnesota had also proposed 
crippling aioendments to out the proposed extension froooi three to tvo 
years, and to out the percentage by Y^ioh tariffs oould be reduced or 
increased to 25 per cent Instead of i3\e 50 per cent #iloh the bill provided. 
Just before the final vote, another member of the farm bloc, face of 
Georgia, offered an smendnent to prohibit the importation any agri-
Qiltural ooBoaodi-ty vhich could be sold at a price lower than the '^support" 
price being maintained for i^rican production. Since this amendment 
did not.acme to a vote. Facets stand has not been recorded against x%clp» 
rooal trade.^ 
In the Seiaate, the test vote on the bill came n^en Senator O'Mahoney 
of looming proposed an amendment -which vcmld require Senate review of all 
O 
Iteciprocal Trade Agreemsnts* A proposal by Senator Shipstead of ISlinnesota 
to exempt all agricultural products from any tariff reduction ms not 
brought to a vote» Zhe final vote in the Senate vas 54 to 21 in favor 
of passage*^ 
^Cf# The Few York Times« Sundajr, May 27, 1945. Vol. So. 31900. 
2 Cf. ITew^ Yoric Times. Thursday, June 21, 1945, Vol. XCIV, Ho, SI,925. 
^A total of 34 members in the Senate and House recorded no vote on the 
bill. A letter mis sent to eaoh of these members asking for a statement 
on idiat stand vould have been taken had been present and voted 
iiihat, in their estimation, isould havB been the urishes of a majoriiy of 
their constituents. Five replied vith a definite statement. These 
have been recorded on the Charts« 
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It vrlll be apparent that a vast majority of tbe opposition in both 
houses oaxne from ths agricultural areas* The strength of the support 
was in the South and the large urban centers. Something of a ooomentajy 
on the support of the Farmers^ Union members for their national leader­
ship is provided in the faot that in ths Great Plains states« the seat 
of that organization's greatest strength, ths members of Congress were 
in almost solid opposition to the bill. This may, of oourse, indicate 
the greater relative influence of ths ccsnnodity organisations with 
their congressmen* 
TSaa evidenoe of this seotion* however* appecurs to indicate rather 
conclusively the extent to 'oftiioh the farmers of the ooxmbzy haw reached 
a conclusion that the domestic market uust be preserved, and that their 
combined political strength can be used to the end of insuring their 
protection in that market* 
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CHAPTER VII. 
BVOLUnOH AND PROPOSED NEW DIKBCIIONS OP U.S. TRADE POLICY 
It ia now proposed to consider in greater detail th® general baok» 
ground of proposed a,S, Trade Policy, with particular reference to its 
conflicts with existing agrioultural policy* 
Althou]^ present trade policy seeks to create a political envii>Qn^ 
raent fa-Torable to trade expansion, ths factors niiich hav» rn&de the United 
States the principal advocate of world trade are econcsoic and technology 
ical* 
Economic Basis of Kew Trade Policy 
Because of its sise, because it now accounts for roughly one^half 
of the world industrial produoticn* and because of its acquisiticm of a 
large part of the world^s gold and credit resoux^ies, whatever t^is 
cousbxy does has an important influence on the other trading ccuntries 
of the world* 
During such of the nineteenth century, the United States was able 
to maintain a trade policy that was highly arbitrary* It refused to be 
bound by the unconditional most favored nation practices of the principal 
trading nations,^ or to follow the rules of reciprocity in ooanmercial 
^Cf. "Viner, "Peace as an Economic Problem", p» 92. "There was, in fact, 
during the middle years of the century, a peculiar interlude in the 
history of civilisation, when all the important trading countries. 
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negotiation. In most of its major oomnBroial agreements, it insisted 
on this oounbry's right to determine when other countries had met the 
conditions fcr special consideration - such as were granted to Cuba ani 
offered to Canada - wiiii the result l^at while expecting most favored 
nation treatanent for itself, it followed neither most favored treatment 
nor the principle of reciprocity* 
For a considerable period, the United States encountered little 
retaliation, because during much of the period before 1914 ttiere were 
still alternative opportunities for those countries that found the 
American mazkets closed. Zhere existed what Lange has called "at«niBtio 
•I 
conditions** in international trade. Xhe United States, itself, Hac? a 
rapidly expanding domestic maricet and an industrial and agrioultural 
plant geared to an expanding population. Surplus agricultural products, 
the principal items traded, w8z« the moat important items in financing 
the import of the industrial revolution. 
After 1920, however, the United States had very largely cleared it* 
self of foreign obligations. It had, by virtue of -ttie first World VSkr, 
become a creditor nation. Jn addition, its industrial plant had expaxsied 
to the point where it dominated maz^ areas. Perhaps more significant 
is the £aot that an industrial economy with a high percentage of capital 
except t^e^United States, were Mducing trade barriers, tdien all the 
important trading countries, again except the United States, had com­
mitted themselves to the policy and the para.ctice of the equality of 
treatment of all foreign countries, and when the two most importaiit 
colonial powers were on their am. initiative establishing the open 
door in their colonial territories*" 
^Lange, O»oar« Price Flexibility and Engloyment. Blocmington,. ]jxd. 
Frincipia Frees* 1944. p« 85« 
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goods produotion, becomes inoreasingly unstable and is dependent upon 
expanding markets in order to avoid periodic depression andv.unemplojrment. 
During the 1920's, under the leadership of Seoretcury of Commeroe 
Herbert Hoaire;Pf the United States vigorously prostoted the sale abroad 
of the products of the hea'sy and mass production induetries, -nhile still 
insisting upon maintaining the traditional trade and tariff barriers. 
Agriculture's role in the policy of this period has already been ooa^ 
sidered in detail* UoKever, it began to encounter increasing retaliation 
from other countriessingly and in combination* Its dominant position 
was too great to be Ignored azQr longer* 
Beginning in 1923* therefore, the United States proposed to extend 
unconditional most favored nation treatanent to all countries, and to 
insist upon such trea-taient for itself*^ 
Xhe continuanee of its high tariff policies, however, ^ ile pushiag 
its escort trade, made it increasing]y difficult for other countries 
ei'Uier to export their own prodvicts to the TMited States, and hence to 
pay for goods purchased, or to pay service charges on capital they had 
borrowed* 
nhen, in 19S0« the IT«S» Congress passed the Smoot^Ha-erley tariff, 
2 the reacti cm in oifcer countries was prompt and retaliatory* 5he twenty-
^(Jra<^, Henry fi* Kew Tariff Policy of U.S.", yoreign Affairs, Vol* 14, 
No* 2* January 1936* 
^Cf• Gayer and Sohsnidt, op* oit* p* 69* "Yihile the tariff bill (1950) 
vtas still being considered in Congress, European trade associations 
from every important country on -tdie continent* filed protests against 
it wilii Amsriean consular and diplomatic representatives and after 
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flTO nations taking action, in nearly every instance, gave aa their 
reasons the tartff act of this oountzy* Soon -Hie breakdom in inter­
national trade was oon^lete. 
The vcilue of foreign trade of the %ited States fell even 
more rapidly than did that of world as a vholei it 
dropped from |9,640«000,000 in 1929 to $2,934*000*000 in 
1932» As world trade diminished, enq^loynent and incomes 
foil and the worldwide eooaomic depression was deepened 
and prolonged* Between 1929 and 1932 our foreign trade 
dropped nearly 70 per centt national income 45 per cent} 
oash fam incoTne, 58 per cent} wages and salaries in man­
ufacturing industries, 53 per oent*^ 
As part of the New i)eal efforts to recover from depression lows, 
the State Department, under Seoretaxy Cordell Hull, Instituted its 
"new trade policy", calculated in part to open up the markets of the 
world once acre to .American exports* It combimd the practice of reeip-
rocal bargaining with the prinoiple of most favored treatment* 
A case ean he presented for the favorable effect on this ooantry*8 
trade, of 28 agreements ooncluded* During the two-year period iamsd-
iately preoediiig the outbreak of the war, ndien 16 trade agreements were 
in effect, this eountry^s exports to the cations covered by 'tiiese 
agreements averaged 62«8 per cent greater than in 1934-35, while its 
exports to all other countries were only 31*7 per cent greater* Imports 
from the agreement countries averaged, during the same tiro years, 21*6 
the Tariff Act of 1930 was signed by the President, foreign govern­
ments proceeded to enaot retaliatory measures* Before 1931 closed, 
fully twenty-five countries either had made extensive tariff revisions, 
had ixioreased specific duties, or had threatened to do so* 
Genius, Frank* Dictionary of Foreign Trade* New York, Prentice-
Ball. 1946* p* 16* 
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per cent gre&ter than in 1934»S5, -while imports from the other counfcries 
averaged only 12,5 per oenb greater,^ 
These figures do not tell a complete story, however# For by 1938-S9# 
this oountry*8 foreign trade policy had alreeidy beooae an instrument for 
rsirairding friends and for punishing those whose policies azd aots were 
olearly leading the world to war« !Qie increased demand for i^erioan 
exports was in part a oonsequenoe of the rearming -which was -baking place 
in -the countries -that were la-fcer to become the victims of Hitler. The 
exception was Japan« ihioh had been able to benefit directly from the 
trade agreemen-bs under provisions of the most fa-vored nation treatment^ 
although no agreement was concluded -with that country* On the actual 
contribution to trade expansion, therefore* IJie figures are inconclusive 
so far as the effec-to of the Beciprooal Trade Agreements program is coa-
oemed. 
Even so, the statistics indicate -iiie fundamen-fcal weakness of the 
United S-tates trade poli<^, even under the leadership of Mr* QuU* The 
expansion in expoi^ tar outran the increase in imports. And imports, 
if the United S-bates is to participa-be in world trade expansion, -cdll 
need to be expanded* Tbsy can be delayed by lending, but not indefinitely* 
Beonomically, -t^e Uni-fced Sta-tes has become -the most industrially 
advanced counfcry, with a high and increasing proportion of its popula-bion 
emplc^ed in secondazy and teriilaiy industry* Sustained economic progress 
requires -that savings be iznres-ted in an ever-^expanding productive enter­
prise* 
^Ibld, p* 19* 
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Under stable world political arrangements, part of these iinrestraents 
wouM move abroad, partioularly in the jraw material producing areas* 
Payment for these loans Tuould be inade initially in raw materials, handi­
craft products and sejni-nanufaotured goods ^ ioh would be imported into 
this country to enter the flow of a rising national income. 
The tendency would tatten be for fewer people to remain in agriculture. 
For those who did remain, agricultural resources in labor and capital 
woild be shifted to the mow specialized production - quality produce, 
dairy and poultrjr products, livestock of high quality and finish, pro-
teotivs foods, and those types of agriculture, generally, requiring 
relatively greater proportions of skill, of capital equipment, and 
specialiEed resources, 
ISiese are the broad economic forces behind the general flovr of trade 
which has taken place and is taking place in a world of unequal and un­
even development, where the important force of technology is in process 
of binding the world together into a single economic unit. 
Political Factors in 11,5• Trade Proposals 
Political institutions, the control of resources, and indirectly the 
control of men, are essentially consezvative, conflicting, and nonoration" 
al« Resources have always been inequitably distributed among the peoples 
of the world* The principal social and political institutions that have 
evolved during the course of histoxy have been conoeimed largely with 
preserving property and the advantages aecruing from such control* 
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The Blow growth of knowledge, the inoreasing oonsnand over the 
plysioal environment, has resulted in a continuing shift in organization 
forms, in types of control, and in the nature of proper^ itself. And 
it has changed the channels through which political control operates. 
Sinoe about the end of the eighteenth century, the predominant 
political organization has been the nation state. The successor to local­
ism and feudalism, in political organisation, and unlversalism in ideology, 
the nation has become the principal e^x<ession of supreme power for the 
protection of property and the provision of security, as well as focus 
of the principal l<^ltie8 of its members. It is, as Kohn points out, 
an empirical arrangement and an idea.^ 
Originally -Hie instrument of absolutist governments, resting upon 
power derived from the control of the land, IJie state, under an extension 
of demooraoy which began with the rise to power of the trading classes, 
has gradually been opened to a wider participation by all peoples, -vHiio 
singly and in combination have exercised their powers to influence "tihe 
eoonomio processes, to command wealth and income, to redistribute property. 
Conflicts among these groups, and among separate states, are a con­
tinuing force in the systems of power relationships. During certain 
periods, hammr, the persistence of comparatively stable political 
relationships have tended to free the efforts of men from such conflicts 
and opened the way for broad cooperative effort ifliich has resulted in sub-
^Cf. Eohn, ^ ms. Ihe Idea of Hationallsm. New York, Maomillan. 1944. 
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•tantlal Inoreases In wealth ancl -nelfare. The latter part of the nine­
teenth oentuiry tas, by and large* such a period* It appeared for a time 
that the politioal stability of those years had resulted in a submergenoe 
of the overt manifestations of nationalsimi and, vAxile inter-group 
struggles •within sorae of the eoonomioally inore backward oountries nere 
frequently bitter, th® temporary stabili-ty gave the liberal thinkers of 
the time a reason to hope that in time the orderly processes of demooraoy 
and individual eoonomio freedom would ultimateJIy spread over the globe. 
The reform of institutions, whioh still contained within them tha 
vestiges of the old feudal povver x^lationships, failed to keep paoe viib 
other changes ndaioh occurred at an inoreasingly rapid paoe« Inequalities 
in wealth and power increased, ra'tiier than diminished, in consequence of 
the new growth of technology. The essentially equalltarlan ideals of 
liberalism vere never realized in fact, inriiii a consequent "eruption of 
the individual end of the group" as Barker has described it. 
The brecQcdoim of the old order in 1914, and the failure to reestab­
lish the kixid of political equilibrium vithin nfelch orderly economic 
relations at the izitemational level were possible, the growth of power­
ful monopolies azid economic poner combinations operating through their 
governments, and sometimes independently of them all coxispired to add 
to iHoB eumlative power struggles, both at the national and international 
levels. In consequence, there -nas no return to iduit some had come to 
regard as normal, no raestabllshment of an environment within ^ ich ex­
pectations could be favorable to orderly eoonomio progress. 
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Eaoh country, aoo«dlng to the eseential^ exolusive and competing 
deinands of di-rergent groups wlbhin, and by the uae of unilateral and 
arbitrary actions without, has progressively reduced the possibility 
of political balance. 
It is as an experiment in induced behavior at the intematiooal 
level* that the proposed trude policy of the U.S. State Department most 
be viewed* It is more than a trade policy. It is a political instru­
ment. It is a pragmatic approach to the attaizunent of a world political 
organization# in v^ich the economic and, probably the military weij^t, 
of tfas United States, is intended to be used as a means of promoting a 
political equilibrium at a higher level. The following quotation from 
Bansen, -nhose influence in shaping this countzy's economic policy has 
been considerable, is to the point* 
The experience in -Uie interwar period malces it clear that 
traditional approaches to the problem of trade and com-
mercial policies are sterile and ineffective. It does no 
good merely to hold an international conference and melo 
pious recommendations with respect to the removal of tariffs 
and trade restrictions. The experience in the interwar period 
shows that such recomnendations produce no results. Worse 
yet, the more the experts recommend trade reductioiis, the more 
it seexoed that those in charge of practical policy in the 
various countries resorted to increasing trade restrictions. 
Ute mat make a fresh start on this problem. Bjqtansionist 
international trade policies caxmot and will not be adopted 
and pat into effect unless they constitute part and parcel 
of a broader program of international cooperation. 
Consni'tansnts already made the United States to the end c£ world 
trade expansion and reconstruction are substantial. In addition to 
^nsen, op. cit., p. 91. 
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adherence to the United Nations, these include: ratification of the 
Bretton T/iloods Agreement, -which provides for a Monetary Fund for ex-
change stabilisation, and an International Bask for Heoonstruotion 
DeTOloifflienti an extension of the Eeoiprocal Trade Agreemenbs program, 
•with increased authority for the chief executi-sre to reduoe tariffs by 
an additional fifty per cent frcaa their January 1, 1945 level) an 
increase in the Isndiog authority for the ^ xport^Import Bank« from 
$700,000,000 to $3,500,000*000] govemmental lOEins to foreign countries 
(including the British loan) vrhidi m&y reach as much as §7,800,000,0001 
and a surplus propertgr sale which will approach $6,000,000,000 - mostly 
on credit.^ 
Ihs National Flaming Association, in its proposed trade program 
for the United States has estimated that world requiremenbs for recoxi-
struction and development will amount to |150 to $200 billions in the 
first postwar decade* Of this amount, it is presumed that perhaps half 
2 
will have to be met by tlie United States* 
Thus may be seen something of the magnitude of an undertaking whioh 
looks to the future of expanded world trade and development* IKIhile these 
figures (conceived during a Idrae of very great optimism i^garding the 
^These figures were omtained in a report presented at the Paris Peace 
Conference by Assistant Secretary of &tate Clinton, Cf• ^ he 
United States News, Vol. 2X1. No. 7« August IQ, ld4d» p« 22. 
2 l&tional Planning Association, America's Hew Opportunities in World 
Trade, 'Report of the Committee on Intematlemal Policy, l^shington. 
November 1944» p. 20, 
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posBibilitios of World cooperation) are undoubtedly in excess of the 
likely scale of lending by this country, it is quite likely that the 
mtions of the world iifill shortly be owing the United States much in 
excess of anything that has previously existed.^ 
VJhile most of the loans are to be amortized over a long period, 
and -while a large part of tiie lending is intergoveminental rather than 
private, as ttiey mostly were during •Hie 1920*8, failure to insure against 
the kind of debacle -nhich oocurred in the 1930* s, would most certainly 
leave a 'wake of defaults and bitterness, as well as disrupted economies. 
Consequently, while proceeding on a program Tjfliich is aimed at the 
alleviation of stagnation and underdevelopment, it is a part of State 
Department policy, as stated at least, to build political breakwaters 
agaizist such failure* 
State department policy can be interpreted, therefore, as a recog­
nition of three iiapoii;ant political and economic facts: (l) that govern­
ment and private interference with trade has proceeded so far that recog­
nition of this important fact must be the starting point for futux^ world 
trade relations; (2) a consciousness of the economic weight of the United 
States in world affairs - a sense of security which comes from possessing 
•^Bftl B, leiy of the Department of Commerce, has elected to think in 
terms of an outflow of American capital aggregating §50 billion over 
the next 20 years. The maximum claim cf all creditor nations against 
all debtor nations in the past was $40 billion in 1914* Cf. Hal B, 
Lary, "International Investment", Aasrican Boonwnio Keviewa Vol, XXXVI, 
No. 2* May 1946» Fapers and Proceedings, p. 672* 
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a "lion's share** of the world's gold and oredit resouroasi and (5) a 
rooogiition that in a highly industrialized country, with large oapital 
aoeinau3ation and facilities for hea-jy goods production, expanding tnarkets 
are a requireinent for sustained eoonomio progress, or e\r8n to a^ert 
retrogression and eoonomio depression» 
Detailed Proposals 
To the end of setting up an Organisation to deal specifically with 
problems of world trade, and for establishing rules for coiKBeroial 
policy, the United States has called for a world trade conference* In 
a llhlte Paper prepared by the U.S, State Department, there is contained 
the essential outlioe of this country's proposed foreign trade policy* 
The Ibllowing detailed outlixie derives principally fron that source*^ 
Ifost iigportant to a release from restrictions iB^)08ed by go^m-
ments, and from fear of irregularity in production and es^loyment, will 
be the functioning of the agencies created under the Bretton Woods Agi^e<> 
ment. 
The Monetary Fund« under the proposed international organisation, 
is charged with providing fort ''(a) short term oredit to countries to 
help -tiiem over temporary difficulties in their balance of ps^ent positions; 
Department of State, Proposals for Expansion cxf World Trade and 
Bnployment^ Publication 3411* Washington* November 1945. Certain 
interpretations of the conteasts of this publication were obtained 
from Jaoob Viner, iritio assisted in its preparation. 
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(b) medhanisms of adjustment to improve the long term balance of pay­
ment position of member countries} and (o) continuous machinery for 
international consultation and for research surveys and reports dealing 
with current international problems."^ 
It is submitted that these provisions would elimixiata the short run 
necessity for a country to interfere drastically with its foreign ex­
change rates in order to prevent their decline and a consequent fall in 
exports, -with unfavorable effects on short term employment. It would, 
therefca'e* tend to discourage aiqr one country from attempting to seek a 
tei!^>orary ad^nntage omr other countries by escorting its unemployment 
through the use of tariffs, quotas or other restrictive measures cal­
culated to stimulate domestic industries. But most important, by the 
surrender to an international authori'^ of the right to insist on cont-
piste national sovsz^ignty over matters that affect all nations, it would 
remove the possibility of the unilateral solution of problems affecting 
the general interest. These problems vould be solved at a higher level* 
In time, if this authori't^ could be established it would constitute a 
system of induced behavior idiich would, in fact, make the actions of each 
participating nation more predictable* 
In addition to the Monetary Fund, the International Bank for recon* 
struction and Development will provide a capital fund of |9«1 billion, 
subscribed by the msmber nations (plus authorisation to sell securities 
'hlazuen, op> cit«< p* 55* 
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for raising additional funds) to constitute a reserw of long term 
capital to facilitate the orderly development of demstated and baok-
•ward countries. This source of capital is to be available "riion private 
investors are unvrilling to provide long term loans at reasonably low 
rates of interest* The bank is designed to assist nations in the 
providing of enplcymsnt through capital improvements to promote a better 
use of their resources* This is escpeoted to coniaribute to an increased 
national income and a rising scale of living, thus insuring a greater 
demand for, those goods whidi move in international trade. By providing 
experienced techzxioal advice* the Bank can promote a regular!sation of 
the processes of international investment' and:?aot as a sedCeguard against 
the kind of investments ishich proliferated during the peak of the private 
lending boom of the 1920*8, when investments were sponsored chiefly by 
investment houses having little oonneotion w-^.th the actual enterprises 
other than an intexvst in the sales ioonmission* 
Use of the Trade Agreements 
As a farther aid 'M the reduction of trade barriers, it is a part 
of State Department policy to use the Becipirocal Trade Agresments program 
as a leverage for obtaining reduction in existing tariffs and trade 
barriers. Instead of bargaining vrith separate countries, however, using 
up the bargaining power granted by Congress (the 90 per cent flexibility 
in tariff rates) it ^  proposed that bargaining shll be oarried on sisnil-
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taaaeously at a oouferenca among all trading nations,^ By this arrange-
mont* the most favored nation treatment oould be made more meaningful^ 
since it vfould, in effect* be extended only to the "members of the club" 
of trading nations. It would obviate the practice followed by this 
cointry during -tiie 19S0*» of using the "principal eupplier"* technique 
and the extension of co&imodity classification for tariff-ioaking purposes. 
Cartel Policy 
As a means of reducing private interference -with international 
trade, the State Department has proposed« as an integral part of its 
policy ''that oouutries will act individually euid cooperatively* to curb 
e is a leaf borrowed from the book of e^qperience of the 'Veeijnar 
republic, which followed tJie practice of having all commercial treaties 
expire in the some year* Known as the koamet.iahre policy, it allowed 
treaty negotiations to proceed simultaneously with several countries 
so -Qmt none would be aware of iidiat concessions had been made until 
all treaties had been signed and published. 
2 In order to protect its bargaining poner under reciprocal negotiations 
the praotioe followed this counbxy has been to negotiate with a 
oountzy on commodities of which it happened to be the principal 
supplier for the United States* This has tended to violate the spirit, 
if not the letter, of most favored nation treatment. Similarly, it 
has been the praotioe to sake a more detailed classification of cosimod* 
ities - for example, Gouda, Swiss, Panoisan and other cheeses have 
replaced the more general rate on cheese - enabling the United States 
to bargain with the principal suppliers of these items. Cf* Popper, 
"Foreign Policy" Vol. XIII, No. 5. 
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those restrictive busiaess praoticos in international trade which inter-
fera with the ohjeotlves of increased production and trade* aooees on 
e(]ual terms to markets nnd raw jnaterlals, and high levels of employioent 
and real income." It is thereby proposing a parallel aotion to that of 
the Department of Justice in this country. To this end it is proposed 
that a special agen(^ be set up within the proposed International Trade 
Organisation to receive complaints and advise on reundies.^ 
Note should perhaps be taken of Hansen^s interpretation of this 
phase of the Intematioxial organisations activity# He contends that it 
does not necessarily require indiscriminate trust and cartel busting* 
but -ttiat it does involve organising for a study of abuses in order to 
prevent unnecessary price raising* suppression of patents* and the 
acotODulatlon of excessive monopoly profits. It Is his belief that* in 
certain of the cartelised industries* peurtioularly those in heavy goods 
and basic materials* monopoly has been an adjustment iiqpOBed by the wide 
fluctuations in demand and -tiie necessity for excess capacity. A more 
stable tsrade* he believes, will help to remove the causes of monopoly 
or cartels; if lib does not* he proposes that gcvemments thoroughly 
rsconsider their patent lavs* regulate prices, and as a last resort tax 
2 
aiM^ monopoly profits. 
I7.S. Depairtment of State, op, eit.> p. S« 
2 
op* cit«, p. 175* 
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Commodity Agreements 
Finallys the State department proposes* as a colleotive approaoh 
to •Wio chronic surplus problem in the basic industries, an extension 
of the use of commodity agreements. This lype of agreement has been 
rather widely used in the past* but chiefly as a price-raising device 
administered by the principal producers of a commodity for purposes of 
controlling the supply.^ The past history of such agreements has caused 
them to be regarded in economic circles with considerable questioning 
as simply another form of cartel with govemioent sanction. Their accept­
ance by the United States as an integral pert of a trade program has 
been regarded as a perversion of a genuine desire for freer trade, 
Eonever* as proposed by the State Department, ''Suoh agreements are not 
intended to freeee existing patterns of production, but rather to provide 
a program of adjustment and a period of time within which the essential 
2 
changes can be made without undue hardship." 
To GOD^rehend the essential proposals of the oommodity agreement 
program it is necessary to oonsider* briefly* the production problem in 
the primary industries. Agricultural and raw mterials production are 
not subjeot to the same type of oyolioal production as industry. The 
fluctuations occurring are caused largely by new discoveries (in minerals), 
weather* pests* and other almost idiolly unpredictable factors. Planned 
^Cf« Davis* J.S.* "Experience Under Intergovernmental Commodity ^ ree-
ments*** Journal of Politioal Hconooy. Vol. VI7. Ko. S. June 1946. 
pp* 193*220• 
2 
U.S. Department of State* op. cit. 
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production, as a Tnhole, is comparativBly stable. In years of good 
hai^sts and large orcps, because of the comparatively inelastic demand 
for most raw materials, prices have a tendency to fall to ruinously low 
levels. Ihen large crops ooincide tdth a general fall in the price level, 
surpluses accumulate and continue to have an adverse effect on prices, 
even uriien recovery has begun in other sectors of the world econojuy. 
Extended periods of depressed prices, theoretically, should induce 
a transfer of resources out of the industry. But in agriculture, partic­
ularly in the predominantly agricultural countries, the opportunity for 
transfer is limited. Farm people tend to be less mobile than other 
segments of the population. TOien transfer does taTce place, it is usually 
through the movement of the younger generation. If agriculture is 
reasonably profitable so that 'tiie sons and daughters of farmers have the 
opportnini'ty for education, the transfer is made more readily. During 
extended periods of depression, diildren are forced to leave school, 
and the generally more fertile farm peoples add to an increasing backlog 
of population in the rural areas. 
It is for purposes of dealing mtii this kind of problem that the use 
of the comnodity agreement is proposed. To insura, however, that it does 
not beewne merely a device for raising prices and restricting production, 
it is proposed that principal consuming countries shall be represented 
and become a party to the agreement. Positive measures mil be initiated 
to stimulate demand for products in surplus, through new uses or perhaps 
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throu^ Bubaidieed oonaumption. in low inooine areas* Coordination with 
the Food and Agricultural Organiaation of the United Nations is expected 
to be close. Suggestiona have been advanced ^ir John Orr for an 
international stoolcpiling, to level out fluctuations between years of 
short supply and yeai^ of overproduction. 
On the assumption that hig^i level employisent and inooste can be 
made possible throu^ internationsLoooperation, it is not anticipated 
that many goods -will be in chronic surplus. In the case of certain 
"inferior"^ goods, however, if suzpluses persist, measures vdll be taken 
to assist in the transfer of resources to ol^er production. 
An Bs^ristent in Induced Behavior 
In the introductimi to the proposals for the expansion of world 
trade and employment, the State Deparbnenfs specialists make this 
observntiont 
Ihe main prise of the victory of the United Hations is a 
limited and traporary power to establish the kind of world 
we want to live in. 
That power is limited by what exists &nd -ti^at can be agreed 
on. Human institutions are conservativej only wiiJiin limits 
can they be moved by conscious choice. But after a great 
war some power of choice exists; it is important that the 
United Nations use it wisely. 
^ inferior good is defined as one with low income elasticity which, 
as incomes increase, will be replaoed with hi^er quality, more 
nutritious or more protective foods. An example of an inferior good 
is the starcdiy foods, such as xye, potatoes, etc., consun^tion of which 
does not rise proportionally as incomes rise, and -idiich may actually 
dee line if low inoomes are raised substantially. 
175. 
mthin the aroa of oholoe that Is opon, ths U.S. State dopartmeni: 
can be said to seek a Jolat polltioal and eooxiomio objective of estab* 
lishlDig a new balance of power* a oooperative supra-national authority, 
and of regularising oomnteroial and trade behavior in a manner to insure 
a certain stability of expectation for iiifcerriational eoonomio behavior. 
lihat are ths ooostraints operating both at the international axd 
the national levels, likely to set the limits to the suooess of this 
policy? 
The first test of U,S« leadership is taking place under conditions 
of the purest of Ifeohiavellian power struggles.^ Unless or until that 
struggle has been resolved, there can be little meaning to a discussion 
of economic progress and development. Trade will oontinue to be a means 
of rewarding friends and withholding goods frcm adversaries or reoal-
citrants. 
The return of political stabili-ty, if and #ien it comes, is likely 
to be slow, and will not oome all at once. A successftil beginning in 
the rebuilding of trade relations could aid its ooming. But policies 
existing in other areas joay be seriously limiting factors even there. 
Beoause of past trade policies, the United States is encountering 
some diffiool'ty ooztvinoing other trading nations that its proposals for 
freer trade are strictly sincere, and not simply an expression of the 
naeds of ths lai^ export industries, whose oon^etitive advantage is 
well recognised. This country's abiliiy and eagerness to sell, and its 
^See A Hote on the Balance of Power at the end of this chapter. 
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uxarillingnBss to buy^ has btten at the heart of oeirtain of the charges of 
"imperialism" "whioh arose out of the Department of Commerce's vigorous 
methods for pushing exports. As Hansen assex^si 
Far fron beizig unable to oo2q>ete in the world markets, the 
fact is that the United States conqpetes altogether too well. 
We are always selling too much in the world mrkets. Ihis 
indeed constitutes one of the great world problems. We are 
always selling to foreigners more than they are able to pay for* 
We are urorilling to purchase from foreigners enough to balance 
our trade.^ 
In the past the United States has had a tendency to oversell« to 
encourage borrowizig» and then when loans e^pear to be getting b^oxtd a 
reasonable prospect for payment, to restrict credits, raise tariffs, and 
spread depression to other countries* This is -idie attitude behind the 
tendency now epparent in other countries to insulate themselves agaixist 
the United States tyizig agreements* Thus far, as part of its stmtegy 
in leadership in attempts to restore freer world trade, the State Oepeurt-
ment has been applyixig jaressure to prevent a resumption of bilateral 
2 trading agreements, with paziiial success* 
^IBansen, op* cit., p. 135* 
^One of the stipulations in the texms of the British Loan was that 
Rngland should all<«r her Entire preference ^stem to lapse as the 
general lowering of tariffs all round approaohed tiie existing tariffs 
on Siqpire traded goods* The recent intervention, in the case of a 
i^ing agreeBM»nt on idieat between Canada and Great Britain is another 
eximple of the attempts to head off bilateral trading. One of the 
laporfcant Issues between the tTnited States and! Soviet Russia has been 
her state monopoly trading, and her tieing agreements with her satelite 
countries, and more recently with Sweden* 
175, 
As fias Indicated 'by the attitude of the Latin Ajrorioan delegates 
at the Chapultapeo conference, the slight prospect that the United 
States -would be able to achieve ai^jr substantial reduction in its tariffs 
on agricultural commodities, has raised considerable doubt in the minds 
of maiiy of the other nations that this countzy's proposed policy is a 
sincere statement of the actual prospects* Those countries indicated 
a singular unwillingness to tnake concessions on industrial products 
likely to compete with their own infant industries* 
Ihu8« the existence of a separate agricultural poli(^, vihioh 
requires a reserved domestic maricet for its success, and 'nhich has strong 
political backing, emerges as a constraint upon the announced policy 
of freer -world trade* 
!Ihe longer tiie present period of world iziseouri-ty persis-bs the 
more the position of agriculture is atreng-thoned, politically and econom­
ically* JL war econoiry, or a potential mr econony is heavily dependent 
upon food sources near at hand* The fact that the TInited S-ta-tes possesses 
-vast resources both in industry and agriculture is an important element 
in its streng-th* Agrioul-fcure is provided with powerful arguments for 
almos-b ai^ degree of special consideration, so long as uncertainly oon> 
tinues*^ 
1 The au-t^oritarian govemmen-fcs of Genoai^ and I-taly provided 
peasants wi-bh substantial subsidies as a pert of their development 
of war eoonoioies, and in turn received loyal support frcm them* This 
support was orgci^zed, of course, through the dominaxoe of the weal-fahier, 
land owning* faxiaers -iho perpetuated their positions through the nyt^ 
of a separate interest of -t^e peasantzy* Poorer peasants received 
little benefit fi^ most of the subsidies. Serschenkron, Alex-
ander. Bread and Pemocracy in Sennany* Berkeley, tTniversity of 
California Press* 1943. 
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A Not© on the Balance of Power 
Since this study ims begun, the outlook for international oooper-
ationj pairtioularly betneen the Western powers ai^ Soviet Russia has 
darkened* There is less optimiam than there vias a year ago vfliea the 
cr,S, state Departmonb -was presenting its proposed new policy to the 
world. 
Ihis country's esperimsnt with world leadership aid organization 
for infcemational development is therefore confronted with a wide reinge 
of instability and uncertainty. In the walco of a global war* particularly, 
'idien old, established power ooinbinations haTS been disturbed, and oppor­
tunities are presented for those oosibinations still extant to expand by 
TBo-ving into power there is all too little basis for prediction. 
There is no rigorous system of equilibrium analysis for political 
forces,^ Reliance on trial an3 error, the principle of laadership, 
coupled .with the art of compromise, are still the rough tools of the 
politioiaxu The political scientist can only describe and analyze 
those tedhaiques. At its most general level, the principle of political 
equilibrittnt is an acceptanco of 'Ute status quo, the laws and institutions 
for enforcing it, and the accepted rules for dianging it« So long as the 
^For this reason, 7(m Mses insists that there can be no solution, 
that loan's only hope is for a return to a system of largely unregulated 
free mrlcets and oon^etition; otherwise, there can be only a oxanulative 
growth of bureaucracy, and an inevitable growth of authoritarian 
dictatorship. Cf. Mises, op« cit., pp» 20-s9» 
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potMr rolations persist under ithioh the equilibrium was established^ 
so long as no par)^ to the existing arrangement desires to change the 
rules and submit to a nev test of power« it can continue* Qace challenged* 
the increased power leads to a cumulative^ extension of power* until it 
can be checked by an outside force. Usually^ this ohe<A: has been in the 
fom of a higher power oonibination or the prospect of such a combin­
ation. In tiffl present world of superpowers, there is little room for 
combination or raaaeafera 
It has already been submitted that the cause for much of the present 
imbalance in the system of power relationships has been brought about by 
the shifts in. vealth and power due to technological changes whicdi ha-ve 
relegated once great powers to subordinate positions, and raised new 
nations to positions of strength and wealth tdiere they have reasons to 
believe in their own superiorly* 
It is generally recognized 'tiia't the most important, single force 
in the modem world acting as a deterrent to peace and cooperation, is 
^Chis tise of the concept of -ttie cuaialaticn of the power struggle is 
based upon a methodological note of %rdal, op, cit», p. 3065, "In 
most social rssearch we haw restricted our uti. lisation of the 
equilibrium notion to tiiat simple and static rnriasd: of it* the 
stable equilibrium. It is this equilibrium notion which is implicit 
in the sociological constructions of "maladjustment" and "adjustment" 
and all tiielr several synoayas or near synong^, where equilibrium 
is thought of as having a virtual realii^ in detenaiBing the direction 
of ehange. He propose the utilisa'tion of other equilibrium notions 
besides the simplest one* For djnoamic analysis of the process of 
change in social relations, it is hi^ly desirable that we disexigage 
our minds frcm the stable equilibrium sclieme of thinking. The other 
types of equilibrium notions are often better description of social 
reali^ than the stable one ••• Xhe most important need is to give 
place in our explanatory schnne to a rational recogr 
nition of the comulation of forces." 
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the idea ot national ism, a belief in an unlimited uee of soToreign 
power for the attainmenb of security and so-called "national honor". 
Ideologies are mostly the synibols of those conflicting natiomlisms. 
Unlimited national sovereignty, once a progressive influence in 
securing release from ths repressions of feudalism and local autoneany 
of the landed aristocracyhas become a constraint upon further world 
development and trade* idiere markets have expanded with little reference 
to the location of the political boundaries that contain it. It is the 
heart of the struggle which has reached its peak during this century 
for raw materialsfor colonies» for marketi^and investments, and in 
the use of poweir consideratioxis in the regulation of foreign trade«^ 
nationalism is not an old idea, as Dr, Eohn demonstrates « an 
hictorleal {Aienomenon of a little less than two hundred years. Tet, 
its demonstrated archaism in 'Uie face of jet propulsion and atomic 
fission has not served to moderate its force. One of ths more depress­
ing consequences of World Ifltar II has been the resurgence of nationalism 
in its most extreme fom, Sven in the Scandinavian and the Low ccHintries, 
possibly 'Qie most cosmopolitan of all nations» in the colonial areas of 
the east and the Southirast Pacific, the upsurge of nationalism is on 
^f. Sta3^, Eugene^ atttt Materials in Peace and War, liaw York, Council 
of Foreign fielations, 1937« 
^Cf, Btyoe, R.B, "international Aspects of an Investment Progiram" 
Postwar Economic Problems, edited by Seymour E, Harris, New York, 
McOrw-Hill, 1945. pp. 361-73. 
%irBobmBn, op» elt,» pp, 19^ • Shis author has developed a statistical 
izidex of foreign trade as an instrument of national power. 
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the grand scale, Soviet Russia, once an exponent of internationalism, 
has become perhaps the most nationalistic of all. 
Yet if anything has been demonstrated^ it is the fact that national 
security Is unattainable by any one country. It can only be attained 
in Borne kind of new power equilibrium, some international authoriiy 
>vhioh can override any lesser force. But in the long run, it must 
involve the aoceptanoe of that authority as an idea, not as imked force. 
And no one can forecast the time that would require. 
For the present, at least, the establishment of some such equil<> 
ibrium is still in doubt-. T\ro possible power combinations appear most 
likely j (l) Thud regional blocks, of the east and vest} or (2) the 
establishment of "universal monard^**. The atomic bomb has come vexy 
near to conferring upon the United States, should it so desire, -the power 
to establish such' a univenal mozuurcl^. It is ooncei'vable that through 
some concert of power v:ith the rest of the essenl^ally 'neetera nations, 
eoupled with this country*s use of -Uie atomic bomb, an intermtional 
sUthorit^ might "ba established. 3he advisability of such a use of the 
atomic bomb has been submitted by Dr. Hturold C. TTrey, one of the leading 
contributors to its dewlopment. ^ 
^Cf. The Chicago Sun« Vol. 5, No. 259. August 19, 1946« 
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CHAPTER 711I. 
BBQUlfiBMBNIS FOR COOKDIHATBD ASHICULiaRAL AND THACE POLICIES 
Zf it 13« assumed t^t some kizid of political stabilii^ will eveatu-
ally emerge at the intematioxial le^el (a necessary, if not an entirely 
reatListio assvmipticn at the moment) it becomes possible to consider 
the problem of organisation for greater political stabili't^ at the 
mtional level. The problensin the two areas are not unrelated; a 
politically stable and economically strong United States will be the 
most importanb force in world stability. 
Both national and international instabilily are the product of a 
^ole new set of political forces created by the quest for security^ 
particular]^ economic security, that have developed out of rapid change 
and the shifting incidence of control* Bainsod and Gordon, in their 
study of the changing role of gO"TOmnwnt in the American eoonony have 
observed J 
The organisation of economic interests to influence policy 
has Increased in scope and intensi-fy with the expansion of 
governmental aui^ori'l^ in the eoonomio realm* Uazqr have ex­
pressed concern lest the tendency of organized groups to put 
primary emphasis on -idieir own economic interest lead to a 
dispersive type of group utilitarianism ,*^ich completely loses 
sight of the general welfare and transforms the political arena 
into a "battle royal" of interests* That .this danger is real 
need not be denied*^• 
'S'lainsod and Gordon, op» eit> p* 45* 
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What is new la essentially the broadening of the base and the rise 
of powerful new political groups, especially among the less privileged 
elements of the population* This is itself a product of the extension of 
denooraoy piroduoed by the rapid growth of toohnology, the rise of mass 
production, improwment in scales of living - a change in expectations*^ 
But it is a process with which the institutions of democracy have 
nob kept pace* For the changing teobxiology has increasingly required 
that men do more things togettier, a process in which the single individ­
ual counts for only a small part. She very complexity and anouymity of 
the process affords little association with the vital econootio organisati(di, 
exoept insoflar as it is expressed in contact with those having like needs 
and like problems* 
More and more groups, operating through govemaent and by indepmd-
ent aotion# have developed policies and aeted in conoert to influence 
the market, to influence the distribution of incomes which are the product 
of the whole cooperative process* 
Politioians rise to power through representing the interests of these 
groups and getting their demands translated into legislation* This too 
is a process of mutual aid, of combination among legislators to secure 
the benefits of the total authority for those with the power to oommand it* 
An important eonsequenoe has been that governments, or government 
agencies, have been intervening to an ever greater extent in i^e use of 
^Ortega y Gasset, Jo8e« 3he Revolt of tJie Masses* New York, Norton* 
1932. 
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TariouB rosouroes in order to inorease the welfare or seourity of 
special groups. 
^riculture's use of its political strength to achieve "parity" 
has been discussed at length. That policy, together with its ideolog­
ical overtones, its -mlue associations, is part and parcel of the vhole 
welfare tendency of the times. 
Agriculture stands to lose from the increase in trade only if it is 
regarded as a unit. Some agricultural products - tobacco, fruits, and 
perhaps cotton * would gain, at least for a tiins from expanded trade* 
In achieving effective organization, however, in the use of polit* 
ioal pofwer to achieve "equality", agrtculture has, of necessity, had 
to be extended to cover a large percentage of those YAXO farm* And the 
tendency has bem to rigidlCy agriculture in existing patterns, without 
full regard to the best use of rosouroes. 
Thus, in acting to determins what the level of prices of agricultur­
al commoditxes shall be, and in effect using existing patteras of agri­
cultural production to determine hovr "income" shall be earned, sep­
arate policy for agriculture has emerged as an important constraint upon 
the proposed foreign trade poli<^ - not the only constraint, certainly, 
but given the stnicture of the American econcmy, the most important con­
straint upon the possibilities of gains through a more efficient use of 
resources for the United States and the world* 
Zhis phenomena is not one that is peculiar to the United States* 
It is given detailed treatment by Ropke^ in his study of decline of 
Industrial Countries," pp* 111-161 and Part 7, "Ihe Industrialization 
of Agrarian Countries*" pp* 165-197* 
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international trade. In fact, an imporbant eleisents in the growth of 
oompetitive ziationaliBm has been the intezrention of governmenta in 
the interest of groups and classes to protect them against adjusfeneixts 
made necessary by the growth of new teohniquea and the opening of now 
lands. Thus, industrial countries have been cut off from raw materials, 
agricultural areas have been cut off from mrkets, the quest for col­
onies, the growth of impeirialism, and ultimately the drive for lebens-
raum have been the result* 
Heed for a General Policy 
Resolution of existing conflicts between agricultural and foreign 
trade policy becomes possible only within the context of a more general 
policy. The sepaxtite policies of conflicting power groups can result 
only in eon^wromising the general walfarw unless or turtil -aiey can be 
resolved at a higher level of aiithority^ 
Only the national government with its greater weight, its political 
and financial strength, can effectively overbalance the increasing power 
of monopoly on the one hand, the mounting pressures of mass organization 
on the other* Only by an effective overall policy sufficiently objective 
to be generally applicable, can the cumlative struggle of opposing 
groups, destructive alike of economic progress and individual freedom 
be averted* ^or that struggle, unless resolved, mast lead in the end 
to t^e imposition of naked power by an authoritarian goverzunent of the 
rigjit or left* 
IKSiat would be the essential elements of such a policy, and how would 
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thoy differ from present govsrnmant participation in eoonomio life? 
Tho steady growth in the use of political power to force the 
interrontion of government in the jnaricet by a broadening circle of the 
eoonomio groups is best vieirad as a decline of belief in the free narket* 
A belief in that inarkst ms a useftil fiction so long as roen maintained 
their faith in it. Competition survived as long as it did, and to a 
certain extent still persists, because there were enough who acted o<»n« 
petitivttly to toake it work• It ms that behavior, and the belief in a 
normal price nAiich did,preserve the stability of the market. 
If all oould agree not to use their political power, and move back 
into effeotive competition, it might be possible to recreate the illusion 
and the reality of a free market* A belief in stability might, in time 
reMtablish sometdiing of a long-time noznal. 
So oomplete has the practice of seeking government intervention 
beeome, howBViBr« "Uiat it is unlikely that such an agreement oould be made 
and kept by all* Govomnent, in a democracy, is not something apart. 
Viihat is required^ howsver# is the establishment of a new procedure 
-ffhich can be made to wox^ and which can be believed* Iho rules of 
monopoly behavior, i^ich are to restrict resource use in order to naini-
tain price, will need to be replaced by a public policy drawn in the 
interest of the efficient functioning of the econtsny and established 
at a higher level* i^ich can command a belief in its ob;}ectivity and 
workability.^ 
"^T^nge, Frioe Flexibility and Employmen"^ p» 87, 
185 
Privata polloiaa hava sought stable prices as enids. fvibllo policy 
irould use thorn as a taeans to the attaizuneat Q£ a system of general 
welfare* 
!l!he General Polloy 
These are essentially the proposals of Lemer, for a controlled 
eoonoay, which oould regulate behavior in a manner least destruotive 
of freedom« and yet induce resource oimers to behave in a manner to 
promote the ooiSBon good. His starting point is the set of oircumstanoes 
-whiidi the classical eoonomists envisioned for a world operating under 
conditions of perfect oompetition* 
Thsse conditions ares (l) Prioes, determined in a free market, are 
taken as given* since no single prodaoer could hope to influence them 
by his small part in the naiicet. (2) The producer would produce to the 
point wfasrs his marginal costs equal his margiml revenue, (s) In the 
long run* mazicet prioe would tend to be equal to lowest avsrage cost of 
produotlon. All prices would equal the necessary cost of production* 
(4} Besources* or factors of production, would be distributed among all 
of the many firms and industries in such a way that their prioe (wage) 
would exactly equal their marginal produotivityi tdbe entire national 
product would thus be distributed among all oooperating footers aooord-
ing to their oontributlon to society* The national dividend would be 
at a naximum idth given available resources* Ihese resources would 
include those obtained by trade from foreign countries, also, since 
specialisation and trade would constitute the most efficient use of any 
given resource. 
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If laiaaeg falre had produced such results« it would hold rightful 
title a.s the True Eoonomio liberalism* But for several reasons it has 
failed to do so* reason is the faot that resources and technological 
processes are highly indiTisible* In oertain industries requiring 
eoonoiaies of scale* with large fixed cost, the tendencies are present 
for "aatural" monopoly. 
^ faot that go'vemment is not something separate an3 apart:, 
particularly in a democraoy is another* 
Wealth itself is an important source of poner to influence govern-
mentf and the faot timt men combine to protect their rights in property, 
that idiere interests conflict there is no objective way of choosing 
betwsen i^em, has resulted in the cumulative power struggle to influence 
goveimwnt and, in turn, to control the economio processes* These ar« 
the principal reasons for the growth of govemmenb control of economio 
life. 
"Ihe appropriate remedy is for government to destroy the powers 
„1 ^ 
of firms to influence prices.^ This it can do by attacking directly 
the problem of establishing an independent system of prioes vdiioh could 
be accepted as given because they could not be influenced* Backed by the 
financial authority of government, these prioes would be maintained by 
a process ihioh Leroer has billed counter-speculation* Government agencies 
would attempt to estimate prioes at vhich the supp^ and demand for staple 
^nier^ A*P. "Economio Liberalism in the Postwar World" in Postwar 
Boonomio Problems edited Isy Sv^our £* Harris* lioGraw-Hill, New York* 
1933* p. 129* 
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gooda vould be approximately equal* This price vould then be guaranteed 
by gOTTBrmnent* In ISiis "way, oonsuiners would mice purchases with the 
assurance that prices werennot going to ehgrnge* that they would not lose 
by buying now rather tiian later* or that they should rush to buy in •tiie 
present -to proteot themselves agaixist future price increases* At the 
same time« firms oould produce at the point idiere their mrginal costs 
'iffere equal to the price* . If .these prices were below average oost of 
production, the govemmont would need to make up the losses, and to 
insure the goods being produced* In shortj, government subsidy, by 
insuring tiie flill necessary oost of produotion iirauld remove the desire 
to rest^ot production for reasons of security, to proteot the omiers' 
investment* If necessary, government itself oould engage in buying and 
selling to insure a competitive price* 
In ana sense, this would mean taking the control of resources away 
from owners, but it would be an iz]direot way of doing it, through reli­
ance upon l^e natural inelimtlon of the entrepreneurs to inaximise 
their profits. It would bring about a separation between the use of 
resources and the earning of incomes* Ihe resource ovners, assured of 
their incomes, expand rather than restrict production* Society would 
benefit frcm VOB larger volume of goods and services* 
Xhs problem of income distribution oould then.be solved in an 
entirely separate way* It could move in the direction of greater -
equality, either throu^ raising the scales of living of the lowest income 
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reoeivere. or through proooeding directly to equalization.^ This could 
be dose means o£ the income tax. lOiatevBr degree of inequality vas 
foimd nsoessazy to provide the incentives to produce oould be arrived 
at from experience• 
Such prioes vrculd not be rigid eoid unchanging. For changing wants» 
changes in tei^ology^ etc., itould decree a shifting of resources from 
one type of produotion to another if the eoonomio system imre to do its 
job of getting the things produced that consumers 'want, and cutting dovm 
produotion of goods they do not mat. Ckmsequently* prioes tould require 
adjustment from time to time. If shortages or bottlenecks appeared, 
this would indicate that more resources should be devoted to their 
productioa. Prioes -would need to be raised in order to encourage 
resource owners to expand output. If» on the other faand« surpluses 
appeared, a transfer of resources out of their production would be indicat­
ed. Prices would need to be lowered. Losses incumd in the case of 
resources that oould not be transferred, or which oould be trazisferred 
only at a oost, would again need to be made up by subsidies* Thus, no 
resource owner would feel the need to rjroteot a less efficient process 
because of the investment he had tied up in it. Society as a whole 
would help to bear tiie oost because it would be the gaizier* 
Only in this way can it be hoped to offset the inclination of 
resource oimers to use the fUll extent of -Qieir private power to resist 
eoonomio progress. 
^lemer. The Economics of Control, op. eit. p9« 23-40. In a diapter 
on the optimum distribution of income. Learner develops on the argu­
ment for complete equality of income. However, this would only be 
approached as an ideal, and could be left to e:!q)erienoe to determine 
how nearly it should be approached. 
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Thoae propo8«ls« of ooursea bear close reaemblanse to mxsy 
partial sohamcs for control that ha%n» bean adopted or proposed - such 
things as minlmam resale prioe rnaintenanoey guaranteed prices 
for agriculture* These have not resulted in greater output, but in out­
put restriction* It is to be noted, however, that these measures have 
all been put forward as the pieoemeal controls by connoting pomr groups. 
Thay are rigid, inflexible prices liiioh are not changed. There have 
been attempts to increase -tiie income of one group at the expense of others. 
These measures could only be successful as pairt of a coordinated, ovex*> 
all plaa to oreate a pattern of induced behavior favorable to the accept­
ance of "given prices" based upon a conviction that -&ey are oos^>etitive 
prices. Only the govensoBnt has tbn authority neoessary to put behind 
such an experiment. 
Such a system has been propceed as an alternative to the aooial-
ieation of all instruments of production, which has been seen to create 
a government monopoly, ibe most powerful of all monopolies, to replace 
those that now exist. 
The Appropriate Agency 
What agency of government -would perform su<^ a function? 
On this point, Lemer and others are somewluit vague* Some have talked 
of a national planning board* But planning has an unpopular oonnotation. 
JL Price Control Board would be even less lilcely to be politically accept­
able. IShatever it might be called, it would need to be a separate, 
administrative agency. 
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Cosigress would be totally inadequate to suoh a taak« not so much 
beoause of incompetence as because of the nay it operates, as the 
representatives of -Hie oompetlng power eiroupe. These pressure groups 
are by no means of equal strength and lobbying ability* As has been 
seen« agriculture is especially favored in that body» as it is in a 
great many of the state legislatures* 
The tenden<^ for "debate and discussion" in Congress to resolve 
itself into increasingly unbridled poirer struggles, and a growing lim­
itation on abilil^ to oompronlse, is perhaps an indication of how 
violent some of these clashes have become in the confusion of present 
issues* 
IhuSf a first requirement for -Uhe establishment of a public policy 
is -Uiat the agenoy or agencies that administer it be once removed from 
the influenoe of pressure groups by being given a semi-independent status 
in the administrative branch of govemmont* It would require a fairly 
definite range for freedom of action, witii C<»igress, perhaps« determin* 
ing that range, but leaving the administrators free to operate within 
that range, in order to allow for flexibilii^ in the production process* 
In tiiis manner there could be established some autiiority at a 
higher level, not for detailed planning but for providing a set of 
constants to the entrepreneurs making decisions on how much to produce* 
And, by placing a premium on producing rather than not producing, all 
would gain through elimination of the stroggle for advantage* 
The question will inevitably arise nAiether i^iis does not mean setting 
up an econoonic dictatorship to regiment all of economic life for the good 
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of th® state* It is Sntorferonoe with individual freedom, to vihich can 
only be replied that there is and vill continue to be regulation. The 
only question to be solved is tiAiether control shall be in the interest 
of general -welfare, or piecemeal regulation which prcmotes ihe increas­
ing struggle for power. Over the longer run, the significant gains will 
need to be mass gains, and not suocessive advantages of sparring power 
groups. 
There is not a great deal of economic freedoTn involved isSxen the 
Secretary of the i^rican Wool Sroners* ''Association tells a congression­
al oommittee that if the country wants a domestic woolen industry it 
will have to pay an even higher tariff than it is now payingi when 
senators from wool-growing states oosfi)ine with the representatives of 
other special Interests to vote advantages at the expense of general 
welfare. %e rank and file of purchasers of woolen goods are never 
given the opportunity to express themselves on vdiether they would rather 
have American grown wool at a much higher prioe or Australian wool, of 
better quality« at lower prices. 
The Trade Poliqy 
Under a general policy of full resource use and expanding production, 
foreign trade would largely lose its distinctive features. For idiezwver 
goods of lower price were available from areas of greater efficiency, 
regardless of -vdiether they were outside the national! boundaxy, it would 
be an advantage to in^ort -tiiem rather ihan produce them. IDie principal 
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ooaasideration regarding foreign goods would be vdiether there would be a 
domestic demnd for them at the price at ndiioh they could be offered* 
Such a policy could well be considered as the paz«llel, at the natioml 
level, to the organiaation for international trade. There, too, the 
power conflict appears capable of resolution only by collective action 
to establish directly vdiat each country acting alone cannot achieve 
because of the constraints imposed by othsr ztations. 
The Agricultural Policy 
That part of a general policy whidi undertakes to influence the 
most economical use of the country's primary resources vould be concerned 
with their use tp secure the raw materials of food and fibre at their 
lowest average cost of production* The prices of agricultural products 
would Ihus be determined by the necessary costs for getting the quan­
tities produced to satisfy consumer demand* 
At the given prices, farmeirs would allocate their resources among 
the various commodities so as to maximize their profits. This -vsould 
be achieved T^ien the production of each cotrnnodlty was carried to the 
point where marginal costs were equal to the guaranteed price* The 
fazmer, relieved frcm the twin problem of att«apting to guess -a^t 
pricea are likely to be, and to compute costs under varying prices, 
could concentrate on costs* 
The application of the general policy to agricalture would be the 
same as in other industries * On the basis of historical infontation. 
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the adndxiietrative agency would Bet the prioe irtiioh appeared most likely 
to satisfy prospective demand with the amounts -tivat would be offered. 
The guaranteed psrioe would be announced in advance of planning for the 
next season's production* 
If, on the basis of the guaranteed prioe, shortages developed so 
that the market prioe was above the guaranteed prioe, it would be an 
indication that Ihe latter had been set too low. Accordingly, the 
assured prioe for the next year would be higher. If, on the other hand, 
surpluses appeared so that the nsarket prioe was lower, the difference 
would be made up to ihe farmers in "Uie form of a subsidy payment. But 
the guaranteed price for the next production period would be lower, 
indicating tkat resources should be transferred to other uses. 
Recojuaendations for such a prioe policy have been advanced by 
several students of the agricultural problem under the desigxmtion of 
« 1 
"forward pricing . Die technique was approached by the Department of 
Agriculture in its wartime price policies to secure expansion and shifts 
in production. 
The administration of such a policy would be confronted with & number 
of important characteristios of agricultural production as it exists in 
this countrys (l) Ad;)u8tments in farming take longer than in industry 
because of the longer period which must elapse between planning and the 
oompletion of plans, and because farmers have traditioiuilly been less 
^Cf, Sohultz, Agriculture in an Opstable Economy, p. 264. 
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inclined to ohangej the industi^ is also subject to greater uncertainty 
because of weather and pests, Trhich can cause a failure of plans to be 
realized; (2) because of past failures to adjust to structural changes 
in the economy and the higher birth rate, the number of persons in 
agriculture is greater than would be required by an effidient industry; 
as a consequence, liie productivity of labor is lower, especially certain 
regions; present incomes tend to be lower, the education inferior; 
(s) as income increases for the eoonoay as a Kidiole, demand does not 
expand, proportior»lly, for many farm products; a rich economy in­
creases its consumption of the aunentties, better housing, personal 
services, quality products - rather thsua bulk food; accordingly, the 
most likely area for expansion in agriculture would be into the produc­
tion of these quality goods, and away from the products with smaller income 
elasticity of demand; (4) a number of high cost industries have been perpet­
uated by protection; among tiiem are wool, sugar, certain oil crops; 
high cost farms on sub-marginal and high risk lands are to be found in 
othex^se low cost farm industries; finally, (5) some resources in 
agriculture are so highly specialized that they cannot be easily con­
verted to other uses; therefore, a decision would be required on 
Ti^ether or not those resources should be kept in production by a 
permanent subsidy or be retired from use. 
Because of slow adjustment and wide variation in output, it may 
be desirable to maintain permanent stockpiles to absorb the shock of 
these irregularities and unpredictabilities. 
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Ihe transfer of human resources out of the areas of low productiv­
ity is likely to involve greater subsidies for education ai^ training. 
To compensate for the changing character of demand for agricultural 
products, incentives to farmeirs to expand into the service areas are 
likely to be the most useful* Special inducements for the developnsnt 
of a "service agriculture" "utoich would niake more extensive use of 
skills and capital, would bring greater returns to the farmer azxS a 
larger national dividend. 
Hie high cost industries in agriculture are currently the most im­
portant obstacles to expanded imports. They are an important element 
in the politics of agrio Iture under existing policy. By insisting that 
agricultus^ be treated as a -vfeole and guaranteed "parity" prices, they 
are acting to restrict the national income as well as world income. An 
example of Tihat "Wie consxaners now pay for the luxury of a wool industry 
can be illustrated by the following figuresi According to estimates 
presented by J«M. Jones, secretary of the .ftzaerican Wool Growers* As so-
ciation, before the House Ways and Means Canmitteo, 70 per cent of 
American wool is produced in Texas and 12 other western states. The 
inrestnenb in the industsy there« he estimated roughly $750,000,000. 
The annual mill constoaption of apparel wool before the war was around 
500 million pounds (grease basis) per year. Of this, about 20 per cent 
was imported. This meant an effective price Increase on all wool 
consumed by the amount of the teuriff. Vftth a duty of 34 cents per pound, 
V.S. Congress. House, op^ cit>^ p» 17S9. 
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the oouxzbxy as a v^olia paid an annual Bubsidy to the '«x>ol growers 
greater than the farm income derived from wool nfliich averaged approx­
imately $90 million during the five-year period preceding the wsir* 
The consumers of wool could support producers at their prewar income# 
with a net saving to themsevles; or t&e investment could be bought 
out and written off in a few years* 
One of the arguments most frequently employed by the wool producers 
to justify protection is the fact that the grasing areas are so highly 
specialized that l^ey could not be used for anything but sheep. Should 
these resources be kept in use 1:^ an annual subsidy (the difference 
betueen the grower's average cost and the guaranteed price vdxich is cal­
culated to satisfy the demand for wool) or should the resources be bought 
out and retired? The decision could be made on its merits when it arose. 
But there is considerable doubt that an advanced econoiny should 8uppoi*t 
an essenbially pastoral industry on its present scale. The ranges 
might well be more useful if stocked with game and used as recreational 
and hunting preserves. 
The question will be raised as to ;}u8t how much agriculture would 
shrink if such a policy ware applied* A positive answer is not possible. 
As a service agriculture e:)qpanded, the dividing line between that industry 
and tiie rest of the econony would become less distinct. Colin Clark 
estimates that about 15 per cenb of the population of an industrial 
oountxy would bs required in agriculture. 
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Riarl Brandt has vontured this opiniont 
If the industries expand because of the stimulus in the 
export end of their business they create more consumer 
purohasing power and offer new opportunities to quality 
producing farmers; thus a good deal of the slack in the 
farm business may be taken up within the field of agri» 
culture itself.^ 
This nay not be an entirely satisfactory ansiror to the advocates 
of famizig as a virtue* a way of life* To them it can be pointed out 
that an efficiently functicning modem agricultural plant, usixig the 
best resources and modem techniques, would still leave aiq>ls room to 
those -mho diose to fam for the good of their souls and were willing 
to take their incrane in puril^ of spirit. Fez^iaps, more seriously, it 
should be noted that time spent closer to nature and Idie out-of-doors 
need not be spent in farming* which after all has become a highly 
specialised business in its own ri^t« 
Thus, it is submitted that so long as the present power struggle 
continues, so long as a forthright attack upon the whole problem of 
political balance and eooaiOTiic progress is not faced, there can be no 
real solution to the world trade problem in other than a sporadic and 
unstable sense* So long as it is made an issue of power, agriculture 
is likely to remain -tiiis country's single most important constraint upon 
a rational abroach to world trade* 
During -ttw 1930*8 it became the fashion to believe that "nations 
can live at hone", to assume that the growth of science end the control 
, op« ctt», p« 248* 
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of the pl^loftl environment have obviated the need for trade* If this 
were true at all, whioh it obviously is not, it oould only hold for the 
richest mtions. She vast majority of men face no suoh prospeot, 
exoept at a very low level* 
Even if the world were altimately to see the prooesses of advanced 
tedhnology so evenly spread, the control of the material aepeote of 
life so oomplete, that the differenoes imposed by nature through the 
unequal distribution of resources and skills oould be written off, that 
tiae is obviously not yet* Nor is it likely to be the ease in aiQr 
finite future* Besolution of the real poverty of the world will require 
liie efforts of many generations, even if eonplete agreement as to pro» 
oedurss and nethods were attainable* The task of education alone is 
•nozmous* 
Only vdien that prooess is ooBiplete should it be possible to say 
with Ksynest 
Ideas, knowledge9 hospitality, travel > these are the 
things li^ich should of their nature be international* 
But let goods be homsspun, if^enever it is reasonably 
passible, and above all else let flnanoe be primarily 
national*^ 
Prospects for Achieving a Ohified Policy 
Ifhat are the prospects for attaining the agreement necessary to 
the achievement oC a general polity for stability aztd eoonomio progress 
^K^ynes, J*M, "Batloml Self Sufficiency'*, Yale Itoview, Vol* 22, 
June 1935. p» 757» 
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within mdiioh agrioultura.1 and trade polloy might cease to be constraints 
upon each other? 
!Ihe fixial determination of that agreement will be made in aotion, 
not in -thought# Conflicting valuations which are the product of the 
power struggle, still must find i^eir common level as the result of 
leadership and the will to pass -Qie issue on to some higher le-vel for 
final resolution* There a«n be no common denominator of agreement 
in a demoeratie society other than the will to agree • until men can 
be inspired to think in terms of an idea that is greater than themselves« 
and therefore -^ink alike. 
All will hinge upon agreements or oompromise that can be achieved 
at the highest levels If agreement oan be arrived at there» It will be 
easier to attain at the lower or national level. Yet the two are 
interdependent» and a solution of the problem of national stability 
and economio progress oould strengthen the leadership of the United States 
as the largest industrial nation. 
The power struggle» the valuations of the conflicting interest groups, 
presents the greatest difficult'. IQien leaders mxzt vie with each other 
for "tils support of these special interests« -t^eir very pronouncements 
on general policy must be couched in tenos so vague as to have little 
meaning* in order that they mean all things to all men. 
Yet, events do have a force of their own. All policies are exper­
iments, subject to empirical test in reality, and in the end imxst abide 
by the results* They set the limits, even to the extent to ifcidi any 
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part oan impose its will* its interests, upon the n^ole. 
Ihe reoexit re^lution in economio thought is such an adjustment 
to events, a recognition of the increasing role of government, of 
collective action, of the extent to n^ich men have heen forced to do 
more things together* 
!nie proposals of Lorner and others, to let the results of effic-
iency^ of the facts of economio e3cperience he the test for staking out 
the areas of collective enterprise ard of private enterprise, is itself 
a reflection of events* 
However, in the confusion that is the present, the prospective 
area of agreement does not appear to be large. As Sc^ults states 
in his review of the laad Grant College Association recommendations on 
postn&r policy* 
This couzAzy is hasioally unprepared for the postwar. There 
is plenty of dqgmt 60«000«000 jobs, free enterprise, and 
parity prices are sovas of them. But there are as yet no 
basic policies azd no agreed upon principles with regard 
to public and private action*^ 
He cites a report Guraiar Ifyrdal to the National EconoTnio Society of 
Sweden, in t^ich hs reported the results of his observations of the 
American scene during the war period. He was led to the conclusion 
that the prospects for this oountxy's jDaintainisg a high level of econom-
ic activity after the war were not particularly bright# He ascribes 
its unpreparedness to a growing optimism and a belief in automatic 
^Schults, ''Postwar Agricultural Foli<7**, op* oit., p.95* 
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businMa •acpasslon, aspeoUlly In bueiness oiroles. This, again, la 
an Indloation of the extent to itfiloh 'tiiepolioiea of the aeparate eeonomlo 
groupa may aot ae a ooxistrainb upon the attainment of a more genaral 
policy* 
More reoeat e'vents in the ooofliotixsg power atrugglea may have 
served aa a brake on that eet of TBluations an3 may b® ahaping the next 
phaae of the experiments in induced behavior. 
DeYalopasenta in Agricultura 
Changea iiq>osed by the var experience ha've speeded certain dersl-
opmenta in agriculture ^ ioh nay make an acceptance of a general polity* 
by f&raera easier. Ft'oduction has expaiided between one-fourtdi and one-
third* Ibe greatest increase has been in meat, dairy products« Tegetablea 
and the oil oropa. Ihia has been in part to satiaiy the demand of a 
full employment* hi^ income econony* It tias partly a stimulated ex-
pension through price inducements and assurances of price mintenanoe 
during reopnversion* !Qias» resources have been transferred to the 
quality products liiich a countxy consumes as it becomss rit^r* Some 
of -^eae reaouroes have been made available through the inoreased meohanr* 
is at ion of agriculture, and the release of land from feed production. 
( 
These increases are likely to be sustained. The 'nar has also been an 
in^ortant influenoa in shiftizig farm people out of agriculture* Biany 
ara likely not to return to farms, if a hi^ level of industrial aetiv>-
iiy oan be maintained* 
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Th® u>9 of subsidies for purposes of stimulating produotioa in 
areas of greatest need during the war has established a basis in ex­
perience for induoix^ the transfer of resouroes according to predeter­
mined i^oals. But subsidies are not popular with fanners, or wi-Hi 
Congress. Yet should the failure to maintain prices in the face of 
mounting surpluses force l^e abandonment of other measures, their con-
timed use is & possibility* 
The joining together of farmers for ooonomie and political purposes 
has had some effects favorable to the developnent of the "service" type 
of agriculture characteristic of farming in a high income economy. The 
slow growth of farm oooperatives can be regarded as part of the process 
idiereby farmers are maixxtaining control over their products through 
more advanced stages of processing and maziceting, providing the avenues 
of easier txvmsition into seoondaxy and teiisiary industries, and anay 
from the concentration on rav material production*^ This in itself, 
would not neoessarily oreate an attitude among farmers favorable to the 
Doane» head of a large fain management sei*7ice, tdio has had 
-wide experience in different i^pes of farming in this country, out­
lined to an Iowa State College seminar late in 1945, proposals for 
idiat he called the **vsrtical integration" of farming, fie proposes 
that farmers expand tiieir enterprises upward by maintaining control 
of iheir products through more advanced stages of processing. What 
he is mooimending, of course, is that farm peoples perform more of 
the services associated with food and fibre production, securing 
the returns for parts of the production processes formerly done by 
others* Thus, the hel^tenlng consciousness among some fiarmers that 
/tiieir greatest econcsaic advantage, and seeidtles;must eventually lie 
in the direction of the "service" agriculture. Another development 
in the dlreotion of tying ibod production more closely to purely 
domsstio oonsumption has been the growth of a practice among large 
restaurants^ canning oos^anieSf and food processors to have their 
own farms to assure qualii^pproduots* 
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Imports of raw materials, sinco, as has been seen, the daiii^ cooper-
atiires have been the most bitterly opposed to tariff reductions. How­
ever, the need for <dieaper feeds might evontaally modify that attitude, 
particularly among the dairj"- producing areas nearest to cheap -water 
transportation. 
Present Impasse of the Power uroups 
Results of the heightened power conflicts have been a sharpening 
of the issues between the general welfare and the special interests 
of the pressure groups. The greater inclusiveness of labor organ­
izations, particularly in transport and comnsuiioations, lias, during 
the rsoonversion period, repeatedly prolonged-periods of shortages 
and added to the inconvenience and suffering of -vriiole cities. This 
haa rest>lted in a growing demand for government intervention, the 
use of the powers of goveroment to offset the pcwers of special groups, 
although this demand has been mostly one sided. 
Xhere are indications also, Idiat despite the favored political 
position in iriiich agriculture now finds itself, the public -will not 
continue to aooept the unbridled extension of a pricing polity -whioh 
forces increased ejcaotiona from the domestio market. Aotivities of 
the Farm Bloo and its repeated attenpts to exempt agricultural 
products from price ceilings, even daring the -war,have done much to 
discredit parity as a sacred symbol. The large scale income shift in 
favor of agriculture since 194:1 has gone far to undermine ?daa-be-ver 
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claim to speoial treatment agriculture my haTe had during the 1920*8 
and -fee dark days of the depression. So acute had feelings beocms 
during the nartime struggles over price control that John D, Black, 
long in th© forofroffb of the struggle for agricultural "justice", 
felt impelled to prepare a semi-popular treatise in irfilch mi exten­
sion of parity to other groups - business and labor - -was adTOoated, 
To call for parily all round, however, is analogous to Calvin 
Coolidge's famous statement that he favored a tariff "-tiiat would 
benefit everyone". Parity, like the tariff, is an instrument of 
special benefit, not adapted to general welfare purposes as a basis 
for long-run poli<^. It sez^s its pujrpose as a device for raising 
farm prices* Its usefulness is chiefly for -tiiat end. 
Mounting general resentment may become a faotor in the final 
resolution of the cusnilative power struggle of the separate groupis, 
and their sublimation to the general welfare* But it could result 
on^ in curbing one or two groups while leaving others unrestrained. 
Should present resentmezzi; take the form of a naive return to faith 
in some kind of lalssee-faire, the inclination to "let business do it, 
the essential issues of this study stay be postponed but left nn-
settled. The prospects of getting either freer trade or a more 
general economic policy would be slight. The party most likely to 
present suoh a program is one with strong agricultural backing. It 
is likewise the long-time party of protection. 
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CHAPTER IX. 
SUMU&fiY 
PART I. 
In study, oertaln of the oonfllets between thia oountxy's 
agricultural and foreign trade policies have bean presented* 
The proposed program of the n«S, State Department seeTcs an expansion 
of foreign trade. Eacisting agrioultural policy requires a reserved 
domestio narket« 
fixpanded vorld trade oould serve a uselUl purpose for tiiis oountxy 
in the full utilization of its most important resoaroes • its advanoed 
industx^al plant and its large capital and credit resources* Capital 
invested Abroad by this country oould help to raise the standards of 
living of devastated and baolmard areas« But it will require imports, 
mostly of agricultural and raw materials. 
The i88ue« however, is conplex and is more clearly seen as a con­
flict betnean economic forces or principles and political forces. 
The present period is oharaoterised by an increasing use of polit-
ioal power as a determining factor in the economic sphere* The develop­
ment of a separate agricultural policy is one phase of the power conflict* 
Policy can be defined as an experiment in induced behavior which 
individuals and groups adopt or have imposed upon them to nske social 
action more predictable^ The growing number of pressure groups, each 
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attraptiag to impase its oim eoonomio polioy on the whole, has resulted 
in inoreaslng power oonfllotSf the oumulatiTe struggle for power 
creases instaMllty and makes the future e'ven less stable* Fieriods of 
great politioal struggle are tines of retax>ded eoonomio progress* 
WhereTOr the separate policies of oompe'ting poiver groups oan be 
brou^t into equilibrium^ through agreement on oommon ends or values, 
or by being imposed, eoonomio proganesa has beoone possible* Behavior 
is institutionalised and men's efforts are directed toward eoonomio 
pursuits* 
It is a oharaoteristio of power stxtiggles that they have had to be 
zvsolvisd at higher and higher levels of authority* Duriixg the ei^teenth 
and nizieteenth centuries the rise of national states contributed to a 
rssolntion of the power struggles and a process of unification* 
A balance of world political forces existed during the latter part 
of the ninetcenUi century, largely as a result of British Dominance on 
the seaa* Expcuisioa into tindeveloped areas was also a stabilising in-
fluenoe* 
Through the process of .rapid technological development and change, 
hoamver, there has ocourred a vast shift in wealth and influence both at 
the national and international levels* The modem markets have tran» 
seended natioml boundaries, rsduoed distances, and given rise to an 
unstable world poli-tioal situation in K^ioh unlimited national sovereignty 
meant inoreasing oonfliots* 
\ 
Inside the state, the inereasingly otxoplex teohnoIogioaX processes 
require that loen do more things collectively* The area of complete free­
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dom of individual action has been reduced* An increasing sphere of 
Public Policy ia the result* The separate policies of pressure groups 
as they find expression in public policy, howeirer, have become in­
creasingly contradictory• 
Until these political conflicts can be resolved at both levels, 
econcmio progress vill be more difficult. 
PART II 
the ohanging role of agriculture as a factor in this countzy's for-
•eign trade policy 'was traced as a background to the develojnnent of a 
separate policy for agricsulture. 
The protectionist foreign trade policy developed during the Nine­
teenth eentuzy nas presented as the policy of industry. Farmers frequent­
ly opposed it* Scsne of them occasionally supported it. But t^e farraers 
were ividely scattered, with divergent interests of their own, and as a 
consequence their voice in that policy was small* 
Foreign markets were important to them* UShenever those markets 
were good, the farmer was in favor of lower tariffs* li^en depression 
was the rule, he usually acquiesced, and sometimes supported tariff in­
creases* Because the demand for agriuultural exports was inelastic, the 
high tariJff policy did not affect the agricultural exports as much as 
might have been expected, until nawsr areas began to be opened up* 
During the atta<& on the trusts by western farm organisations, the 
tariff also attacked as a breeder of monopoly•> Howetfer, when the 
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free silver issue was at its peak, the tariff issue was segleoted. 
Just prior to Vforld War I, sentiraent fcsr lower tariffs -mas fairly 
strong among the farm groups, and their support mis an important factor 
in the election of Woodrow Wilson on a platform pledged to lower tariffs. 
After the nmr, however, which had promoted great expansion in 
agriculture, farmers became highly protectionist* This waa partly due 
to the fisiot that the foreign outlets had "been dwarfed by the large 
domestio markets, partly because of depressed conditions in the industry 
itself. Attention during the 1920*8 was directed to the tariff 
effective for agriculture* The "farm bloo^ was an is^ortant faotor in 
the passage of the Smoot-Hawl^ tariff of 1930, 
But the development of a separate policy for agriculture was more 
the result of agrieulture's increasing political influence. Parii^ for 
agriculture, conceived as a deprassion measure, has become increasingly 
a faotor in the faznnsr's insistence upon a resezved market. 
An e^Amination of the attitudes of most important agricultural organ­
izations shows them to be, with few exceptions, unalterably opposed to 
concessions on the impoirt of agricultural commodities. A major part of 
the oppositiozi to the 1945 extension of the Bseiprocal Trade Agreements 
aot cane from representatives frcra agricultural districts. 
The separate development of this country* s foreign trade policy after 
192S and particularly after 1934 show it to be a reflection of the needs 
of en advanced industrial eooanDay. 
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PAHX III 
Trade has beoome a function of the State Department* and an in-
strunent of foreign poli<^« 
Commitinents to trade expansion are substantial. The proposals for 
a Ivor Id trade authority whicsh -will effeotiirely remove the inoenti've and 
the ability of individual countries to restrict trade^ ms exsmined as 
part of this oourttxy's program for world stabilii^ and trade. 
Hoimrer* it is submitted tba.t unless and until a more general 
eoosonic policy for settling the problems of the cumulative power struggle, 
dcoestioaltyy have been adopted* agricultutal policy will continue as a 
constraint upon this country's trade policy and its leadership. This 
oan be acooaplished best by a general policy lidiieh can restore confidence 
in a stable and progressive econonic development. 
Proposals ivere examined for the use by the natioml government of 
its greater financial end eoonomio power to stimulate production by a 
system of sustained prices and subsidies for staple products. 
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